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Today’s religious landscape is one that invites reflection on the place of faith, its cultural 
connections, and its future. This is, in part, due to the various religious sensibilities at play in 
the present time. On the one hand, there is an attraction to a structured, doctrinal-based form 
of religion that asks one to recognise a particular authority and to surrender to it. On the other 
hand, there is a decline in the explicit practice of religion. Our places of worship reflect these 
dwindling numbers, rows of once full pews now standing empty as attendance falls. There are, 
of course, several reasons for this decline. Many simply cease practicing, while still professing 
themselves to be believers; others are drawn to non-Christian religions and New Age practices; 
and some claim that they have allegiance to any religion. There is, of course, a middle-ground 
between the two religious sensibilities, which will be the focus of this dissertation. This middle-
ground constitutes the reality, and the difficulty, of developing a religious life in contemporary 
culture. It might be best understood in terms of a search for faith and meaning without, often, 
adhering to any particular doctrinal framework or authority. Many are choosing to follow their 
own instincts in searching for something that will provide a spiritual nourishment or 
enrichment for their lives. While the goal is to encounter something that lies beyond our own 
selves, the seeker and their own personal experience remains at the heart of this spiritual quest. 
As a seeker, one is free to search, to engage with others, and to express oneself without being 
confronted with a set framework of beliefs. This middle-ground is not necessarily free from all 
Christian influence; many events, courses, and spiritual practices are rooted in Christianity, yet 
retain the freedom for participants to ask and to answer without being restricted by the 
parameters set by institutional religions. This search for meaning marks a shift away from the 
emphasis on institutions and beliefs, focusing more on the pragmatic and experiential elements 
of faith as a way of life. 
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 The current religious landscape, and the difficulties of coming to faith in such a setting, 
provides the backdrop for this dissertation. How indeed might we access, or come, to faith in 
contemporary culture? I will explore this question in relation to the work of Gianni Vattimo 
and how one might come to faith from the perspective of his writings. I will, for example, tease 
out his thinking on the use of sacred and secular space in our engagement with works of art as 
an opening up to the religious dimension of life. In considering this position, it is important not 
to confuse framework with content. Indeed, many practices that are not affiliated with a formal 
framework or institution may, nonetheless, act as a point of access to faith. In discussing the 
question of faith, this dissertation offers a contribution to fundamental theology. The pathway 
explored here is, of course, only one of the possible avenues left open to us for coming to faith 
in postmodernity, but, nonetheless, presents a fresh approach to such a question.  
Gianni Vattimo’s work may be understood as the intersection of his religious, political, 
and philosophical beliefs. Born in Turin in 1936, his education and upbringing were firmly in 
the Catholic tradition.1 He was, for example involved with the Catholic Action Group, 
(becoming a leader), and he was the diocesan representative of the Student Movement’s 
Catholic Action Group. He was, however, mainly involved with the group for socio-political 
reasons. During this time, he became friends with Umberto Eco, who was studying with the 
existentialist, Luigi Pareyson. Vattimo’s introduction to Pareyson was through Eco. Vattimo 
opted to study philosophy in order to combine his interests in religion and politics. His interest 
in politics and social justice grew, with his socialistic ideology eventually becoming too 
progressive for the Catholic youth groups with which he was still involved. He was asked to 
 
1 The details in this introduction concerning Vattimo’s personal history are drawn from the following 
publications: Santiago Zabala, “Introduction: Gianni Vattimo and Weak Philosophy” in Weakening Philosophy: 
Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed. Santiago Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2007); 
Gianni Vattimo with Piergiorgio Paterlini, Not Being God: A Collaborative Autobiography. Translated by William 
McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Gianni Vattimo, “Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality: 




leave. Following this, he was approached by the director of RAI, the Italian television network, 
and asked to do some television programmes and documentaries. He did so from 1955-1957, 
until the directorship of RAI passed to a director who was sympathetic to the Christian 
Democratic Party. The Party were behind some of the news censorship at the time, with which 
Vattimo was not comfortable. Simultaneously, Pareyson was encouraging him to teach, so 
Vattimo put an end to his television career and began teaching. Once again, his political 
activism proved too much and he was fired from his post after bringing some students to a 
demonstration against South African Apartheid in 1959. He did, however, continue to teach at 
the Rosmini high school in Turin until 1962. On finishing the Laurea at the end of 1959, he 
became Pareyson’s assistant. Pareyson had founded the Aesthetic Institute in the University of 
Turin and Vattimo assisted him with both his publications and with his teaching, sometimes 
substituting for him in his courses on aesthetics. On gaining his PhD, Vattimo taught aesthetics 
in Turin, from 1964 onwards.  
Vattimo spent two years in Heidelberg while undertaking his PhD, studying under Hans-
Georg Gadamer and Karl Löwith. Influenced by his reading of Heidegger, Vattimo began to 
interpret the God of the Bible in terms of the Heideggerian Being. This reading excluded the 
discipline of the Church, with which Vattimo was always at odds. His politics and professional 
work continued to intersect. He succeeded Pareyson as the chair of aesthetics and became the 
dean of the faculty, holding that position until 1983. While dean of the faculty, Vattimo and 
other academics were threatened by the Red Brigades, an anarchist group, for not being radical 
enough. He was involved with the Italian Radical Party at that time. These years were certainly 
formative for Vattimo. His entire discussion on weak thought, il pensiero debole, is, in part, a 
reaction to the terrorism of the Red Brigades. Vattimo does not, however, condone violence. 
Weak thinking maintains the dissolution of stable structures (or metaphysics), presented as 
solid certainties, that act as foundations or truths. Influenced by Nietzsche and Heidegger, weak 
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thinking claims that there is a plurality of truths, rather than reducing everything to a single 
ideology. Crucially, for Vattimo, while Nietzsche and Heidegger focused on the dissolution of 
any such structures, they did not propose a new philosophy to replace them. This way of 
thinking is hermeneutical, allowing for various experiences and interpretations rather than 
adhering to a single version of ultimate truth. It appeals and announces, calling for a response 
instead of demanding.  
While Vattimo’s political and philosophical beliefs influence his understanding of 
thought as being weak, il pensiero debole, so too do his religious convictions. For him, the 
incarnation is an event that, at its core, includes a dynamic of weakening. Not only does it have 
a propensity for weakening, but, given Vattimo’s reading of René Girard’s work Things Hidden 
Since the Foundation of the World, he believes is a rejection of both violence and victimization. 
He maintains further that secularization is in fact a continuation of the process of weakening 
that began in the incarnation.  
This dissertation sets out to examine the form that faith might take in contemporary 
culture in light of Vattimo’s philosophy. The project aims to explore the possibility in his work 
of a way of coming to faith in a post-modern world that is reflective of the meaning of God’s 
action in Christ, the nature of the Godself, and the character of our own response. His thinking 
invites a reconsideration of metaphysics, its relationship with Christian faith, and what that 
might entail in a post-metaphysical age. The recognition that the Christian tradition has been 
marked by metaphysics, requires us to re-examine our approach to faith in light of what is 
understood by many to be the dissolution of metaphysics. The emphasis on the need for a new 
relationship with religion reflective of the current cultural climate is central to this discussion. 
The aim, then, is to explore a possible avenue through which one might come to faith in our 
culture that does not rely on a foundational metaphysics. 
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In order to facilitate the discussion, the thesis is structured tripartitely. To begin with, 
Part One focuses on Nietzsche and Heidegger as Vattimo’s work draws significantly on their 
thought. The primary focus is to show that we are always dealing with interpretations rather 
than ultimate, definitive truths. As regards Nietzsche, for whom interpretations can be 
understood as a response to a particular historical situation, our discussion includes a 
consideration of the past as a manifestation of historical malady and the eternal return. With 
regard to Heidegger, as Heideggerian Being underpins to a large degree Vattimo’s thought, it 
will be necessary to explore Heidegger’s work on Being, paying attention, particularly, to the 
ontological difference. Again, the central focus of this section of the thesis is the idea that we 
do not have an objective worldview; it is, rather, always coloured by our culture, background, 
and so on. Ultimately, Part One deals with the importance and centrality of the two German 
philosophers for Vattimo. Indeed, their thinking on the dissolution of strong metaphysical 
structures is a central theme in Vattimo’s work and, therefore, germane to this thesis. It is their 
respective emphases on nihilism and interpretation that ultimately facilitates Vattimo’s 
development of weak thinking.  
Part Two looks to Girard’s influence on Vattimo’s thought. I will examine, in particular, 
mimetic theory, which is Girard’s discussion of human interrelations. While focusing on the 
violence arising from mimetic desire, it connects religion, culture, and violence. This is 
grounded in Girard’s recognition that primitive religion is centred on violence itself and on the 
means by which societies deal with such violence. In terms of Vattimo’s later appropriation, 
the crucial category here is myth. Key to Girard’s thought is the fundamental difference 
between the Gospels and traditional mythic accounts, which seek to cover up the outbreaks of 
violence in a community. The Gospels exposed the truth of what exactly happens when an 
outbreak of violence occurs, and, in this way, can be read and understood as a process of 
desacralization. Going beyond Girard, Vattimo views these same dynamics in terms of his own 
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discussion of weak thinking. Girard’s work offers Vattimo a further foundation on which to 
develop his thinking on violence in conjunction with social justice, the political, and religion. 
The section will also discuss Vattimo’s particular understanding of what he considers to be the 
core tenets of Christianity. It will show that, while his work demonstrates a departure from the 
more classical metaphysics associated with Christianity, he retains what he considers to be its 
central teachings.  
While Part One and Part Two of the dissertation focus on the fundamental influences 
and themes underpinning Vattimo’s work, Part Three will be the culmination of this discussion, 
offering an exposition of how one might access faith from Vattimo’s perspective in 
contemporary culture. Taking up the theme of myth explored in the previous section, here, the 
connection between philosophy and religion will be examined as expressed through lived 
experience in myth. Because of the dissolution of strong metaphysical principles, or truths, 
Vattimo maintains that a new theory of myth that takes this into account is required. In addition, 
he maintains that a new understanding of the relationship between religion and secularization 
is necessary for the same reason. In order to explore what such a new understanding of the 
relationship between religion and secularization might entail, this section will focus on 
Vattimo’s understanding of aesthetics, which raises questions that are of particular concern in 
contemporary culture. An example here might be the use of sacred and secular space in our 
engagement with works of art. Continuing the discussion of art as an opening up to the religious 
dimension of life leads to a discussion of the eschatological and prophetic character of art itself, 
recognizing art as a message or form of communication that calls on us to respond.  
As a whole, the dissertation seeks to show that Vattimo’s thought invites us to engage 
in new explorations of the possibility of faith in contemporary culture. Of course, the 
dissertation discusses only one possibility of coming to faith that is independent of a 
foundational metaphysics. It does, however, illustrate that Vattimo’s work offers a pathway for 
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a renewed engagement with the religious tradition, opening up possibilities for serious 
reflection with regard to religious questions amid the changing cultural conditions of life. The 
thesis will emphasize that, ultimately, for Vattimo, there remains the hope that we can still 
glimpse the God at the centre of weak thought, and that faith itself continues to be a possibility 
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Chapter One     
 
Only Interpretations: Vattimo’s Reading of Nietzsche            
 
1.0 Introduction 
Nietzsche’s thought features extensively throughout Vattimo’s writings. In particular, 
his understanding of nihilism plays a central role in the Torinese’s work. This chapter 
begins by considering the origins of his interest in Nietzsche, both academically and 
politically. Following on from this, attention is paid to Vattimo’s understanding of 
Nietzsche’s nihilism, focusing on active and passive nihilism. We will see that the 
figure of the artist is the one best able to face the challenges thrown up by nihilism. For 
Vattimo, nihilism and historicism form the basis of Nietzsche’s philosophy, developing 
together throughout his work. Because of this, the chapter next discusses our 
relationship to the past in the light of Nietzsche’s concept of the historical malady and 
the eternal return.  
Continuing the discussion of Vattimo’s understanding of Nietzsche’s thought, the 
chapter’s focus shifts to Nietzsche’s appreciation of culture. This begins with an 
exploration of the relationship between philology and philosophy that shaped 
Nietzsche’s writings. Here, the focus is on Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy out of the 
Spirit of Music, with its discourse on the Apollonian and Dionysian drives that, 
according to him, epitomize Greek culture. The next section will explore how 
Nietzsche’s experience as a philologist formed his understanding of truth. Our 
perception of what is true is coloured by our belonging to a particular era and culture. 
This leads, then, to an exploration of Nietzsche’s morality, encompassing his well-
known declaration that ‘God is Dead.’  
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The final part of this chapter deals with Vattimo’s treatment of Nietzsche’s 
thought concerning aesthetics. It opens with Vattimo’s exploration of the dichotomy 
between appearance and identity in Nietzsche’s work, considering the connection 
between excess and art. The penultimate section discusses the will to power, 
considering both the concept and the manuscript of The Will to Power. This leads to 
the very final section, which focuses on art and the will to power where we will see that 
art is the model of the will to power. The figure of the artist makes a reappearance as 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch, who is capable of living through the tragic element in 
contemporary culture. Essentially, what Vattimo takes from Nietzsche’s work is that 
there is no such thing as an ultimate foundation but only interpretation.  
 
1.1 Vattimo’s Understanding of Nietzsche’s Nihilism  
This section discusses some of the aspects of nihilism that are central to Vattimo’s 
writings on Nietzsche. Beginning with Vattimo’s early interest in Nietzsche, it moves 
to a more in-depth discussion of nihilism, dealing with active and passive nihilism. The 
next part explores Vattimo’s understanding of the development of Nietzsche’s thought, 
which, he maintins, is centred on nihilism and historicism. The section closes with a 
discussion of the historical malady and the eternal return.  
 
1.1.1 Nietzsche’s Influence For Vattimo 
Vattimo’s supervisor, Luigi Pareyson, encouraged him to study Nietzsche’s 
philosophy.1 Originally planning to study the work of the German philosopher and 
 
1 Vattimo studied at the University of Turin, receiving his degree, the Laurea, in 1959 under the 
tutelage of Luigi Pareyson. At that time, the Laurea was the highest degree that one could receive in an 
Italian university. Afterwards, he worked for Pareyson as his assistant, editing publications and 
occasionally teaching some of Pareyson’s courses on aesthetics. Further details are available in Santiago 
Zabala, “Introduction: Gianni Vattimo and Weak Philosophy” in Weakening Philosophy: Essays in 
Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed. Santiago Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2007). See 
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social critic, Theodor Adorno, Vattimo acted on his supervisor’s advice and, in the 
summer of 1960, began reading Nietzsche. Unable to read German at that time, and, 
with the works not yet translated into Italian, Vattimo read the French translations of 
The Birth of Tragedy and Untimely Meditations. He states that he enjoyed his study, as 
he found a common thread running through Nietzsche’s and Adorno’s work, believing 
that Nietzsche’s critique of modernity resembled Adorno’s critical perspective.2 His 
reading of Nietzsche continued in Heidelberg during the following summer of 1961. 
This time Vattimo read Nietzsche through a Heideggerean lens. As he was learning 
German at that time, he read Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche, which had been 
published in German. From then on, Vattimo began publishing on Nietzsche, with four 
essays dating from 1961-1967 collected in Ipotesi su Nietzsche.3 These essays compose 
the first four chapters of his volume Dialogue with Nietzsche: “Nietzsche and the 
Problem of Temporality,” “Nietzsche’s Vision of the World;” “The Problem of 
Historical Knowledge and the Formation of the Nietzschean Idea of Truth,” and 
“Philosophy as Ontological Activity.”4 The latter was also presented at the Royaumont 
Conference in 1964, in which Nietzsche was first treated as a major philosopher in 
France.5 Vattimo also delivered a lecture for the Italian Society of Philosophy entitled 
 
also Gianni Vattimo with Piergiorgio Paterlini, Not Being God: A Collaborative Autobiography. 
Translated by William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
 
2 See Gianni Vattimo, “Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality: A Biographical-Theoretical 
Interview with Luca Savarino and Frederico Vercellone,” Iris 1(2009): pp 311-350. For more on 
Adorno’s and Nietzsche’s critiques of modern culture, see Karin Bauer, Adorno’s Nietzschean 
Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of Wagner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1999).  
 
3 Gianni Vattimo, Ipotesi su Nietzsche (Turin: Giapichelli, 1967). 
 
4 Gianni Vattimo, Dialogue with Nietzsche, trans. William McCuaig. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006. Originally published as Dialogo con Nietzsche: Saggi 1961-2000 (Milan: 
Garzanti, 2000).  
 
5 See Alan D. Schrift, ed, Poststructuralism and Critical Theory’s Second Generation (Acumen, 
2010; reprint Oxon: Routledge, 2014). The French interest in Nietzsche increased after Heidegger’s 
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“Who is Heidegger’s Nietzsche?” which became the first chapter for his book Essere, 
storia e linguaggio in Heidegger.6 In 1964 Vattimo gained his first official teaching 
post, which was in the University of Turin; the first course he offered was on Nietzsche. 
Later, he hoped that his 1974 publication Il soggetto e la maschera: Nietzsche e il 
problema della liberazione would become the ideology for the radical libertarian Left.7 
Although the Torinese failed to realize these hopes for Il soggetto; nonetheless, the 
result of the publication was that Vattimo was accepted into the company of politically-
active Nietzscheans. He lectured on Nietzsche, Marx, and nihilism to the newly elected 
Left-wing councils of 1975.8  
The troubled political situation in Italy from the 1960s to the 1980s significantly 
influenced Vattimo’s thought on Nietzsche. Social conflict was widespread and 
terrorist acts were carried out by both Left-wing and Right-wing groups during this 
time. The period is known as the ‘Years of Lead’ (Anni di piombo), which is a reference 
to the number of bullets fired during the unrest. Student activist groups sided with the 
 
publication in 1961. Royaumont, an international colloquium on Nietzsche was held in 1964. Along with 
Gianni Vattimo, scholars such as Michel Foucault, Karl Löwith, and Gilles Deleuze attended it. The 
second conference solidifying Nietzsche’s place in the French philosophical canon was held in Cerisy-
la-Salle in June 1972. This took place over a ten-day period with many leading philosophers present. 
Indeed, according to Alan Schrift, the focus on Nietzsche changed the French philosophical landscape; 
for example there was a greater emphasis on the nature of language, which reflects Nietzsche’s 
background and interest in philology (see Alan D. Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: 
Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction [New York: Routledge, 1990]).   
 
6 Gianni Vattimo, Essere, storia e linguaggio in Heidegger (Turin: Edizioni di Filosofia, 1963).  
 
7 Vattimo hoped, specifically, that Il soggetto would form the basis for a communist newspaper, 
Il Manifesto, as it examined Nietzsche’s work in the light of liberation.  Gianni Vattimo, Il soggetto e la 
maschera: Nietzsche e il problema della liberazione (Milan: Bompiani, 1974). See Lieven Boeve and 
Christophe Brabant, eds, Between Philosophy and Theology: Contemporary Interpretations of 
Christianity (Ashgate Publishing, 2010; Reprint, Oxon: Routledge, 2016); see also Gianni Vattimo, 
“Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality: A Biographical-Theoretical Interview with Luca Savarino and 
Frederico Vercellone,” Iris 1(2009): pp 311-350. See also Stefano G. Azzarà, "Left-Wing 
Nietzscheanism in Italy: Gianni Vattimo,” Rethinking Marxism 30, no. 2 (2018): 275-290. 
 
8 For details, see Vattimo, “Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality: A Biographical-Theoretical 
Interview with Luca Savarino and Frederico Vercellone,” Iris 1(2009):  311-350. 
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working-class factory workers, who conducted a mass series of strikes in what became 
known as the ‘Hot Autumn’ of 1969 in order to establish better pay and working 
conditions. The most infamous group of the period was known as The Red Brigades 
(Brigate Rosse), which was student led, Marxist-Leninist based, and dedicated to an 
armed struggle against a capitalist state. Vattimo was in danger at this time, as, although 
he was Left-wing, he was not considered revolutionary enough by the Brigate Rosse. 
Even though they wanted him to join the movement, they required him to renounce his 
work Poesia e ontologia. He was not prepared to do so. Subsequently, Vattimo received 
threats from the Brigate Rosse. Other academics that did not hold with the terrorism of 
the Brigate Rosse were also threatened. Though placed under surveillance by the police 
for his own protection, Vattimo eventually fled to Tuscany.9 His experience during the 
Anni di piombo significantly affected hid philosophy, particularly his reading of 
Nietzsche. The reality of the Leninist attitude of the Brigate Rosse was, he realized, 
completely at odds with what he had held as revolutionary in Nietzsche’s work. Indeed, 
his own students were responsible for this realization as several of them were arrested 
during the worker’s strikes, corresponding with Vattimo while they were in prison. It 
was in reading their letters that the Torinese came to the conclusion that the type of 
deception that the students practised in convincing themselves that they were workers 
and joining the worker’s protests, did not, after all, correspond with Nietzsche’s 
liberated subject. The “liberated subject” that Vattimo refers to is Nietzsche’s 
“Overman” or “Übermensch.”10 While Vattimo had previously understood the 
Übermensch as a revolutionary, the events of the Anni di piombo brought him to the 
 
9 See Vattimo, “Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality.” 
 
10 The Übermensch is liberated because they are able to set aside the principles that they were 
raised with and face new challenges as they arise, with their own interpretation of the world. 
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conclusion that this was not, as he had previously thought, a correct reading of 
Nietzsche.  
As the result of the terrorism of the Anni di piombo, Vattimo’s fresh 
understanding of Nietzsche marked a new chapter in the Torinese’s thinking. At that 
particular time, his philosophy was concerned with responding to two positions arising 
from his experiences of the Anni di piombo. The first position was concerned with a 
supposed political transformation that still contained elements of what it attempted to 
overthrow: “which promised a political transformation which was still imbued with 
authoritarian elements.”11 The second position looks to the possibility of simply 
replacing one foundation with another. From a Nietzschean perspective, it is not 
possible to replace the regime that one is protesting against; “the best that Nietzscheans 
can do is to conspire against the state, rather than attempting to found a new one.”12 
Should revolution wish to retain its own integrity, it cannot directly acquire political 
power. Vattimo’s new philosophical focus was a response to both the acts of terrorism 
and the self-deception of his students.  
 
1.1.2  Active and Passive Nihilism 
Vattimo claims that in his work regarding nihilism, which is the devaluation of our 
highest values, Nietzsche alludes to two responses to this devaluation or loss of 
meaning.13 These responses are namely, active and passive nihilism. Passive nihilism 
 
11 Vattimo, “Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality,” 319. 
 
12 Ibid., 328. 
 
13 Nihilism is derived from the Latin, nihil, which means nothing or what does not exist (Rex 
Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche [Chesham: Acumen, 2004], 57). Friedrich Nietzsche worked 
extensively on nihilism. His posthumous volume The Will to Power contains some of, what David Rowe 
describes as, his “most vivid ideas relating to this topic” (David Rowe, “The Eternal Return of the Same: 
Nietzsche’s “Value-Free” Revaluation of All Values.” Parrhesia 15 (2012): 72). Nietzsche understood 
nihilism as the devaluation of our highest values. While they once held meaning and value for us, they 
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accepts, in an attitude of despairing resignation, that the world is meaningless. Active 
nihilism seeks to destroy all remaining categories of valuation. “Nietzsche’s attacks on 
traditional religious, moral, and philosophical values such as God, metaphysics, truth, 
pity, compassion, humility, and the distinction between good and evil, can be seen as 
active nihilism in action.”14 Vattimo claims that they are best described in terms of the 
power of the spirit, or Geist. The word ‘Geist’ may be translated as ‘mind’ (also 
intellect) or ‘spirit.’ Both meanings are intended in Nietzsche’s work, referring at times 
to the mind (or mode of thought) of an individual or group, and at other times to their 
spiritual practices.15 For Nietzsche, power is not measured in bodily strength, but 
through reason. Indeed, reason, intellect, and spirit are all indicative of the same drive 
to which our passions may be reduced.16 Reason gives humankind the skills required to 
reach a conclusion based on evidence and logic, and it also allows us to control our 
impulses. “Foresight and patience, and above all ‘great self-mastery’ . . . that is, 
according to Nietzsche, of the very essence of Geist.”17 Those who are strong in spirit 
are those persons who have outgrown previous values that are no longer vitalizing. 
“The power of the spirit is increased, above all, by the dissolution of everything that 
 
no longer do so. The result of this is that there is no objective meaning; there is only the meaning that 
we ourselves give to something. There is nothing that we may hold to as fact, but, instead, there are many 
interpretations of the same. Nihilism is, for Nietzsche, a normal condition for humankind.  
 
14 Ashley Woodward, “Nihilism and the Postmodern in Vattimo’s Nietzsche.” Minerva: An 
Online Journal of Philosophy 6, (2002): 51-67, at 55. For further discussion of Nihilism in Vattimo’s 
thought see Ashley Woodward, Nihilism in Postmodernity: Lyotard, Baudrillard, Vattimo (Colorado: 
The Davies Group, 2009), see also Robert T. Valgenti, “Vattimo’s Nietzsche,” in Interpreting Nietzsche: 
Reception and Influence ed. Ashley Woodward (London: Continuum, 2011), 149-163. 
 
15 See Katrina Mitcheson, Nietzsche, Truth and Transformation (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 136. 
 
16 See Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1947), 29. 
 
17 Ibid., 230. 
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requires our acceptance of an objective structure, of a meaning, or of a value.”18 Active 
nihilism, then, is the attitude that is possessed by those who are strong in spirit.  
“Nihilism as a sign of the increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism . . . nihilism 
as a decline and retreat of the spirit’s power: passive nihilism.” 19 Those who are strong 
in spirit annihilate all that presents itself as an objective foundation. “For this reason, 
saying no is per se a sign of activity.”20 Vattimo believes that active nihilism 
corresponds to a far freer way of life since it creates new interpretations that are not 
presented as objective truths. Rather, those who reflect this position are fully aware of 
the hermeneutic structure of life and thought. “They correspond to a more adventurous 
form of life, which is free, rich and open.”21 In contrast, those persons that adhere to 
passive nihilism cannot present any interpretation as belonging to someone, but, 
instead, must always be portrayed as an objective truth. “In the form of life of the herd 
. . . no interpretation is strong and courageous enough to present itself as the 
interpretation of someone. It always has to appear as the ‘objective’ truth.”22 Thus, any 
sense of creativity or individuality is stifled. 23  
 
18 Gianni Vattimo, “Nihilism: Active and Reactive” in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: 
Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics eds. Tom Darby, Belá Egyed, and Ben Jones (Ottowa: 
Carleton University Press, 1989), 16. 
 
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and ed. R.J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Random House, 1967), 17, quoted in Gianni Vattimo, Dialogue with Nietzsche, trans. William 
McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 134. Emphasis original. 
 
20 Vattimo, Dialogue, 134. Reactive nihilism refuses to acknowledge the evanescence of values. 
“The attempt in twentieth century culture to resist nihilism through the re-establishment of a realm of 
use value or through humanism is seen by Vattimo as a type of reactive nihilism” (Marta Frascati-
Lochhead, Kenosis and Feminist Theology: The Challenge of Gianni Vattimo (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1998), 70).  
 
21 Vattimo, “Nihilism: Active and Reactive,” 17. 
 
22 Ibid. Emphasis original. 
 
23 See Vattimo, “Nihilism: Active and Reactive.”   
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Vattimo claims that Nietzsche fails to make a clear distinction between the two 
forms of nihilism. He further argues that the German philosopher’s notes for The Will 
to Power, to claim that the work points to the same conclusion. Vattimo draws on the 
fragment “European Nihilism” — a fragment found in Nietzsche’s late notebooks and 
dated 10th June, 1887 — to show the lack of a clear distinction between active and 
passive nihilism. This fragment’s sixteen paragraphs deal with the main themes in 
Nietzsche’s later works, including nihilism, and argues that these themes are central to 
European culture. It also discusses the historical development of nihilism in European 
thought, contending that it forms the basis of contemporary European life.24 “European 
Nihilism” offers a description of nihilism, which Vattimo sets out in his own Dialogue 
with Nietzsche as “the growing awareness of the senselessness of existence, the absence 
of purposes or goals, and the essence of Being as the will to power.”25 The weak suffer 
as a result of the absence of purpose, unable to hide behind the shield of values (be they 
religious, moral, or other) created by reactive nihilism. The strongest, those who are 
able to survive the loss of this facade, are those who are so sure of their own power that 
they have no need for such values. The artist, for Nietzsche, is best able to survive the 
loss of values. He defines the artist, whom he refers to as ‘tragic,’ by an ability to accept 
the more terrible aspects of life, such as evil and suffering. “The tragic artist . . . ‘says 
 
24 See Jeffrey Metzger, ed., Nietzsche, Nihilism and the Philosophy of the Future (London: 
Continuum, 2009); see also Nuno Nabais, translated by Martin Earl, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of 
the Tragic (London: Continuum, 2006). Europe’s heritage is rooted in Christianity, which means that 
European nihilism’s history is bound up with Christianity. Humankind was receptive to the morals that 
Christianity offered, due to the problem of suffering in the world. Christianity offered a solution to this 
problem in the form of an absolute value, contrasting to humankind’s own smallness and brevity. This 
also gave suffering a fullness of meaning as Christianity was life affirming. However, in time, the 
absolute truths that Christianity offered were undone, leaving the present European situation poised on 
the tension that resulted, as, on the one hand, we still have the same needs that made our predecessors 
disposed towards morality, on the other we are aware that these needs form the very ‘truths’ that we 
recognise to be untrue.  
 
25 Vattimo, Dialogue, 139.   
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yes to precisely everything questionable and terrible.’” 26 The artist’s acceptance of this 
instability, according to Vattimo, overrides the instinct for self-preservation, and so it 
is in the artist that we find a reckless pride or hubris. This hubris may be seen as a 
disposition to taking risks or a lack of need for objective, supreme truths or beliefs. The 
artists’ hubris may be seen as a kind of experimental courage.  
The artist who presents through appearance certain versions or segments 
of reality is contributing to a greater presence of life by virtue of 
amplifying reality, amplifying and highlighting the here and now, and 
not merely when it comes to life’s pleasant Romantic landscapes but 
precisely when life’s questionable and terrible manifestations are at 
stake — this is affirmation at its best.27 
 
The artist possesses the ability to rise and face the challenges thrown up by the 
absence of purpose.28 Indeed, it is only through leaving behind the instinct of self-
preservation and questioning that this hubris or courage is developed.29 “The possibility 
of an active nihilism is the capacity, to which the artist bears witness, to transcend the 
instinct of self-preservation and achieve a condition of moderation that also forms the 
 
26 Adrian Del Caro, Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 
78, emphasis original.  
 
27 Ibid.  
 
28 Vattimo, Dialogue, 140.  
 
29 The loss of self-preservation is particularly evident in modernity with increased technological 
advancement: the use of machinery, for example, allows us to extract fuels at an environmental cost to 
the planet, our shared home; “our whole attitude towards nature, the way we violate her with the aid of 
machines and the heedless inventiveness of our technicians and engineers, is hubris.” (Friedrich 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 
1967), 113, emphasis original). Even our attitude towards our own selves disregards the instinct for self-
preservation. "Our attitude towards ourselves is hubris, for we experiment with ourselves in a way we 
would never permit ourselves to experiment with animals and, carried away by curiosity, we cheerfully 
vivisect our souls: what is the 'salvation' of the soul to us today? ... We violate ourselves nowadays, no 
doubt of it, we nutcrackers of the soul, ever questioning and questionable, as if life were nothing but 
cracking nuts; and thus we are bound to grow day-by-day more questionable, worthier of asking 
questions; perhaps also worthier-of living?" (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce 
Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), 113, emphasis original); see also Gianni 
Vattimo, Dialogue with Nietzsche, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 140; see also Tyler T. Roberts, “"This Art of Transfiguration Is Philosophy": Nietzsche’s 
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basis of the heedless, disinterested hubris.”30 In order to further examine this 
‘disinterested hubris,’ Vattimo draws on Schopenhauer’s understanding of aesthetic 
disinterestedness. Schopenhauer maintains that we do not experience beauty and 
sublimity in the same way as we do other experiences. We become detached and 
uninvolved from the experience or the object that we contemplate. For Schopenhauer, 
this allows us to step back and view things more objectively. “The adoption of a 
disinterested attitude amounts to the adoption of a state of pure objectivity. For when 
we look at the world disinterestedly, we see it independently of our will, and therefore 
independently of our own individuality.”31 This experience is not entirely a passive one; 
Schopenhauer believes that it is active in the sense that we are aware that during this 
experience we lose our will and are reduced to what Schopenhauer describes as ‘pure 
will-less subject of cognition.’32 The aesthetic experience temporarily allows a person 
to disengage from both his or her desires and sense of self.33 Indeed, Vattimo believes 
that once aesthetic disinterestedness is taken into account, there is very little difference 
between active and passive nihilism. The figure of the artist, for the Italian philosopher, 
illustrates Nietzsche’s inability to distinguish clearly between active and passive 
nihilism. Active nihilism in the artist transcends the instinct for self-preservation; yet, 
this leads to the creation of the ‘disinterested hubris’ that brings about a detachment or 
 
30 Vattimo, Dialogue, 140.  
 
31 Thomas Hilgers, Aesthetic Disinterestedness: Art, Experience, and the Self (New York: 
Routledge, 2017), 45. See also Julian Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).  
 
32 Hilgers, Aesthetic Disinterestedness, 46. See also Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Representation, translated by E.F.J. Payne, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1966). 
 
33 Ibid. See also Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation.  
 
 
 20  
uninvolvement from the world.34  “The fact that the characterization of active nihilism 
must, in the last analysis, refer to the capacity to transcend one’s own interest in self-
preservation indicates that at bottom active nihilism is always passive and reactive 
too.”35 For Vattimo, Nietzsche has failed to present a clear distinction between the two 
types of nihilism; instead, by examining them in light of the artist, there is very little to 
differentiate active nihilism from passive or reactive nihilism.36   
 
1.1.3 Nihilism and Historicism: The Historical Malady 
Historicism emphasizes the historical character of human existence. As history 
influences our comprehension of the world, paying attention to this historical character 
is central to human knowledge and understanding.37 Historicism cannot be reduced to 
one, single movement, but, instead, stresses the importance of historical context, which 
influences interpretation, maintaining that history reflects the interests of the society 
and culture of the time; even historians, for example, are influenced by the conditions 
of the age in which they write.38 As a movement within nineteenth century German 
 
34 The artists’ disinterestedness is based on ‘a condition of moderation’ (Vattimo, Dialogue, 140). 
Moderation, for Nietzsche, is a useful virtue. Those who practice moderation possess great self-control, 
as it is more difficult to partake of things in moderation than to forego them entirely (Ruth Abbey, 
Nietzsche’s Middle Period [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 52). Nietzsche also associates 
moderation with free-spiritedness, as those who are moderate do not need to adhere to extreme beliefs 
or values.  
 
35 Vattimo, Dialogue, 140. 
 
36 Ibid.  
 
37 See Charles R. Bambauch, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995).  
 
38 See Paul Hamilton, Historicism (New York: Routledge, 2003).  
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philosophy historicism may be described as one in which human events are examined 
in the light of historical context.39  
Vattimo claims that nihilism and historicism are significant for Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, having developed together in his work, particularly in the essay “On the 
Utility and Liability of History for Life.”40 He approaches historicism through 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the historical malady. The historical malady is a problem 
that arises from our relationship with the past. An excessive awareness of history 
effectively shatters humankind’s ability to live in the present as it prevents the creation 
of new and original cultural achievements.  
The historical malady is a species of consumption, manifesting itself in a 
civilization that, through the excessive study and knowledge of the past, 
loses all creative capacity. This, in Nietzsche’s view, is the situation of our 
epoch: the enormously expanded array of aids to historical knowledge and 
the quantity of notions and documents available regarding past epochs 
have reduced large areas of culture to mere ‘cultural history,’ as we see in 
the syllabuses of the educational institutions, with no more productive 
élan.41  
 
The historical malady is a characteristic of humankind as it is our acknowledgement of, 
and engagement with, the past that produces the difficulty of the historical malady.42 It 
reduces both our creativity and our culture, resulting in the loss of our ability to create 
anything new due to our awareness that we are simply transitory; we are merely a tiny 
particle in the flow from past to future.43 To illustrate this effect of the historical malady, 
 
39 See Charles R. Bambauch, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism; see also Terrence 
Tice and Thomas Slavens, Research Guide to Philosophy (Chicago: American Library Association, 
1983). 
 
40 The essay “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life” is found in Nietzsche’s 
Unfashionable Observations, trans. Richard T. Gray in Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. 
Bernd Magnus and Ernst Behler (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995-). vol. 11, 1999. 
 
41 Vattimo, Dialogue, 5.  
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Vattimo draws on a passage from Nietzsche’s “On the Utility and Liability of History 
for Life:”  
imagine the most extreme example, a human being who does not possess 
the power to forget, who is damned to see becoming everywhere; such a 
human being would no longer believe in his own being, would no longer 
believe in himself, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, 
and would lose himself in the stream of becoming; like the true student of 
Heraclitus, in the end he would hardly dare to lift a finger. All action 
requires forgetting.44 
 
Instead of being able to forget this “stream of becoming,” we view ourselves as a 
stepping-stone in the river of time; we are simply a product of the past and a preface to 
the future. For Vattimo, it is precisely this awareness of being stuck in this rut that 
renders us incapable of making history, since the historical malady leads to a loss of 
confidence and a lack of belief in our own capabilities.45 In order to revive our creative 
capacity we would have to restore confidence and belief in our decisions and abilities. 
Vattimo believes that our awareness of, and relationship to, the past is what makes 
us differ to other species. “Humans are set apart from the other animals precisely 
because, at a certain point, they learn to say “es war” (“it was”).”46 By our engagement 
with the past, we acknowledge that our lives are part of the continual flow of history. 
Often, we only realize the real worth of an experience once it is over. “By learning to 
say ‘es war,’ man also acknowledges his own deepest nature as a never to be completed 
imperfect [ein nie zu vollendes Imperfectum], in other words an uninterrupted 
 
 
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, Unfashionable Observations, trans. Richard T. Gray, vol. 2, 1995 in 
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, 3 vols. Ed., Bernd Magnus and Ernst Behler (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995—), 89, quoted in Gianni Vattimo, Dialogue with Nietzsche, trans. William 
McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 5. 
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succession of instants, each negating the last.”47 Due to our reliance on the past to make 
sense of, and give meaning to, our experiences, the present is left devoid of meaning. 
The past is imbued with the quality of greatness, retaining the “character of a lost 
paradise: ‘the demigods always lived only in earlier ages, the present generation is 
always the degenerate one.’”48 Due to the emphasis on the illustriousness of the past 
we are left feeling inferior. We are reduced to simply being poor imitators of our 
predecessors and hoping, somehow, to acquire the skills or creativity to match them. 
Because of this focus on past greatness, instead of having a vibrant, living culture, we 
simply have a knowledge of culture that is devoid of all originality and creativity. 
“Having contracted the historical malady, an individual wanders about like a tourist in 
the park of history, or as Nietzsche will say later, behaves like an actor playing various 
parts, losing himself in historical situations, none of which really belongs to him.”49 
Contrary to the supposition that an historical awareness broadens an individual’s 
character as it widens the confines of their own particular situation, historical awareness 
does exactly the opposite. It reduces the individual’s outlook and gives rise to a sense 
of displacement as we are aware of, and connected to, a variety of situations to which 
we do not belong.50 “The historical malady . . . results in an imbalance between internal 
content and form evident in our civilization, which is highly cultivated and barbarous 
 
47 Ibid. Translation modified.  
 
48 Vattimo, Dialogue, 6. If we look to Greek mythology, for example, Hesiod’s myth of the five 
ages of man illustrates this point. Hesiod outlines five ages of man, with each age, bar one, degenerative 
of the previous. It is indicative of the degeneration of the human condition and of the struggles of 
humankind in the writer’s age; this is in contrast to the “Golden Age” of humankind when an existence 
akin to that of the gods was in place. See Hesiod, Works and Days, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.  
 
49 Vattimo, Dialogue, 6.  
 
50 Ibid., 7.  
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at the same time, which has no style, no living unifying principle of its own.”51 Vattimo 
sums up the historical malady by claiming it to be the amalgam of all that is wrong in 
our culture.52 
For Vattimo, in “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life,” Nietzsche takes 
the historical malady as a starting point. He believes that Nietzsche’s examination of a 
person or culture lacking the capacity for creativity due to an engagement with the past 
offers a particular sense of historicism, “the attribution of a providential order to 
history, and the complete relativization of mankind to the epoch in which it occurs, 
without reference to a larger natural order of becoming.”53 The providential order is 
rooted, for Nietzsche, in the Christian idea of the Last Judgement. The worldview of 
the memento mori is retrospective, focusing on the past and seeing oneself and one’s 
culture as the culmination of history.54  
 A religion which of all the hours of a man’s life holds the last to be the 
most important, which prophesies an end to all life on earth and condemns 
all who live in the fifth act of a tragedy . . .  is inimical to all new planting, 
bold experimentation, free aspiration; it resists all flight into the unknown 
because it loves and hopes for nothing there.55  
 
The ‘memento mori’ of the Middle Ages is a reminder of the ephemerality of human 
life. It later developed into the conviction that nothing new could be created and, 




52 See Vattimo, Dialogue, 7. 
 
53 Vattimo, Dialogue, 12.  
 
54 Anthony K. Jenson, An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s “On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life” (New York: Routledge, 2016), 130. Memento mori is a phrase meaning ‘remember you 
must die.’  
 
55 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” in Untimely 
Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 101-102.  
 
56 Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. Nicolas Martin (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 35. 
 
 25  
excessive awareness of the past loses the capacity for creativity, due to the realization 
of being simply a transitory moment in the cycle of history. “For it seems pointless and 
fruitless to devote oneself to sketching that which sooner or later must disappear in the 
unstoppable flow of history.”57 There is a sense that it is too late to do anything better 
than what been produced in the past; our age is always the ultimate age, with an 
emphasis on perfecting what has gone before, rather than creating anything new. Thus, 
creativity, for Nietzsche, requires a contrasting memento vivere, which is a reminder to 
live and produce our own values instead of looking back towards past ones.58 
 
1.1.4 Temporality and the Eternal Return 
For Vattimo, the historical malady illustrates the connection between historicism and 
nihilism in Nietzsche’s work. He claims that nihilism signals the endpoint of a 
providential order to history and the sense of historicism that Nietzsche identifies in 
“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life” validates this point. First, the 
providential order gave meaning and order to the world. Our knowledge of the past, 
however, has expanded our worldview, rendering the providential order redundant: 
“actually there is no providential order or comprehensive meaning in historical 
becoming.”59 The collapse of the providential order leads to the complete relativization 
of humankind to a particular epoch, without reference to a larger natural order of 
becoming.60 The realization that there is no providential order means that there is no 
 
 
57 Ibid.  
 
58 Anthony K. Jenson, An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s “On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life” (New York: Routledge, 2016), 130. 
 
59 Vattimo, Dialogue, 13.  
 
60 Ibid., 12.  
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longer any absolute meaning or value in the world. “Everything that comes into 
existence deserves to pass out of it.”61 This loss of meaning and value represents the 
most general form of nihilism.62 Such an understanding of historicism highlights how 
nihilism is an issue of temporality. For Vattimo, the resolution to this issue lies in 
Nietzsche’s concept of ‘eternal return.’ The eternal return involves two strands of 
thought, cosmological and moral. The cosmological aspect structures reality in a 
cyclical manner. Its circular framework means that there is no rational order, and, for 
Nietzsche, given the vast amount of time that has passed, if there was a purpose or goal 
then it would already have been attained.63 There is, then, only the repetition of what 
has gone before; nothing new is created and every situation is repeated. “The actions of 
man are simply produced by the cyclical becoming of the cosmos.”64 The moral aspect 
of eternal return is more a task set before us. If each moment of our lives was to be 
eternally repeated, then we must ask ourselves if we have lived in such a way as to 
desire to live each one once again. “We would have acquired an excellent evaluative 
criterion for our actions, for only an entirely happy being would desire this endless 
repetition.”65 Such repetition acts as a measure against which to gauge our actions and 
choices. “Only he who regards his own existence as fit to be eternally repeated 
endures.”66 Vattimo draws on The Gay Science to reiterate the importance of the eternal 
 
61 Ibid., 13. 
  
62 Ibid., 12.  
 
63 Ibid., 3. 
 
64 Ibid.  
 
65 Vattimo, Nietzsche, 107.  
 
66 Vattimo, Dialogue, 3. “Nur wer sein Dasein für ewig wiederholungsfähig hält, bleibt übrig” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli, Mazzino 
Montinari, et al. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967-.  5.2 11 [338], spring-autumn 1881, quoted in Gianni Vattimo, 
Dialogue with Nietzsche, trans. William McCuaig [New York: Columbia University Press, 2006], 3).  
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return as a moral choice. “The wording, taken literally, implies a proposal made to 
mankind: ‘do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’”67  
Vattimo identifies an issue arising from the two strands of thought in the eternal 
return: both give rise to the problem of determinism, which holds that all events and 
human action are determined by causes outside of the will. For Vattimo, this issue of 
determinism is most evident in a line from Nietzsche’s unpublished papers from around 
the time he was writing The Gay Science. “My doctrine says: the task is to live in such 
a way that you must desire to live again — you will in any case.”68 It also implies that 
human beings have no free will.  In order to overcome the problem of freedom and 
determinism, Vattimo considers what a proper relationship with the past ought to entail. 
“[It] would somehow reveal the possibility of a closer, more profound link between the 
eternity of the world and human choice.”69 The historical malady afflicts only those 
 
 
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 341, as quoted in Gianni Vattimo, Dialogue 
with Nietzsche, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 3. Vattimo cites 
the entire passage in Nietzsche: An Introduction: 
“The greatest weight — What if, some day or night a demon were to creep after you into your loneliest 
loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live one more 
and innumerable times over; and there will be nothing new in it, rather every pain and every joy and 
every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence — even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this 
moment and I myself. The endless hourglass of existence is turned upside down over and over again, and 
you with it, speck of dust!’ Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the 
demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have 
answered him: ‘You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine!’ If this thought took hold 
of you, it would transform you as you are, or perhaps crush you; the question for each and everything, 
‘Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’ would lie upon your actions as the greatest 
weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to demand nothing more 
fervently than this ultimate, eternal confirmation and seal?” (Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, 
trans. Nicolas Martin [Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001] 105-106. Emphasis 
original). 
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who allow it to do so, with the degree determined by what Nietzsche terms plastic 
power. For humankind, plastic power is the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s 
own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal 
wounds, to replace what has been lost, and to recreate broken moulds.70 “The capacity 
to draw boundaries by choosing, accepting, and refusing is . . . plastic power.”71 Plastic 
power involves an active and creative way of interpreting the past. It is formative, as, 
for Nietzsche, one must form oneself, growing in this fashion as opposed to passively 
imitating a model.72  Historical knowledge is only useful to those who have this 
capacity; for those who do not, the historical malady infects them and diminishes their 
creative capacity.73 In order to overcome the historical malady, we need to have a 
relationship with the past that is not purely historical. “Our relationship with the 
historical past has its appropriate site only within something that is not reducible to 
history.”74 There must be a nonhistorical element in order for creativity and this is 
located in forgetfulness. The moment of forgetfulness is a moment in which historical 
awareness is suspended, thereby allowing action and creativity to take place. “This 
moment of forgetting, which cuts the decision-making subject off from historical 
awareness like a cone of shadow, is what Nietzsche calls the nonhistorical element, the 
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only environment in which action can occur.”75 As our inaction (the product of the 
historical malady) is the result of our historical awareness, action requires and springs 
from the forgetfulness of this sensibility. Forgetting, for Vattimo, is the correct attitude 
to take towards history, as this means that the nonhistorical is given precedence over 
the historical. We look to the past only insofar as it serves the present. The focus must 
be on action in the present, as opposed to the past.  
Vattimo believes that the solution to nihilism as the problem of temporality is 
found in the eternal return itself. He locates this solution in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
referring to the section titled “Of the Vision and the Riddle.”76 The book records the 
travels of its fictitious character, Zarathustra, with “Of the Vision and the Riddle” 
focusing on a particular vision of Zarathustra’s. The vision is of the eternal return. Here, 
Zarathustra stops at a gateway where two paths join. “They are but one road, which 
loops round and is sealed into a perfect ring by the gate itself. These roads are the past 
and the future, and on the gate which joins them is written the word ‘Augenblick 
[instant].’”77 This vision illustrates the circular structure of time that is contrary to the 
usual perception of time, which is rectilinear, “composed of an irreversible succession 
of instants.”78 It is the rectilinear vision of time that creates the impression that we 
cannot shake off the weight of the past. In Zarathustra’s vision, however, while the past 
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influences the future, the future also influences the past. The ‘instant, or ‘moment,’ 
saves this circular structure of time from becoming meaningless. “It is in a sort of 
immediate rapport with the totality of time, which is how Nietzsche conceives of 
eternity . . . The moment is not now defined in relation to the past and the future; rather 
the past and the future acquire profile and meaning only in relation to it.”79 While 
connected to both past and future, the instant is more than simply a point in the flow of 
time; it is a moment of decision that gives meaning to both the past and future. 
 
1.2 How the World Became a Fable: Myth, Interpretation, and Culture 
This section focuses on Nietzsche’s appreciation of culture, beginning with the 
relationship between philology and philosophy. Vattimo claims that this relationship 
played a significant role in shaping Nietzsche’s thought, including his position 
concerning truth. This will lead to a discussion of the German philosopher’s well-
known dictum, ‘God is dead.’ 
 
1.2.1 From Philology to Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Understanding of Culture 
For Vattimo, the relationship between philology and philosophy plays a seminal role in 
Nietzsche’s thought. The German philosopher taught philology at Basle, although his 
work was not consistent with the established academic philology of the time.80 In fact, 
the very nature of academic philology was distasteful to him as he felt that not only did 
it break with the classical spirit, but it also created a chasm between the philologist and 
the object of study.81 Rather than treating antiquity as a model with much to offer, it 
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was reduced to the subject matter of an objective academic study. The lectures that 
Nietzsche delivered in Basle show his dissatisfaction with the way that academic 
philology treated antiquity and reflect his concerns about the manner in which the study 
of antiquity was treated and handed on.  
We may consider antiquity from a scientific point of view; we may try to 
look at what has happened with the eye of a historian, or to arrange and 
compare the linguistic forms of ancient masterpieces, to bring them at all 
events under a morphological law; but we always lose the wonderful 
creative force, the real fragrance, of the atmosphere of antiquity; we forget 
that passionate emotion which instinctively drove our meditation and 
enjoyment back to the Greeks. From this point onwards we must take 
notice of a clearly determined and very surprising antagonism which 
philology has great cause to regret. From the circles upon whose help we 
must place the most implicit reliance—the artistic friends of antiquity, the 
warm supporters of Hellenic beauty and noble simplicity—we hear harsh 
voices crying out that it is precisely the philologists themselves who are 
the real opponents and destroyers of the ideals of antiquity.82  
 
Nietzsche’s concern for how the study of antiquity was treated in academia continued 
throughout his early writings. He further elaborated on this theme in his volume, The 
Birth of Tragedy.83 
For Vattimo, antiquity is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of culture. Indeed, 
Nietzsche’s focus on antiquity’s potential as a model worth imitating is the essence of 
The Birth of Tragedy.84 Vattimo believes that this work combines Nietzsche’s interest 
in philology and culture with philosophy. “One of the main attractions of this 
unparalleled work lies in its peculiar fusion of philology and philosophy. The scope and 
impact of this work have no equal, not even in the great philosophizing of philologists 
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in the Romantic period.”85 The work analyses and reappropriates the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian drives that epitomize Greek culture. Each represents a different part of 
the Greek attitude that is both beautiful and chaotic. “The Birth of Tragedy is at once a 
re-interpretation of ancient Greece, a philosophical and aesthetic revolution, a critique 
of contemporary culture, and a programme to revitalize it.”86 Indeed, the polarity 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, Vattimo claims, is the central premise of 
Nietzsche’s work as it was the foundation for his work in philology.87 He maintains the 
connection between philosophy and philology throughout his work, although it is 
subtler in the later stages.88  
The European tradition focused on the classical aspects of Greek culture, which 
are the beautiful and the harmonious. These aspects are found in the Apollonian drive. 
The Greeks were deemed to be capable of producing such beautiful works because they 
as a people had a beautiful existence. Nietzsche believes that Christianity is responsible 
for upholding this ideal, since it held to the classical and so influenced our knowledge 
of antiquity in this way. “The prime contributor to this stereotyping of our image of 
Greece has been Christianity, through which our knowledge of ancient culture had been 
filtered.”89 The classical, Apollonian ideal, however, is only one aspect of the Greek 
culture. The Dionysian represents the other side, which is found in more marginal 
elements such as folklore. In contrast to the Apollonian drive, which seeks to promote 
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harmony, the Dionysian is based on chaos. “In the same way that the Apollonian drive 
attempts to produce definable images, harmonious and reliable forms which bestow 
security, the Dionysian drive possesses . . . a sensitivity to the chaos of every 
existence.”90 Both drives are representative of the duality that defined the Greek spirit.91 
Vattimo draws on The Birth of Tragedy to illustrate this duality: 
The Greeks knew and felt the terrors and horrors of existence: in order to be 
able to live at all they had to expose the radiant dream-birth of the 
Olympians between themselves and those horrors. That terrible mistrust of 
the Titanic forces of nature [ . . . ] – the Greeks repeatedly overcame all this, 
or at least veiled and concealed it, with the artistic middle world of the 
Olympians.92  
 
Here, the gods represent the Apollonian drive as they served to justify existence through 
the quality of their own existence: “they live it [life] in bright sunlight and beyond the 
terrifying threat of death.”93 The world of the gods was a higher order of existence. The 
gods knew and understood the suffering of those on earth. They were not without their 
own squabbles and amusements, yet were free of the misery and horrors of nature that 
humankind must endure. The Apollonian drive gives form and structure and some 
measure of security combined with a strong sense of self. In contrast to this, the 
Dionysian drive leans towards chaos and formlessness, encouraging humankind to 
embrace the maelstrom. The boundaries that exist between persons and the world in 
order to ensure the proper functioning and maintenance of society are tested by 
Dionysius as he coaxes humankind to abandon them.94 Vattimo remarks that in 
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Nietzsche’s argument we cannot have one drive without the other, and in order to fulfil 
their roles the Apollonian gods must have a connection to the Dionysian. “The relation 
of the Olympian gods to the dark ground of the primal Oneness is not . . . a mere 
antithesis.”95 This connection, Vattimo believes, allows for an understanding of Greek 
culture as a struggle between the Dionysian and Apollonian drives; even certain art 
forms are recognised as belonging to one or the other. “So Doric art can only be read 
as the result of a defence by the Apollonian against attacks which were real attacks by 
invading peoples, attacks by the Dionysian and orgiastic cults of barbarians.”96 Greek 
history, then, may be seen as emerging in the contention between the two drives, 
reflected in the art forms that developed throughout Greek antiquity. 
Nietzsche focuses on Greek drama to illustrate the relationship between the 
Apollonian, the Dionysian, and culture, where “the apogee is represented by Attic 
tragedy which is the perfect synthesis of the two impulses.”97 Like the idea of the 
Olympian gods, Greek tragedy helped to render the unbearable bearable as it depicted 
death and mortality through the duality of the Apollonian and Dionysian drives. Here, 
the Dionysian was portrayed though an Apollonian lens, which lent it structure and 
logic. Vattimo maintains that it was this combination of the two drives, for Nietzsche, 
that made Greek tragedy the apogee of Greek culture. The decline of tragedy was 
brought about, Nietzsche claims, by Euripides who “recast tragic myth in realistic and 
rational terms.”98 This recasting was to satisfy Socrates, who presented the world and 
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the human condition in rational terms. If a person lived a just life, then they would come 
to no harm, and vice versa. “Because everything had to proceed according to a pre-
ordained, rational scheme, it was easy to understand the need for a deus ex machina.”99 
In turn, the excitement of the drama itself was lost as everything unfolded as expected. 
 
1.2.2  Philology: A Basis for Truth 
Vattimo maintains that Nietzsche’s experience as a philologist reinforces his 
connection to the European philosophical tradition. This is, he suggests, due to 
philology’s standing as a model, rather than as a specialized academic discipline. 
Philology’s primary concern is understanding humankind’s existence in the world and 
time, and, as such, is connected to some of the significant movements in the European 
philosophical tradition, such as the Renaissance’s focus on humanism.100 “The 
philologists of Renaissance humanism and eighteenth-century classicism, or at any rate 
the leading ones, were never pure masters of erudition, specialists in the past for its own 
sake.”101 He argues that this is Nietzsche’s primary concern, and while he pursued other 
areas of interest, such as the natural sciences, this was done in a cursory fashion. 
Nietzsche’s refusal to immerse himself in philology as a specialized discipline, Vattimo 
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claims, confirms his connection to the European philosophical tradition, placing him 
firmly in the category of humanistic thought.102 
 Nietzsche focuses on philology so as to examine humankind’s existence in 
relation to the past, as opposed to treating antiquity solely as the subject matter of an 
academic discipline. “Philology for Nietzsche signifies principally the posing of the 
problem of our relationship to the past.”103 Vattimo draws on The Birth of Tragedy in 
order to further his argument regarding the centrality of philology for Nietzsche. This 
volume examines the connection between the idea of classical antiquity, such as the 
beautiful and harmonious that are found, for example, in architecture, and the epigonic 
mentality towards this idea of classical Greek culture.  
You could say that Nietzsche does no more than put starkly the paradox of 
the classicist mentality present in German pre-romanticism: the longing for 
antiquity as the only world authentic, balanced, and worthy of mankind—
together with the awareness, accompanied by acute nostalgia, that this 
condition is lost forever.104  
 
Regarding the Greek world as the ‘classical’ shapes our vision of that same world via 
an epigonistic attitude that imagines it as a more authentic world than the present, which 
is a lesser imitation of what has gone before and which fails to live up to its ideals. In 
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effect, then, we place ourselves in an era of decadence. ‘Decadence’ originally refers 
to those who believed that civilization was in decline and that they were, in fact, in an 
age of mediocrity.105 For Nietzsche, however, the term has a broader significance. 
Nietzsche explicates decadence in Ecce Homo as any unhealthy, failed 
response to the threat of pessimism and despair; physiologically, 
decadence is a lack of discipline to such stimuli, so that the threat of 
pessimism (the reality of death, say) provokes an undisciplined response 
(for example, the idea of eternal life).106 
  
Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘decadence’ encompasses everything that he held in an ill 
light, such as morality, reason, and Christianity. For Nietzsche, everything that springs 
from weakness, such as all philosophies, art, and religion, are decadent.107  
Vattimo understands that for Nietzsche philology as an academic discipline was 
an unsatisfactory approach to antiquity as the Greeks were not primarily scholars. 
“Whereas classical philology trains men of erudition, the Greeks were anything but 
érudits, and there was no trace of erudition in their educational ideal.”108 They were, he 
maintains, poets rather than scholars. “The relationship of scholars to great poets has 
something ridiculous about it.”109 As the Greeks were poets, Nietzsche argues that the 
rational scholar is incapable of fully comprehending the poetic and artistic 
achievements of Greek civilization. Academic philology is disproportionate in the 
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object that it claims to know, which is classical antiquity, and its method of approach, 
which is rational and detached. Rather, historical knowledge, properly speaking, is 
rooted in the aesthetic, the self-expression of a people, so that our relation to truth must 
be approached in a way that honours this. “The kind of aesthetics that characterizes 
Greek civilization and the works it bequeathed to us has to do with our relation to truth, 
in a way neither rational nor reflective, one that somehow has the immediacy and the 
simplicity characteristic of the work of art.”110 Nietzsche, keeping this in mind, 
attempted to find a new way of looking at the past, marked by a break with the classicist 
mentality. He focused on Greek civilization through the lens of the tragic, which 
transforms our understanding of antiquity, shifting away from an epigonistic view. 
Vattimo argues that Nietzsche’s sense of antiquity is shaped by the Apollonian and 
Dionysian, that, in turn, influences his understanding of culture. This is so since the two 
drives underpin culture in its entirety. “The Apollonian and Dionysian therefore define 
not only a theory of civilization and culture but also art.”111 As Greek drama combined 
the classic, or Apollonian, with the tragic, or Dionysian, it showed the full spectrum of 
human existence and not simply an ideal.112 For Nietzsche, the aesthetic is a particular 
way of understanding the becoming of the world.113 “It is only as an aesthetic 
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phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified.”114 When taken on its 
own, the Apollonian cannot do justice to the aesthetic dimension of life. Nietzsche 
attributes a state of ‘dreams’ to the Apollonian. This implies that the Apollonian 
emphasis on the beautiful is merely a ‘dream,’ or ‘appearance’ that does not capture 
adequately the real substance of all that the world is.115 The Apollonian veils the horrors 
of existence. “The Apollonian . . . symbolizes the tremendous artistic powers which 
need to be employed in order to transfigure the horror and absurdity of existence.”116 
Thus, the Apollonian is a form of self-deception that allowed the Greeks to lie to 
themselves about the nature of the world; it fails to acknowledge the reality of the world 
as it is. In contrast, the ‘intoxication’ of the Dionysian allows us to see through the 
Apollonian so as to acknowledge the suffering and destruction in the world. This 
perspective offers a more profound view of the world.  If we accept this contention, the 
tragic becomes another way of engaging with the past, one which does not simply invite 
a decadent way of thinking.117 “We must now seek to discover a new and different way 
of establishing a rapport between us and the past that will correspond to the new tragic 
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conception of Greek antiquity.”118 The German philosopher develops his understanding 
of truth as the search for a new way of engaging with the past. “Nietzsche’s initial 
thinking about truth develops in relation to this problematic: the search for a way we 
might be able to call authentic, or in any case not decadent, of assuming a stance vis-à-
vis the past.”119 For Nietzsche, philology encounters the past as if it were a dead, 
mummified thing on which specific judgements may be announced as historical fact.120 
It is impossible for philology in this academic sense to encounter the past in a ‘living 
manner,’ in which the past has an infinite character, one that cannot be pronounced as 
a single objective fact.121 Like the past, it is not possible to approach truth adequately 
in the same manner as the érudits; but it must be encountered in ‘living manner,’ taking 
into consideration its ‘infinite character.’  
 
 
1.2.3 The Death of God 
Vattimo explores the nature of truth for Nietzsche and the implications of what it 
designates as the ‘death of God.’ The German philosopher disagrees with the 
assumption that truth is that which is generally clear and distinct. It is, he believes, folly 
to assume that what is clear must be true, as our common experience of the world is far 
from this. The main reason that we consider certain things to be evidently true, as truth 
is because we belong in a certain time and place, and our historicity has left us with an 
inherent intuition for the appreciation of certain things but not for others. Any 
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philosophies that fall within the parameters of traditional metaphysics tend to strike us 
as being true, since we are already inclined to believe them as they reflect our 
presuppositions of our ambient world.122 “They do no more than state explicitly the 
presuppositions upon which the world we inhabit rests, presuppositions that we cannot 
do without on pain of renouncing our own humanity.”123 These presuppositions form 
the cornerstones of our way of living as they provide us with a structure that forms the 
basis of our epoch. We cannot do without these constructs as they are necessary for the 
functioning of our society, for the way in which we live. What this amounts to is that 
the world is, in essence, a fable constructed by humankind.  
For Nietzsche, morality, too, is a fable because the traditional systems of 
metaphysics and religious morality are founded on a system of values that is also a 
human construct. The most fundamental error is the belief that there can be moral acts 
as our very belief in morality rests on the preconception that we are fully aware of our 
actions.124 According to Vattimo, for Nietzsche, this too is a fable. Morality, rather, rests 
on a dynamic of sublimation, which is the transformation of an impulse into a more 
creative activity. Thus, “the barbarian’s desire to torture his foe can be sublimated into 
the desire to defeat one’s rival, say in the Olympic contests.”125 In this light, morality, 
then, is a division of human nature, whereby one part of our nature is sacrificed for the 
promotion of the other.126 Nietzsche offers, as an example, a soldier wishing that he 
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could die for his country on the battlefield. The soldier is driven by an egoistical, self-
interest, which is to stay alive. This self-interest is, however, is annulled by a subsequent 
action, which is done in the name of something else, namely, the soldier’s desire of  
sacrificing himself for his country. The soldier is a split subject, with an egoistical 
interest developing in both of his parts. “The body has immediate needs; the body wants 
life and health; but an idea overrides these pressing concerns and imposes upon the 
subject another urgency.”127 The idea is also something precious to the subject, creating 
the division. The division may be described in terms of an internal voice. “It is as if a 
voice within the soldier . . . commands ‘you ought to . . .’  – a voice that consequently 
splits the subject into an ‘I’ talking and a ‘you’ listening.”128 If the voice suggests that 
the subject ought to, or should do, something, then this is a moral message. It is the case 
that the moral message is something that is internalized as a part of the subject’s identity, 
“an idea that has now become something that ‘man loves of himself.’”129 The moral 
message is an idea that is understood as something virtuous or noble and forms a 
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fatherland; for his supreme desire is victorious in the victory of his fatherland. A mother gives her child 
that of which she deprives herself: sleep, the best nourishment, if necessary her health, her strength. – 
But are all these selfless states of mind? Are these moral deeds miracles because they are, in 
Schopenhauer’s words, “impossible and yet real”? Is it not clear that, in all these cases, man loves 
something of himself, an idea, a desire, an offspring, more than something else of himself, that he thus 
divides his nature and sacrifices one part of it to the other? Is something essentially different when some 
obstinate man says: “I would rather be shot down that move an inch out of that fellow’s way”? –The 
inclination to something (wish, impulse, desire) is the present in all the above instances; to give in to it, 
with all the consequences, is in any event, not “unegoistic”. – In morality man treats himself not as an 
individuum but as dividuum. (HAH, § 57, 74)” (Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. 
Nicolas Martin [Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001], 66-67, quoting Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, in Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. 
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), 74. Emphasis original).  
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precious part of the subject’s self-identity.130 Sublimation, then, rests on two principles, 
or drives, namely, preservation and pleasure. The need to establish security, for 
example, can be traced back to the drive for preservation.131 Indeed, security is a factor 
serving to create the fable of morality. The individual learns, much like animals do, to 
fall in with the herd and hide in the security and reliability that the herd offers. “For this 
reason the animals learn to master themselves and alter their form, so that many, for 
example, adapt their colouring to the colour of their surroundings . . . Thus the individual 
hides himself in the general concept ‘man,’ or in society.”132 Vattimo claims that, for 
Nietzsche, religion offers a level of security that is greater than that which the herd, or 
society, can provide. Religion offers stability that comes from a higher being and from 
a higher plane than our own. This security is manifest in the form of divine will. 
Everything that happens to the individual, whether good or bad, may be seen as a 
manifestation of the divine will. In addition to the drive for preservation and the need 
for security, there is one too for pleasure-seeking. In the case of pleasure seeking, 
sublimation leads to morality acting as a source for dramatizing the subject’s inner 
life.133 This dramatization is played out as an inner struggle between honour and desire. 
The most usual means the ascetic and the saint employs to make his life 
nonetheless bearable and enjoyable consists in occasionally waging war 
and in the alternation of victory and defeat, for this he needs an opponent 
and he finds him in the so-called ‘enemy within.’ Specifically, he exploits 
his compulsive vanity, his thirst for honour and domination, then his 
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132 Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. Nicolas Martin (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 70, quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, in Nietzsche: Werke. 
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sensual desires, in an attempt to see his life as a prolonged battle and 
himself as a battlefield.134 
 
This inner struggle between the preservation and pleasure drives disrupts the unity of 
the self. The self is reduced to being simply the arena, where the battle between 
conflicting motives takes place, and this inner disruption affects morality. “Once the 
belief in the ultimate immediacy and unity of the self was undermined, everything that 
man characterized with this name appeared doubtful.”135 We view this battle of 
conflicting impulses, of pleasure and preservation, as the development of our moral 
code. In the end, the winner will be the most powerful impulse. These impulses, 
however, are nothing more than human constructs. What we believe to be moral 
imperatives are habits or actions first performed for the benefit of society. As they were 
necessary for survival, people continued to perform these actions for the benefit of all. 
As time passed, subsequent generations executed the same habits, yet for different 
reasons, such as “out of fear or reverence for those who demanded and recommended 
them, or out of habit because their performance everywhere produced joy and 
concurring faces, or from vanity because they were praised.”136 The original motive, 
which was for reasons of utility, was forgotten and morality was born. “Such actions, 
whose basic motive, that of utility, has been forgotten, are then called moral actions: not 
because, for instance, they are performed out of those other motives, but because they 
 
134 Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. Nicolas Martin (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 72, quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, in Nietzsche: 
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are not performed from any conscious reason of utility.”137 For Nietzsche, then, our 
moral actions are produced for motives of utility, rather than as the result of our own 
conscious reasoning.  
 Nietzsche’s interest in sublimation rests on a particular philosophical problem; 
namely, how something can originate in its opposite.138 He suggests, as an example, that 
truth can originate in an error.139 This was denied by metaphysics, which maintained 
that this could not occur. “It was assumed, for example, that values derived to be ‘higher’ 
could only come from above or from a mysterious ‘thing in itself.’”140 Nietzsche, 
however, disagrees, deeming that higher values are simply the product of human 
circumstances. Morality, for example, is the product of sublimation and utility, which 
are human factors. One of Nietzsche’s most famous dictums, “God is dead,” 
corresponds to the self-sublimation of morality. “The self-sublimation of morality refers 
to the process whereby ‘faith in morality is withdrawn — but why? Out of morality!”141 
Nietzsche believes that the root of the self-sublimation of morality is, in fact, morality’s 
very commitment to truth. Morality, he maintains, is built on an error. In morality’s 
quest for truth, it discovered that morality itself was a lie. This ‘error’ is reflected in the 
observation that ‘God is dead.’ In the same manner in which the world is a fable 
constructed by humankind, God too is a construct. This dictum, however, is not a denial 
of God’s existence. Rather, it is a reflection on how changing social conditions 
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determine the shape of human existence. Changed conditions have made God 
superfluous to our existence. This particular fable was rooted in an age where it fulfilled 
a need for security in an uncertain world.  “The ultimate decisions (concerning so-called 
eternal questions) lose their importance when the character of life in society is less 
violent.”142 We are in different circumstances in today’s society to when the ‘fable’ of 
God was created out of a need for security. According to Vattimo, Nietzsche believes 
that as conditions change the need for such security recedes. “And under these (at least 
relatively) secure new conditions, the possibility of a new form of human existence 
grows and takes shape, which Nietzsche dubs the self-sublimation of morality, the death 
of God.”143 The death of God, far from being a pronouncement on the reality of God’s 
existence, is, instead, an announcement, an event that may set other events in motion.144 
The death of God is, for Nietzsche, a pronouncement concerning the  idea of an ultimate 
truth. “Everything that declares itself superior and transcendent, in other words 
everything we deem valuable, is nothing more than a product of the sublimation of 
‘human, all too human’ factors.”145 What we consider to be an ultimate truth is unveiled 
as a construct, when the need to maintain it has passed. “It is only unveiled as fiction at 
the moment when, having done its job of guaranteeing a certain organization of social 
life and also scientific and technical progress, it turns out to be no longer strictly 
 
142 Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. Nicolas Martin (Stanford, California: 
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necessary.”146 Truth is, for Nietzsche, simply a set of principles to which we commonly 
adhere. “What we believe to be truth . . . is nothing more than the ideological projection 
of a certain form of life.”147 The idea of objective truth, then, is reduced to interpretation 
as we only have contact with human constructs. For this same reason, historical 
knowledge and scientific knowledge fail to provide us with any form of objective truth. 
“Nietzsche’s thinking on the problem of historical knowledge inevitably had to expand 
to the point of bringing the whole metaphysical theory of truth as objectivity into 
question.”148 Vattimo maintains that although science is not capable of giving us any 
objective truth, it provides us with an example of how we ought to think; it does so in a 
way that allows us to discern without succumbing to our interests or emotions, nor does 
it allow us to yield to fanaticism or erraticism. For Vattimo,  
the critique of the concept of truth as evidentness—as the immediate, 
psychologically convincing, and irrefragable givenness of something, and 
“object” or a proposition, as time, as corresponding to “what is the case”—
is one of the most constant and important themes of Nietzsche’s speculative 
career.149  
 
It could be argued that lying is inherent to our society, then, as we know the world only 
through metaphorical constructs. By lying collectively, we conform to the metaphors 
that make up our reality, which means that we conform to the predominant customs of 
‘the herd.’ “The principal convention is to believe in the ‘objectivity’ of ‘objects,’ to 
believe that the world gives itself up, like a panorama totally translatable into logical 
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schemes, to knowing.”150 Truth is merely our compliance with the metaphors to which 
we generally adhere. “A truth impresses itself on consciousness in a certain and 
unquestionable manner . . . to a historical world whose conventions, or more generally, 
whose very language, are accepted more or less unconsciously and without 
resistance.”151 We know nothing of the world as it is of itself, all we know is a world 
shaped by these constructs, and there can be no truths in a world of such illusions, merely 
conformities. We cannot judge truth by what is evident as ‘truths’ are propositions that 
conform to certain established conventions. 
 
1.3 Vattimo’s Exploration of Nietzsche’s Aesthetics 
This final section focuses on Vattimo’s exploration of the arts and culture in Nietzsche’s 
work. It begins by discussing the dichotomy between identity and appearance, paying 
particular attention to the connection between excess and art. The discussion shifts to 
both the concept and the manuscript of The Will to Power, exploring further the 
importance of art and the figure of the artist in Nietzsche’s work.  
 
1.3.1 The Death of God: Excess and Art 
Vattimo is concerned with the dichotomy between appearance and identity in 
Nietzsche’s work, which is a reflection of the death of God. The death of God illustrates 
Nietzsche’s thinking that the world is a human construct, with ‘fables’ created in order 
to fulfil a particular function or need. Even God was a construct designed to fulfil a need 
for security. For Nietzsche, the symbolic world of appearance, characterized by the 
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metaphors or constructs that have been created by humankind, is not a stable one.152 The 
stability of this world is threatened by one particular element; namely excess. Excess, 
then, blurs the boundaries between reality and appearance, particularly when the subject 
itself is threatened. “Excess . . . is nothing more than the excess of the drive to masking 
and appearance.”153 The death of God illustrates this, as the ‘death’ occurs precisely 
because of its own excess. “God is dead as the result of the extreme degree of refinement 
reached by religiosity.”154 The self-sublimation of morality occurs because of morality, 
which cannot tolerate the ‘error’ of the construct that is God. “Excess: fiction, although 
arising ‘at the outset’ for utilitarian ends, it becomes autonomous once those ends are 
attained and actually revolts against the very canons of order that it had itself 
established.”155 Excess threatens the stability of the hegemonic social order of the 
created, symbolic world. 
In Vattimo’s exploration of aesthetic appearance, the negation of social roles, and 
identity in Nietzsche’s work, he relies heavily on the tension between the Apollonian 
and Dionysian drives. He draws, in particular on the connection between appearance 
and identity with respect to the arts. The Apollonian is now associated with illusion and 
appearance, as well as the principium individuationis or the principle of individuation, 
 
152 Vattimo claims that there are problems with this impulse to constantly produce and destroy 
new metaphors and symbols (fables). He believes that if, as Nietzsche claimed, these metaphors were to 
safeguard humankind then there would be no need for this impulse to function. This critique is, however, 
not a question that Nietzsche chose to address because, according to Vattimo, this would result in 
Nietzsche having trapped himself in exactly the type of metaphysical exploration that he wished to avoid. 
See Vattimo, Dialogue.  
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whereby each individual stands permanently alone, apart from all others.156 The 
principle of individuation is crucial to our perception of the world. It allows us to order 
mentally the world, distinguishing things and animate objects, for example, from one 
another.157 In contrast, the Dionysian threatens the equilibrium of the principium 
individuationis as this drive desires to negate identity. “The devotee of Dionysus is 
consumed by the horror and ecstatic rapture that result when the principium 
individuationis (the principle that each individual is himself alone and stands 
permanently apart from all the others) is violated.”158 The rupture of the principle of 
individuation breaks with societal convention, returning humankind to an almost primal 
state of unity, both with nature and with other human beings.  
Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and 
man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or 
subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son, man 
. . . Now the slave is a free man; now all the rigid, hostile barriers that 
necessity, caprice, or ‘impudent convention’ have fixed between man and 
man are broken.. Now, with the gospel of universal harmony, each one 
feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbour, but 
as one with him.159 
 
While we may perceive things as individuated or distinct, they are in fact connected. 
The principle of individuation is illusory. “The more fundamental truth about the world 
is that the things and creatures that we perceive as distinct entities are all intimately 
 
156 Vattimo, Dialogue, 101. Vattimo suggests, that, although Nietzsche draws on Schopenhauer’s 
principium individuationis, ultimately he breaks with Schopenhauerian thought. Nietzsche does so as he 
wishes to avoid becoming entangled in a metaphysical discussion on the tragic.  
 
157 See Kathleen Marie Higgins, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010), 
15. 
 
158 Vattimo, Dialogue, 101. 
 
159 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann in Friedrich Nietzsche, 
The Birth of Tragedy & The Case of Wagner, translated, with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1967), 37. 
 
 
 51  
connected in the life of the whole of which they are parts.”160 Vattimo claims that it is, 
in fact, the ongoing struggle between the Dionysian and Apollonian drives that impacts 
on appearance and identity. “The dichotomy between the real and apparent worlds is 
already embedded in a certain historical configuration of the balance of power between 
Dionysus and Apollo.”161 He considers this power struggle between the two figures as 
a socio-political one, that is evident in for example, issues of race, social standing, and 
politics. This means that culture is the result of the struggle between the Dionysian and 
Apollonian. “Culture is born of conflict, and the beauty of ancient Hellas must be 
understood in terms of a contest of two violently opposed forces.”162 Here a sort of peace 
treaty was drawn up between the two opposing forces, “the two antagonists were 
reconciled; the boundary lines to be observed henceforth by each were sharply defined, 
and there was to be a periodical exchange of gifts of esteem.”163 The dichotomy between 
reality and appearance continues to live in the arts. It is for this reason that excess, 
according to Nietzsche, may be most evident in art as art blurs the distinction between 
reality and appearance. “For excess . . . is nothing more than excess of the drive to 
masking and appearance.”164 The struggle between Dionysus and Apollo, then, is 
mirrored in the struggle between appearance and reality, which is evident in art as a 
locality of excess. “The confines between reality and appearance quiver and dissolve, 
indeed the very distinction between the two spheres is nullified (which is the essence of 
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excess), only when the identity and continuity of the subject with itself come under 
attack.”165 Theatre is a quintessential example of this essence of excess, as, here, the 
distinctions between appearance and reality are indistinct: it is the site where 
appearances elicit emotion, making them are as good as real. “The subject is (herself, 
himself) drawn in and made to become other than (her-, him-) self.”166 This act of 
becoming other means that theatre reigns as the principal site of artistic imitation. 
Indeed, born out of the capacity for adaptation that goes beyond what is necessary in 
terms of utility, the actor characterizes the connection between excess and art. 
Falseness with a good conscience; the delight in simulation exploding as a 
power that pushes aside one’s so-called “character,” flooding it and at times 
extinguishing it; the inner craving for a role and a mask, for appearance; an 
excess of the capacity for all kinds of adaptations that can no longer be 
satisfied in the service of the most immediate and narrowest utility.167 
 
The ability to step in and out of roles as one chooses, however, destabilises individual 
identities. Any centre that would establish the individual as a solid pillar of society is 
lost.168 The individual truly becomes the actor, losing any sense of inner truth, and this 
disidentification is the site of the struggle between Dionysus and Apollo, which is 
played out through art.169 Vattimo identifies the Apollonian and Dionysian struggle in 
Nietzsche’s aesthetics. Art is not, he claims, chosen casually as the principal site of 
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excess, but because it is in art that the boundary between reality, appearance, and 
identity is blurred.170  
Only a reading of the vicissitudes of art (its productions, its social status, 
its psychological significance for the art-maker and the spectator) that 
views it as the locus of a historic struggle between the principle of identity  
(the system of roles) and the Dionysian revel would have meaning.171 
 
Art, then, as the site of excess continually violates the boundaries between appearance 
and identity, and in doing so threatens the social order. Vattimo believes that this 
Nietzschean reading of art has much to offer towards enabling an understanding of the 
subversive character of art in contemporary aesthetics.  
 
 
1.3.2   The Will to Power 
The Will to Power is a collection of writings from Nietzsche’s notebooks, dating from 
1883 to 1888. This collection was published posthumously by Nietzsche’s sister, 
Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, in 1901, the year after his death. Neither the arrangement 
nor the numbering of these notes were Nietzsche’s; the notebooks contained drafts for 
several works and were never intended to be published in this particular format. Not all 
the notes were published in the 1901 edition. In 1904, his sister published a biography 
of Nietzsche, which contained additional notes from The Will to Power. Later, in 1906, 
another version was published, offering new notes blended in with the old in two 
volumes.172 Originally, The Will to Power was considered to be the culmination of 
Nietzsche’s thought. This view, according to Walter Kaufmann, was propagated by 
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Nietzsche’s sister, when the book was first published. It was upheld by Alfred Bäumler, 
who supplied the postscripts for a one volume edition of the work in 1930, which proved 
popular (probably because it was cheaper than other versions). Bäumler became a 
professor of philosopher in Berlin after Hitler came to power, which meant that his 
views on The Will to Power as Nietzsche’s magnum opus were widely accepted in 
Germany.173 Bäumler supported the Nazi regime and, by distorting Nietzsche’s work, 
did much to bring about Nietzsche’s Nazification. “Two years before the Seizure of 
Power, he wrote Nietzsche the Philosopher and Politician, which sought to cast him as 
the greatest intellectual forefather of Nazism.”174 After World War II, however, due to 
this connection with the Nazi regime, both the book itself and Bäumler’s view of the 
book were discredited. 
Vattimo notes that the traditional division of Nietzsche’s work marks three distinct 
periods: the early works; the middle period, which encompasses his writings from 
Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science; the later period that begins with Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. For him, The Will to Power stems from a turn in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
and so, in contrast to the traditional division of Nietzsche’s corpus, Vattimo suggests 
alternatives. The first is to view all of the writings from Human, All Too Human onwards 
as a unified body of work, and the second is to treat Thus Spoke Zarathustra as separate 
from the later works as “the latter are on the whole dominated by the (ultimately 
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abandoned) project to write a great, systematic work with the title The Will to Power.”175 
For Vattimo, Thus Spoke Zarathustra marks a new phase in Nietzsche’s thought: it is 
the beginning of Nietzsche’s focus on his planned project The Will to Power. Vattimo 
believes that even from a stylistic viewpoint Zarathustra is different from Nietzsche’s 
previous works. “It is a kind of long prose poem, whose most obvious model would be 
the New Testament. Zarathustra is similarly set out in verses, in which the didactic and 
cultic aims of the text are expressed.”176 He suggests that the reason for this difference 
is the prophetic character of the work, which holds that a radical redevelopment of 
culture and civilization must take place, owing to a distancing from the metaphysical 
tradition that produced the fable of morality.177  
 The term ‘will to power’ made its first appearance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.178 
Although no work prior to Zarathustra mentions the term, it is possible to chart its 
development throughout Nietzsche’s writings. ‘Power’ (Macht) frequently appears in 
his works and is used in the early The Birth of Tragedy in the context of the ability of 
art, music, and myth to affect people.179 His usage of the word ‘power’ developed over 
the course of his writings, with Nietzsche later speaking of the lust or desire for power 
(Machtgelust) in The Wanderer and his Shadow and Daybreak.180 Here, power is 
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associated with a psychological motivation. This shift from power as an external force 
to an internal one continued to develop in his writings.181 In Daybreak, for example, the 
phrases Gefühl der Macht (feeling of power) and Machtgefühl (powerfeeling) began to 
appear, illustrating a deepening of his use of the idea of power. 
This move, however, does not make the external and internal positions 
mutually exclusive; rather, it appears to mark a broadening of the notion 
of power from more overt, physical expressions of power to more subtle, 
covert, psychological or motivational expressions.182 
 
Eventually, Wille zur Macht (will to power) became Nietzsche’s most frequently used 
term in relation to power. Linda Williams suggests that, as his thought concerning power 
evolved, Nietzsche needed a phrase that would convey more than what the word ‘power’ 
usually did.183  
 The will to power is, for Nietzsche, the basis of reality. It is the driving force 
behind all human behaviour. Life, he maintains, is not so much a struggle for survival 
but a will to power.184 Reality consists of quantities of force in varying degrees of 
tension in relation to each other.185 This relation of tension means that every force is 
related to others, with every force being either dominant or submissive towards another. 
The dominance or submissiveness of a force does not diminish it in any way as obeying 
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and commanding both relate to power. “Individual power is by no means surrendered. 
In the same way, there is in commanding an admission that the absolute power of the 
opponent has not been vanquished, incorporated, disintegrated. ‘Obedience’ and 
‘commanding’ are forms of struggle.”186 The dominant (or superior) forces are known 
as active, while the submissive (or inferior) forces are known as reactive.187 We have an 
awareness of reactive forces as they tend to be forces of adaptation or conservation. 
Reactive forces fulfil “the conditions of life and the functions and tasks of conversation, 
adaptation and utility.”188 Active forces, in contrast, tend to escape our awareness and 
are creative, affirmative, and transformative.189 “Consciousness merely expresses the 
relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them. 
Consciousness is essentially reactive; that is why we do not know what a body can do, 
or what activity it is capable of.”190 Force may be characterised in terms of quantity and 
quality, which is determined by their relationship to each other. “Of two forces in a 
relation, one will be dominant and the other dominated, and each will have a specific 
quality, that of being active or reactive.”191 The will to power, then, as the inner will of 
force determines the relationship between both the qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of force. Forces are simply instruments of the will to power; they cannot achieve 
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anything without it. The will to power, while being the inner will of force, is not 
reducible to it. It has qualities that must be distinguished from those of force. While 
‘active’ and ‘reactive’ are terms used in relation to force, ‘affirmative’ and ‘negative’ 
are used in relation to the will to power. While linked to ‘active’ and ‘reactive,’ 
‘affirmative’ and ‘negative’ denote something more beyond these terms. “Affirmation 
is not action but the power of becoming active, becoming active personified. Negation 
is not a simple reaction but a becoming reactive.”192 The qualities of the will to power 
are more subtle and primordial than those of force. The will to power, then, decides the 
qualities of forces, interpreting and evaluating, and determining whether a force is active 
or reactive. “In this way the will to power is essentially creative and giving: it does not 
aspire, it does not seek, it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It gives.”193 
Vattimo takes up the will to power through the lens of nihilism and the eternal 
return. With Christian morality, humankind managed to chart a way out of the chaos of 
what the Italian philosopher describes as a ‘first nihilism.’194 Morality, for several 
reasons, was beneficial to humankind. It combatted humankind’s ‘smallness’ by 
providing an absolute value: morality gave meaning to suffering and evil; it implied that 
humankind possessed adequate knowledge of what was important; and it was also a 
mean of preservation.195 What Vattimo terms a ‘second nihilism’ is associated wit hthe 
collapse of  Christian. Morality was built on an error, and, in following morality’s 
imperative to be truthful, humankind discovered that it was a lie. The collapse of 
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morality, however, brought about a ‘second nihilism’ as the lens through which 
humankind had interpreted the world for centuries was broken. “The world no longer 
had any aim or purpose: ‘life as it is, without meaning or goal, a descent without any 
finale into nothingness: ‘Eternal Recurrence.”196 While morality provided values to live 
by, Vattimo maintains that it concealed the root of these values, which was the will to 
power. With morality’s collapse, these roots are exposed, revealing that everything is 
rooted in the will to power.197 The tension between forces, the instruments of the will to 
power, compels each individual to choose a side. While morality enabled the weak to 
survive by condemning the strong, with its collapse so too has this very safety net of 
condemnation. “These people will go under if they expressly and honestly acknowledge 
the struggle going on between the fundamentally opposed tendencies of the Will to 
Power.”198 There is a hermeneutical dimension to the will to power; in deciding the 
qualities of forces, it interprets and evaluates, determining if a force is active or reactive. 
In contrast to the weak, those that will prove themselves able to cope with the struggle 
thrown up by the will to power are those, who do not need to abide by absolute values.199  
“The strong man is characterized less by features that belong to the world of struggle 
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than by a kind of ‘hermeneutic’ character.”200 For Vattimo, the struggle between forces 
is, in essence, a struggle between two competing interpretations. As the will to power 
is, for Nietzsche, the basis of reality, what we perceive as the real world is simply a 
myth. Each of the forces competes with others, bringing forth different perspectives that 
make up our “apparent world.”201 
 
1.3.3 The Will to Power as Arts 
Art, Vattimo writes, is the model of the will to power. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
remarks that “existence can be justified aesthetically because art protects us from the 
truth.”202 While originally, for Nietzsche, art protects us from the truth, Vattimo claims 
that he later revisits and expands this thought. While art’s beauty shielded us from the 
ugliness of the chaos of reality, Its functioning is more than that of a mere shield. Art 
protects us from the truth because it is a creative activity of lying.203 Art does not hide 
an objective “truth behind” its forms. As a creative activity of the lie it opposes passivity, 
reactivity, and the spirit of revenge, that determine the search for truth.204 Vattimo draws 
on Nietzsche’s Nachlass to illustrate this: 
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There is only One world and it is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, 
meaningless. . . A world so constituted is the real world. . . We need lies in 
order to conquer this reality, this ‘truth’, that means in order to live [. . . ] 
Metaphysics, morality, religion, science – these are considered merely as 
various forms of lying: with their aid, life can be believed in. ‘Life should 
inspire trust’: presented in these terms, the task is immense. In order to solve 
it, man must naturally be a liar; more that anything else he must be an artist 
[ . . .] Metaphysics, morality, religion, science – all simply monstrous 
products of his will to art. (N Autumn 1887 – March 1888, VIII.2, 435, 
11[415]).205  
 
 The recognition of the will to power removes the comfort of the world of illusions and 
leaves us with the stark ‘reality’ of the world of chaos. Nietzsche views the will to power 
as art positively, given that it is not trapped within the cycle of metaphysics and morality 
that mask ‘reality.’ Art is free from these traditions, so that Vattimo points out that the 
Übermensch, today, only exists in the guise of the artist. The Übermensch, or overman, 
is one who does not look to an other-worldliness because of a dissatisfaction with this 
world, but instead meets new challenges as they arise. The Übermensch sets aside the 
principles by which he was raised and develops his own interpretation of the world. 
Nietzsche believes that those who do not follow suit are condemning themselves to a 
condition of slavery, subject to the traditions of morality and metaphysics. Vattimo 
regards the will to power as art and as represented in the Übermensch to be a portrayal 
of life without metaphysical structures. “Less a theory of art than as the working out of 
a picture of life in a world conceived as subordinate to the Will to Power, a world, in 
other words, free of stable foundations and structures, devoid of ultimate determiners 
and stripped of any guarantees.”206 For Nietzsche, even the expression itself of art is 
demonstrative of the will to power as those, for example, who take pleasure in tragedy 
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show an ability to cope in a world, where nothing can be considered as being ‘normal.’ 
It marks them as being strong characters, able to accept the world as a fable. In contrast 
to this, those who delight in the pretty and the delicate show an inability to cope under 
the same circumstances, as they are of weak character and require a suppport in the form 
of metaphysics or morality. “The concept of tragedy becomes a synonym for every 
healthy art form, because the enjoyment of tragedy is only open to those who have no 
need of ultimate solutions.”207 Strength is measured by the ability to cope with the 
difficulties of life, while weakness is reflected by the gravitation towards the beautiful. 
The pleasure in tragedy, then, distinguishes the strong from the weak. Strength is not 
only defined by rising to new challenges. Although the Übermensch is strong in the 
sense of being capable of rising to new challenges, Vattimo even notes that Nietzsche 
takes this in a physical sense. The denial and contempt for the body that is characteristic 
of both ascetism and of Platonic-Christian morality and metaphysics are suggestive of 
ressentiment and the desire for definitive solutions.208 He claims that, in being remote 
from the body, morality, metaphysics, and religion demonstrate a nihilistic spirit: 
nihilistic because they have reduced the body by removing its vitality.209 Art, for 
Nietzsche, has the opposite effect. Rather than distancing itself from the body, it 
possesses ‘enlivening qualities,’ acting contrariwise to ascetism and nihilism.210 In this 
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case, art does not provide a fleeting outlet for the emotions, as with metaphysics and 
morality, nor does it comfort us with a sense of rationality. There are echoes here of 
Nietzsche’s thought concerning tragedy. “Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo, but 
ultimately Apollo speaks the language of Dionysus.”211 The Apollonian, the beautiful, 
was rooted in Dionysian chaos, and here we see the same idea in the understanding of 
art being rooted in the body. However, in a similar manner to how the death of God was 
brought about by morality, asceticism too works towards freeing one from one’s own 
interests of self-preservation212. This is something akin to the Übermensch, who 
possesses ability to live through the tragic.  
 
210 See Vattimo, Introduction, 140-141. Vattimo draws on Nietzsche’s Nachlass to illustrate the 
“enlivening qualities” of art. 
The feeling of intoxication, corresponding to an increase in strength: 
most powerfully in the coupling of the sexes: 
new organs, new skills, colours, forms . . . 
“beautification” is a consequence of heightened strength 
beautification as a necessary consequence of strength-heightening 
beautification as the expression of a victorious will, a heightened 
co-ordination, a harmonization of all strong desires [ . . . ] 
logical and geometrical simplification is a consequence of strength-heightening: conversely, the 
perception of such a simplification 
in turn heightens one’s feeling of strength . . . 
Peak of development: great style [. . .] 
the state of desire one calls intoxication is precisely a high feeling of power . . . 
sensations of space and time are transformed: immense distances are surveyed and indeed are 
only now perceptible 
the extension of one’s gaze over vast subjects and expanses 
the refinement of the organ used to detect the smallest and most fleeting of things 
the power of divining, the ability to understand with only the slightest prompting, 
the slightest suggestion, “intelligent” sensuality . . . 
strength as a feeling of power in one’s muscles, as suppleness 
and pleasure in movement, as dance, as lightness and presto [ . . .] 
artists, if they can cut the mustard, have strong (physically strong) constitutions, 
have reserves, are powerhouses, sensual: without a certain overheating of the sexual organs no 
Raphael would have been possible. (N Early 1888 — Early 1889, VIII.3., 85ff., 14[117]). Gianni 
Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. Nicolas Martin (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2001), 141-142, quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, in Nietzsche: Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, eds. 
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), 85. Emphasis original). I have opted 
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211 Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. Nicolas Martin (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 143, quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, in Nietzsche: 
Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), 
136.  
 
212 Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, 146.  
 
 64  
The profundity of the tragic artist lies in the way that his aesthetic instinct 
ignores more distant consequences, that he does not become preoccupied 
with what is nearest, that he affirms the economy in great things, which 
justifies the terrible, the evil, the questionable and not only . . .justifies. 213 
 
It is only because of our capacity to look beyond our own self-interests, our need for 
self-preservation, that it is possible for the Übermensch to exist. Ascetism made this 
possible by turning on itself in much the same way that morality brought about the death 
of God. For Vattimo, this “radical disinterestedness” characterizes a world in which 




Vattimo believes that in Nietzsche he has found a thinker whose work is charged with 
meaning for the future. The German philosopher has contributed to the transformation 
of modern thought, and, in particular, to our understanding of truth. With the dissolution 
of strong, metaphysical structures that we regard as ‘true’, Nietzsche moved away from 
the idea of a foundational truth towards one that allows for a plurality of truths. Our 
beliefs are coloured by our belonging to a particular era or culture, meaning that what 
one person may hold as being true, may not be so for another. Indeed, this chapter 
examines how Nietzsche’s experience as a philologist colours his understanding of 
truth. In turn, this led to an exploration of Nietzsche’s idea of the death of God. While 
Nietzsche may have significantly altered the philosophical landscape with his emphasis 
on nihilism, he did not put forward a new foundation to replace the old. For Vattimo, 
of central importance in his appreciation of Nietzsche’s work, is the idea that there is 
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no longer an ultimate foundation but, instead, only interpretation. As a result, he 
believes that there is a vitality to Nietzsche’s work, limited only by the interpreter 
themselves.  
 




Vattimo’s Reception of Heidegger 
 
2.0 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on Vattimo’s understanding of Heidegger’s thought. Indeed, much 
of Vattimo’s thinking is rooted in Heidegger’s work. As the problem of Being is central 
to Heidegger’s thought, I first begin with a discussion of his treatment of this problem. 
This involves an exploration of his early work. In particular, Vattimo points to three 
publications that he believes play a significant role in the structuring of Being and Time: 
Heidegger’s doctoral thesis, his habilitation thesis, and his inaugural lecture on The 
Concept of Time in Historiography. In Introduzione a Heidegger, Vattimo pays 
particular attention to Husserl’s influence in the eventual formation of Being and Time, 
which I will explore in this section.  
The chapter next moves to discuss Being in relation to temporality. The problem 
of Being, Vattimo affirms, must be discussed in relation to time. This leads to an 
exploration of existence, including the important category of Dasein. This is the term 
used by Heidegger to characterise our being in the world. It encapsulates our existence 
and the disclosure of being, which I will discuss in relation to the meaning and 
significance of things in the world. Following on from this, I will consider our 
understanding of the world in relation to historicality, as the world is given to us as an 
already always. This means that we do not have an objective worldview, but already 
have certain ideas and understandings that shape it for us.  
The ontological difference, or the difference between Being and beings, is central 
to Heidegger’s work. I will examine the ontological difference through Vattimo’s 
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reading of Derrida, as he contrasts Heidegger’s ontological difference to Derrida’s 
différance. The first of Derrida’s two points, in which he is distinguished from 
Heidegger, is that any attempt to name difference is futile. The second point is that 
difference is erased as it is presented to us: that we can only search for the traces left 
behind. I will explore Vattimo’s presentation of Heidegger’s side of the debate, 
focusing on metaphysics.  
The discussion leads to a consideration of Heidegger’s thought on nihilism, 
focusing primarily on Being. For Heidegger nihilism is the forgetting of Being, in 
which the ontological difference is erased. The discussion of nihilism in relation to 
Being leads to an exploration of values; these are the medium through which we 
understand the things we encounter in our everyday world. Our awareness of Being is 
trapped in a table of values, which contribute to our inability to discuss the question of 
Being. We will see that Vattimo examines nihilism through a Heideggerian and a 
Nietzschean lens. One of the main similarities between Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s 
understanding of nihilism is their respective concern with values; I will explore this in 
the chapter through an analysis of exchange-value.  
The exploration of the relationship between Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s work 
leads to a consideration of the crisis of humanism. Vattimo sums up the crisis of 
humanism with the ironic remark: “God is dead but man isn’t doing so well himself.”1 
The Torinese believes that there is a link between the death of God and the crisis of 
humanism, as we will see in the chapter. The crisis of humanism, for Heidegger, is 
linked to technology, which is discussed in this section. This leads, penultimately, to a 
consideration of Vattimo’s understanding of Verwindung, a word that Vattimo believes 
 
1 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 
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Heidegger uses in the sense of a healing or convalescence. It is through the concept of 
Verwindung that the crisis of humanism may be understood.   
The final section focuses on the healing of the crisis of humanism. This comes 
about in relation to the Ge-Stell, which Vattimo translates as an ‘im-position.’ The Ge-
Stell connects technology and Being, in that it allows technology to reveal the traits of 
humanism and metaphysics. Vattimo sees this unveiling itself as a gift of Being. This 
unveiling means that the Ge-Stell is the place where we get a glimpse of the Ereignis, 
or the event. It may also be spoken of in terms of something coming into view. The 
chapter concludes with this discussion. 
 
 
2.1 Heidegger on Being 
This section focuses on the central question in Heidegger’s thought: Being. In his own 
writings, Vattimo identifies three publications that he believes were central to the 
development of Heidegger’s publication, Being and Time. I will discuss further 
temporality in relation to Being, and Dasein, Heidegger’s term for our being in the 
world. Finally, the section discusses the ontological difference. Vattimo juxtaposes 
Heidegger’s ontological difference against Derrida’s différance.  
 
2.1.1 The Question of Being 
The question of Being is central to Heidegger’s thought. The philosopher questioned 
how “being” could be understood, or, rather, what it means “to be.” He drew attention 
to the problem of “being”, which had been neglected by Western philosophy. “Being” 
was more complex than simply acknowledging or identifying things or objects that exist 
in terms of their characteristics. Rather, the problem of Being means looking past the 
various forms of characteristic identification and focusing instead on actual existence. 
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This prompted Heidegger to make a distinction between “Being” and “beings.” For 
him, beings are entities; they are things that exist in the world and have characteristics 
or properties that define them. Being, in contrast means the being of these entities, as 
the expression of their very existence. Heidegger found that Western philosophy had 
focused on appraising particular entities, and, in the process, neglected the Being of 
entities.  
In order to examine the question of Being, Heidegger turned to three particular 
philosophical periods: the Greeks, the Scholastics, and, finally, to modern philosophy. 
With regard to the Greek philosophers, Aristotle’s work on the categories proved to be 
particularly interesting for Heidegger. In his philosophy Aristotle approaches beings 
through the two significant categories of were substances and attribute. Substance is 
what the thing is in itself, allowing one to distinguish one substance from other 
substances. For example, a table is identifiable and separate from a chair, a plant from 
an animal, and so forth. Attributes mark out the qualities that a substance possesses, 
such as its size, colour, and so on. A substance such as a table, then, may have any 
number of attributes. It could, for instance, be made of wood, it could be painted, it may 
be large or small, it may be round or square. While Aristotle identified different 
categories in approaching beings, which, then, became a cornerstone of Western 
ontology, this was not adequate in addressing Heidegger’s question concerning Being 
itself. A substance or attribute did not explain the Being of something, in terms of its 
actual existence. Seeking to explore this further, Heidegger turned to the Scholastics. 
Duns Scotus, the Scottish Franciscan, read Aristotle in a manner that was consistent 
with Christian theology. He was concerned with how entities were thought to exist. As 
God encompassed and generated all other beings, it was impossible to place God simply 
in either of Aristotle’s categories of substance or attribute. God was not merely a being 
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among other beings, and so God became the origin and explanation of Being. God, 
then, became the ground, the ultimate origin, of Being. Heidegger became dissatisfied 
with the idea of any sort of ground for Being. He believed that trying to explain Being 
by grounding it in something else did not adequately explain Being. And so, he turns 
to modern philosophy in order to further explore the question of Being. In particular, 
he draws on the work of Edmund Husserl, whose thought forms the foundation of 
phenomenology. Husserl’s work focused on consciousness, specifically on subjective 
consciousness as the condition for all experience. His primary focus was on how our 
consciousness is the condition for all experience; in other words, how we become aware 
of things is crucial to our sense of what actually is. God as the ground of Being was 
replaced with consciousness in Husserl’s work. While Husserl was certainly influential 
for Heidegger, his discussion was still not adequate in terms of dealing with the 
question of Being.  
The next phase on his search regarding the question of Being brought Heidegger 
back to Aristotle. It was not, however, a return to the categories, but to the practical 
ways in which the world is known, i.e. phronesis. This is found in Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics. Heidegger believed that the focus on Aristotle’s categories, 
which was prominent through the Scholastic period and, indeed, carried through to the 
late nineteenth century, needed to be replaced. The emphasis ought to be on 
encountering being practically. To further this train of thought, he drew on William 
Dilthey’s work. Dilthey concentrated on lived experience or ‘factical life.’ This was the 
lived experience of the practical and social world with all that it implies, such as 
perceptions, evaluations, and responses. This lived experience is, essentially, 
interpretative as our experiences of the world change throughout time. For Heidegger, 
the factical life is where entities appear before they become objects of theoretical 
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knowledge and it is that he decided to focus his energies. As Being is, essentially, 
always the Being of something, he opted the human being as the place of emergence of 
Being, which he referred to as Dasein. Dasein comes from Da, there, and Sein, being, 
so literally means there-being. It was also the eighteenth century translation of the Latin 
praesentia, which means existence or existence. Dasein could not be reduced to 
consciousness, to a species, or to a body. Dasein, then, is not simply human being, but 
human being in all its ways of being. This study of Dasein lead to his major work, Being 
and Time, which is his investigation of the relationship between being and time.  
 
2.1.2 The Early Heidegger on Being 
Vattimo believes that three of Heidegger’s works prior to Being and Time play a crucial 
role in the development of its structure.2 The first is Heidegger’s doctoral thesis, The 
Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism. Heidegger completed his doctorate in 
philosophy in 1913. Husserl’s influence on Heidegger is evident in this work with its 
emphasis on  “the claim of the validity of ‘logic’ against the ‘psychologistical’ 
tendency, that . . . reduced the laws of logic to empirical laws on the working of the 
human mind.”3 This focus on logic continued in Heidegger’s habilitation thesis, Duns 
Scotus’ Doctrine of Categories and Meaning, which continues the discourse on the 
world of meaning that he began in his doctoral thesis.4 Indeed, Heidegger’s own way 
of philosophizing becomes visible in the habilitation thesis, where we already see some 
of the themes and interests that will become characteristic of his later work. The third 
 
2 See Gianni Vattimo, Introduzione a Heidegger (Roma-Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2000), 
4.  
 
3 Ibid., 5. “La rivendicazione della validità della « logica » contro la tendenza « psichologistica» 
che . . . riduceva le leggi logiche a leggi empiriche sul funzionamento della mente umana.” 
 
4 Ibid., 6. “Il discorso sull’autonomia del mondo dei significati.” 
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publication that Vattimo views as a precursor to Being and Time is Heidegger’s 
inaugural lecture on The Concept of Time in Historiography. Once again, he believes, 
we see an important foreshadowing of the structure of Being and Time: “The explicit 
connection of metaphysics with that which Heidegger calls a ‘«teleological-
metaphysical clarification of consciousness»’, that is the living spirit, already clearly 
alludes to the structuring that will become explicit in Being and Time.”5  
Vattimo underlines the importance of the years preceding and succeeding the 
First World War. He believes that these years play a central role in the formation of 
Heidegger’s thought through Husserl’s influence. Indeed, after the First World War, 
Heidegger became his assistant in Freiburg. Even though Being and Time breaks with 
Neo-Kantianism, regardless of the Neo-Kantian affinity present in Husserl’s work, 
Vattimo considers that the fact that the work is dedicated to Husserl is in itself 
significant. He maintains that it shows that Heidegger saw a way of developing his own 
discourse through Husserl’s phenomenology.  
The fact that Being and Time, has no longer anything to do with Neo-
Kantianism, is dedicated to Husserl, shows that Heidegger saw in Husserl 
and phenomenology, more than a change and a deepening of the Neo-
Kantian transcendental point of view, the way for enlarging his own 
discourse in the direction of the dimensions of history, or effectivity, we 




5 Ibid., 7. “L’esplicita connesione della metafisica con quela che qui Heidegger chiama una 
«chiarificazione teleologico-metafisica della coscienza», cioè dello spirito vivente, allude già 
chiaramente alla impostazione che diverrà esplicita in Essere e tempo.” Living spirit, according to 
Gregory Bruce Smith, for Heidegger, is subjectivity “recast as lebendinger Geist, living spirit embedded 
in historical practice” (Gregory Bruce Smith, Martin Heidegger: Paths Taken, Paths Opened [Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007], 45). In Heidegger’s later works living spirit “is what will 
. . . be called Being” (ibid). 
 
6 Ibid.,8- 9. “Il fatto che Essere e tempo, che con neokantianismo non ha più nulla da spartire, sia 
dedicato a Husserl, dimostra che Heidegger vedeva in Husserl e nella fenomenologia, più che una 
variazione e un approfondimento del punto di vista trascendentale neokantiano, il modo per allargare il 
suo discorso proprio nella direzione di quelle dimensioni di storicità, di effetività, potremmo dire di 
concretezza, a cui alludevano le pagine conclusive della tesi su Scoto.  
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Indeed, Vattimo’s opinion is that Heidegger was able to find ‘a radical novelty’ in 
Husserl’s works.7  In regard to his own interests, Heidegger focused on areas in 
Husserl’s work that differed from Neo-Kantianism. While Neo-Kantianism, for 
example, favoured science as a valid form of knowledge, Husserl turned toward 
intuition. “For Husserl the cognitive act is resolved in Anschauung, intuition (of the 
essences), that cannot be reduced to scientific knowledge but is an encounter with 
things, so to speak, in flesh and bone.”8 For Vattimo, importantly, Heidegger’s 
interpretation of phenomenology was a reflection of the wider interests of German and 
European culture during that period. He argues that Heidegger’s acceptance speech on 
becoming a member of the Academy of Sciences in Heidelberg is an indicator of how 
Heidegger he the cultural climate of the time.  
It is not possible to describe adequately the significance of the vivid years 
between 1910 and 1914; one can at best try to clarify it through a choice of 
names and events: the second edition, redoubled, of the Will To Power of 
Nietzsche, the tradition of the works of Kierkegaard and of Dostoyevsky, 
the incipient interest for Hegel and Schelling, the poetry of Rilke and of 
Trakl, the Gesammelte Schriften of Dilthey.9  
 
The speech is certainly indicative of the other influences on Heidegger, such as 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Dilthey.  Nietzsche, in particular, proves to be a dominant 
force, especially in later years. Dilthey too takes a central role in the formation of Being 
 
7 Ibid., 9. “Una radicale novità.” 
 
8 Ibid. “Per Husserl l’atto conoscitivo si risolve nella Anschauung, l’intuizione (delle essenze), 
che non si riduce alla conoscenza scientifica . . . un incontrare le cose, per dir così, in carne e ossa.” For 
Husserl, intuition is whatever is given to us immediately. It is not a separate source of truth, but rather a 
generic term for whatever any privileged consultant tells me. “One can say in general, that in order to be 
quite clear as to the sense of an expression (or as to the content of a concept) one must construct the 
corresponding intuition: in this intuition one can see what the expression ‘really means’” (Husserl, 
Logical investigations I, Chap. 2. § 21, 306).  
 
9 Ibid, 11. “Non è possibile descrivere adeguamente quel che portarono i vivaci anni tra il 1910 e 
il 1914; si può al massimo cercare di chiarirlo attraverso una scelta di nomi e di avvenimenti: la seconda 
edizione, raddoppiata, della Volontà di potenza di Nietzsche, la tradizione delle opere di Kierkegaard e 
di Dostoievskij, l’incipiente interesse per Hegel e Schelling, la poesie di Rilke e di Trakl, le Gesammelte 
Schriften di Dilthey.” 
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and Time, and, for Vattimo, this is evident in the discussion of care and historicity. 
Dlthey’s influence is especially evident in Being and Time “where the existential 
analytic culminates in the recognition of temporality as the ontological sense of care, 
that is of all the structures constitutive of being human.”10 Indeed, Being and Time 
marks the point where Heidegger’s interest in the problem of  the historical sciences 
shifts from a methodological problem to an ontological problem: “the real foundation 
of history and historiography is possible only in the light of a restatement of the problem 
of being: the problem of historicity is that then of a “philosophy of life” . . . the same 
fundamental problem of Being and Time.”11 It is here, too, in Heidegger’s turn to the 
ontological, that we find Kierkegaard’s influence. He is credited in Being and Time as 
having affirmed the problem of existence as an existential problem.12  
For Vattimo, what lead Heidegger to study the problem of Being in Being and 
Time is developed between two poles.13 First is the German philosopher’s religious 
formation, beginning with his interest in both the New Testament and the Church 
Fathers. “Both the problem of history and in general of ‘life’ that is found in the culture 
of the time, led him to put more radically in question the ideas of validity, of reality, of 
being, inherited from metaphysics.”14 Indeed, Heidegger’s interests after the First 
 
10 Ibid. “Là dove l’analitica esistenziale culmina nel riconoscimento della temporalità come senso 
ontologico della cura, cioè di tutte le strutture costitutive dell’essere dell’uomo.” 
 
11 See Vattimo, Introduzione a Heidegger, 11. “Un vera fondazione della storicità e della 
storiografia è possibile solo alle luce di una riproposizione del problema dell’essere; il problemo della 
storicità è poi quello della “filosofia della vita” . . . con lo stesso problema fondamentale di Essere e 
tempo.” 
 
12 Ibid., 12. “In Essere e Tempo, Kierkegaard viene nominato come un pensatore che «ha 
espliciamente affermato e accuratamente penetrato il problema dell’esistenza come problema 
esistentivo».”  “In Being and Time, Kierkegaard was nominated as a thinker that has explicitly affirmed 
and accurately penetrated the problem of existence as an existential problem.” Vattimo quotes from 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, pg 357.   
 
13 Vattimo, Introduzione a Heidegger, 15.  
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World War include religion; he taught courses in mysticism, the phenomenology of 
religion, and on Augustine and Neo-Platonism. This religious interest plays a part in 
the formation of Being and Time in exploring the question of Being. The second pole 
is in relation to the question of the validity of knowledge, which stems from the Neo-
Kantian polemic against psychologism. This question, combined with the problem of 
truth and the application of the categories of the object introduces Heidegger to the 
great themes of the metaphysical tradition.15 These two poles mark the difference, for 
Heidegger, between the living spirit and the more conceptual schemes found in Western 
philosophical thought.  
 
 
2.1.3 Being in the World  
Given that Heidegger considers the problem of Being in relation to time, temporality is 
key to Vattimo’s understanding of Heidegger’s contribution. “[The notion of Being] is 
dominated by the idea of presence — that is thought of in relation to a specific temporal 
determination — the proposal of the problem of being must be made in relation to 
time.”16 This means that temporality, then, is central to any discussion of existence.17 
Indeed, Vattimo maintains that the. term existence can be understood in its 
etymological sense, which points beyond the simply-present reality in the direction of 
 
14 Ibid., 16. “Sia il problema della storicità e in genere della «vita» che trova nella cultura del 
tempo, lo conducono a porre sempre più radicalmente in questione le nozioni di validità, di realtà, di 
essere, ereditate dalla metafisica.” 
 
15 Ibid., 16. 
 
16 Ibid., 18. “[La nozione di essere] rivela dominata dall’idea della presenza — cioè pensara in 
rapporto a una specifica determinazione temporale — la riproposizione del problema dell’essere va fatta 
in rapporto al tempo.” 
 
17 Vattimo notes that “the essence of man is existence.” “L”«essenza dell”uomo» è l”«esistenza»” 
(Vattimo, Introduzione a Heidegger, 20).  
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possibility.18 Here exsistere means to stand outside (star fuori), going beyond the 
simple present. This means that being is not given to us solely as a determined reality, 
but has potentiality, opening up future possibilities and other ways of being. Prior to 
recognizing this potentiality, however, there is the ordinary, everydayness of being, 
being-in-the-world, or Dasein.  
It [Dasein] expresses well the fact that existence is not defined only as an 
overcoming, that transcends the reality given in the direction of the 
possibilities, but that this overcoming is always an overcoming of 
something, that is always concretely situated, there is. Existence, being 
there, being in the world are therefore synonyms.19  
 
As Heidegger writes of Dasein as the activity of existing or being in the world, Vattimo 
considers it necessary to further discuss the world as being existential. “« The ‘world’ 
is not only a determination of being dissimilar to Dasein, but is, on the contrary, a 
character of Dasein itself », namely that the world is existential.”20 The world is a 
feature of Dasein itself. We encounter things in the world that are tools or instruments 
for us which belong equally to Dasein as the projection of Being.  
Simple-presence is the way in which things are manifest in relation to a 
precise operation of man; and in general things are not first of all in 
themselves, but first of all in relation to us as tools; their being is radically 




18 Ibid., 21.  
 
19 Ibid., 22. “Esso [Dasein] esprime bene il fatto che l’esistenza non si definisce solo come 
oltrepassamento, che trascende la realtà data in direzione della possibilità, ma che questo oltrepassamento 
è sempre oltrepassamento di qualcosa, è sempre, cioè, concretamente situato, ci è. Esistenza, esserci, 
essere-nel-mondo sono dunque sinonimi.” Italics original.  
 
20 Ibid., 23. “«il ‘mondo’ non è affatto una determinazione  dell’ente difforme dell’esserci, ma è, 
al contrario, un carattere dell’esserci stesso», ossia che il mondo è un esistenziale” (Gianni Vattimo, 
Introduzione a Heidegger [Roma-Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2000, 23, quoting Martin Heidegger, 
Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe 2 [Frankfurt a.M., Stand: Klostermann, 1977]). 
 
21 Ibid., 25. “La semplice-presenza è un modo in cui le cose si manifestano in rapporto a una 
precisa operazione dell’uomo; e in generale, le cose non sono anzitutto  «in sè», ma anzitutto in rapporto 
con noi come strumenti; il loro essere è radicalmente e costuitivamente in rapporto all’essere progettante 
dell’esserci.” 
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Tools or instruments have their being in relation to Dasein; their totality can only be 
because they are put to use by someone or because there is someone there to use them. 
The world itself is rooted in Dasein. For Vattimo, the world is a totality of instruments, 
with signs as a guide to their use: “we can in fact say that, if the world is the totality of 
the instruments [or tools] of man, signs are a bit like the instructions for the use of these 
instruments.”22 For Vattimo, it is the relation to the totality of these instruments, the 
idea of understanding, that signifies being in the world.23  
The world is given to us as an ‘already always,’ meaning that we already have 
certain ideas, prejudices, and understandings.24 Vattimo describes it in Plato’s words: 
“we can recognise the truth when we meet it because in some way we know it 
already.”25 He takes care to point out that although we have a pre-comprehension of the 
world, it is far from being a complete knowledge of the same; our knowledge of 
instruments, for example, rests in their possible uses, which is the opening up of 
possibility or a guide for potentiality.26 We do not have an exhaustive knowledge of 
their uses, but much more a rough outline that must be built upon. Vattimo likens it to 
the “form of a sketch that must be further elaborated.”27 Our knowledge, then, rests on 
 
 
22 Ibid., 27. “Si può infatti dire che, se il mondo è la totalità degli strumenti dell’uomo, i segni 
sono un po’ come le instruzioni per l’uso di tali instrumenti.” 
 
23 Ibid.  
 
24 See Vattimo, Introduzione a Heidegger, 29. “Già sempre.” 
 
25 Ibid. “Noi possiamo riconoscere il vero quando lo incontriamo perché in qualche modo lo 
conosciamo già.” 
 
26 “Our being in the world is not only or first of all a being in the middle of a totality of 
instruments, but a being familiar with a totality of meanings . . . Il nostro essere nel mondo non è solo o 
anzitutto in essere in mezzo a una tonalità di strumenti ma un essere familiari con una totalità di 
significati”. Vattimo, Introduzione a Heidegger, 27. 
 
27 Ibid, 30. “Forma di un abbozzo che deve essere ulterioremente elaborato.” 
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interpretation as further uses and possibilities are open to discovery. “Knowledge is the 
articulation of an original comprehension in which things are already always 
discovered.”28 Indeed, Dasein is always open to possibilities and is always in relation 
to the world. Knowledge, as interpretation, is open to development, yet retains its 
original relation with the world as the articulation of an original comprehension. In 
addition, not only does Dasein reflect a comprehension of “the totality of 
significances,” but also exhibits what Vattimo describes as a “certain affective 
tonality.”29 Things are significant, or meaningful, but provide an emotional value. This 
emotional value is not merely an accompaniment to pre-comprehension, but is, in itself, 
a type of pre-comprehension. This, Vattimo acknowledges, is his own hypothesis, but 
he maintains that it is supported by Heidegger’s position; “every specific relationing 
with individual things (but then also the comprehension and its interpretative 
articulation) is made possible by the opening to the world guaranteed by the affective 
tonality.”30 Affective tonality is the original way in which one find and feels oneself to 






28 Ibid., 31.” La conoscenza è l’articolazione di una comprensione originaria in cui le cose ci 
somo già sempre scoperte.” 
 
29 Ibid., 32-33. “Totalità di significati.” “Una certa tonalità affettiva.” 
 
30 Ibid., 33. “Ogni specifico rapportarsi alle cose singole (ma quindi anche la comprensione e la 
sua articolazione interpretativa) è reso possibile dalla apertura al mondo garantita dalla tonalità affettiva.” 
 
31 “The affective tonality, that is the original way of finding oneself and feeling oneself in the 
world, is a type of first global prension, that founds in a certain way the same understanding.” “La tonalità 
affettiva, cioè il modo originario di trovarsi e di sentirsi nel mondo, è una specie di prima «prensione» 
globale del mondo, che fonda in qualche modo la stessa comprensione.” Vattimo, Introduzione a 
Heidegger, 34.  
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2.1.4 The Ontology of Difference 
Vattimo emphasizes the centrality of the ontological difference in Heidegger’s thought, 
particularly in his volume Introduzione a Heidegger. The ontological difference is the 
difference between Being and beings, or, rather, entities and the being or existence of 
these entities. Indeed, Vattimo describes the ontological difference as the light in which 
Being distinguishes itself from being; it is that light by which an entity becomes 
visible.32 He discusses the ontological difference not only in regard to foundation, but 
also technology. His understanding of the ontological difference is, in fact, best 
appreciated in The Adventure of Difference.  
In The Adventure of Difference, Vattimo explores the question of Heidegger’s 
ontological difference by examining it in the light of Derrida’s différance. Derrida 
played on the word difference with its orthographic variant, différance. In French, the 
verb différer has two meanings: it can mean to differ and to defer. Derrida exploits this 
ambiguity in his philosophy. Vattimo, for his part, identifies these meanings as “‘being 
distinct or divergent’ and ‘deferring’ in time.”33 So, for example, différer can be used 
to distinguish two different spatial objects, such as the red coat being different from the 
blue coat. It may also be used in the sense of to defer something, as for an appointment, 
in terms of temporality. Normally, one meaning or the other is used. In Derrida’s 
différance, however, the two meanings are combined so that both meanings are present 
simultaneously. In other words, différance itself is a play on its two senses. First, as it 
has two different meanings, it differs in itself. Secondly, it also defers any single 
meaning being applied to it. For example, if we use différer in the sense of a distinction 
 
 
32 See Vattimo, Introduzione e Heidegger, 66-67. 
 
33 Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger, trans. 
Cyprian Blamires with Thomas Harrison (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 37.  
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between one object and another, its other meaning, to defer, is simply held in reserve 
until it is required for use in another context. Derrida’s play on the meaning of the term 
différance is reflected in the spelling of the word itself where he introduces the variant 
spelling to underline the ambiguity. This underlines the difference between the audible 
and the written and, at the same time, the imperceptibility of that difference. “Wishing 
thereby to show that the differential element that constitutes the sign is not at the same 
time something that can be grasped as ‘different.’”34 We can speak of things, objects, 
and so on, because we cannot speak of the absence that difference produces. As any 
word used to describe the absence, or difference, is subject to the effects of différance, 
it is trying to say the unsayable. Derrida emphasises this inaudible and invisible trace. 
As the meaning of the sign is derived from the difference, from the meaning held in 
reserve, the sign always contains a trace of that other meaning. Or, in other words, the 
sign contains a trace of what it does not mean. Trace, then, may be understood as a term 
for the absence of a presence, an always-already absent presence.  
Derrida considered the possibility of a connection between différance and 
Heidegger’s ontological difference. Vattimo believes that, while he was aware of a 
connection between the two, ultimately Derrida had  an issue with it.35 This is because, 
 
 
34 Ibid. Here Vattimo notes that it is important to remember that the sound of the word remains 
the same, regardless of whether an ‘e’ or ‘a’ is used in the spelling. Derrida draws on Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s work on semiotics, which is the study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretations. 
Although Saussure’s model gave priority to linguistics, Derrida preferred a more general outlook. For 
him, focusing on linguistics meant that semiotic was restricted as it failed to take prelinguistics into 
account. Terms derive their meanings in relation to other terms; this is the interplay of differences. For 
Derrida, this does not occur solely in language, but in all systems of signs or codes. For more on Derrida 
and Saussure, see Russell Daylight, What If Derrida Was Wrong About Saussure? (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011) and Carol Sanders, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Saussure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
35 Ibid., 139. Although Derrida was aware of the connections between his idea of difference and 
Heidegger’s ontological difference, he believed that Heidegger still remained within a metaphysical 
framework. For more on Derrida’s critique of Heidegger, see Nicholas Waghorn, Nothingness and the 
Meaning of Life: Philosophical Approaches to Ultimate Meaning Through Nothing and Reflexivity 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014) and Stephen Burik, Comparative Philosophy and the Task of 
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for Derrida, Heidegger’s ontological difference is caught in a “metaphysical 
nostalgia.”36 This is so as he, Heidegger, is caught in a search for a single word that 
will accurately sum up the essence of being. Derrida is not of the opinion that this is 
possible, and différance emphasises this impossibility. There will never be such a name 
as it is not possible for there to be one name. There cannot be a word to describe the 
essence of Being as human experience always originates in différance.  There can, then, 
only ever be a trace and never an original. “Difference is prior to everything.”37  
Vattimo asserts that if Derrida’s position on the matter were to be summed up in one 
sentence it would be “in the beginning was the trace.”38  For Derrida, even using the 
term ontological difference is an attempt to name that difference between Being and 
beings that cannot be named. Vattimo adds that this is not a shortcoming of language, 
but rather it is simply that there can be no such name: “the moment difference is 
enunciated it disappears . . . to name difference is merely to open up the system of 
differences that constitutes the symbolic in its effective differential structure; it 
discloses differences as différance, that is, as simulacra.”39 As difference cannot be 
named, and as it erases itself in presenting itself to us, we must search for the traces it 
leaves behind. Derrida calls these clues undecidables. 
 
Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2009).  
 
36 See Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, 138. 
 
37 Ibid., 139. 
 
38 Ibid, 139. “A trace, then, and never a presence to which the trace can be related; for the 
differences that structure the field of human experience originate from the start in a difference, a 
difference that is at the same time divergence and indefinite deferment, and in which what is there 
beforehand is always a trace and never an original” (Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, 139).  
 
39 Ibid., 141. 
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Vattimo, however, rebuffs Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s ontological 
difference. His issue with Derrida lies in his belief that Derrida failed to consider the 
problems that Heidegger took into consideration in his thinking on the ontological 
difference. He maintains that Derrida failed to acknowledge the problem of difference 
relative to our time, or, rather, who and what makes such a difference? “All Heidegger’s 
thinking on difference, for example, may be read as the development of a problem 
Derrida never stops for a second to consider – the problem of how difference can seem 
to be the most appropriate term for conceiving our epoch.”40 In other words, Vattimo 
believes that the problem with Derrida’s thought is that it is itself still trapped within a 
metaphysical framework and does not take into account the possibility of  moving into 
a post-metaphysical era. Différance, he believes, fails to offer any alternative to 
metaphysics, and, as a result, takes on the very attributes of metaphysical Being that 
Heidegger’s ontological difference opposes.41 The problem rests in the undecidables; 
as difference cannot be named, and as it erases itself in presenting itself to us, we must 
search for the traces it leaves behind. Derrida calls these clues undecidables and these 
undecidables are what allow us to speak of difference. The problem is that to speak of 
difference within a metaphysical framework can only be done parodistically. “Parody 
is the only way of ‘making the difference’ in a situation in which all differentiation is 
always only the process of duplicating the trace, that is a situation in which the 
absolutization of difference has taken away all possibility of difference.”42  Parody 
makes the philosophy of difference nothing more than a simulacrum of the 
 
 
40 Ibid., 140.  
 
41 Ibid, 144.  
 
42 Ibid, 143.  
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metaphysical text that it seeks to rewrite. For Vattimo,  parody is defined from a 
“position of consciousness,” which is typical of a metaphysics and of presential 
thinking.43 “Différance is in every respect an archstructure, diametrically opposed to 
Heideggerian ontological difference.”44 Difference, then, does not offer any alternative 
to metaphysics, but, instead, constitutes a return to it, albeit indirectly. 
Vattimo further claims that, in his thought on the ontological difference 
Heidegger shows that the work of a particular thinker is not a complete and finished 
product. Rather, it is a foundation on which others may build, elaborating on and 
furthering the original idea. “Heidegger showed that the inheritance we receive from a 
given thinker is the nucleus he leaves us of what is still to be thought, not acquired 
results but ways thinking feels called on to follow again and again.”45 Given that 
thinking concerning Heidegger’s ontological difference appears to be in decline, 
Vattimo asks if it is possible that it could be considered as such a nucleus. For him, this 
decline does not indicate a complete deterioration of the interest in the ontological 
difference. “Far from signifying any decline in or exhaustion of the idea of the 
ontological difference put forward by Heidegger . . . ontological difference taps into its 
still-productive core, a core that constitutes an authentic future for thinking.”46 Thus, 
he believes that one can continue to develop Heidegger’s thought on the ontological 
difference, even in the light of criticism from other thinkers. The ontological difference 
 
 
43 Ibid, 144.  
 
44 Ibid.  
 
45 Ibid, 137. 
 
46 Ibid, 138. 
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may act as a means through which further discussion on hermeneutics may continue to 
take place.  
 
2.2 Heidegger’s Nihilism  
I now turn to Vattimo’s appropriation of Heidegger’s on nihilism. Again, Being is at 
the forefront of this exploration. This analysis leads to an exploration of values, which 
contributes to our further engagement with the question of Being. Finally, the section 
returns to Vattimo’s understanding of nihilism, now through a Heideggerian and 
Nietzschean lens.  
 
2.2.1 Nihilism  
Heidegger’s discussion of nihilism, Vattimo believes, is inextricably linked to his 
thought concerning Being. For Heidegger, nihilism is focused on Being and the 
forgetting of Being, as characterised in the ontological difference. The kind of nihilism 
defined by Heidegger is a “process in which, at the end, ‘there is nothing left’ of Being 
as such.””47 This Heideggerian definition addresses the forgetting of Being by 
humanity, but acts as a deception or self-deception of knowledge against which one 
could seek refuge in the solidity of Being as though forgotten but not vanished. The 
forgetting of Being and the concomitant neglect of the ontological difference meant 
that Being was eventually equated with God as the supreme being. Heidegger’s 
definition of nihilism, however, fundamentally counters this equation, and in this sense, 
even goes beyond Nietzsche’s death of God.48 Western philosophy had focused on 
 
 
47 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 19. 
 
48 For further discussion, see ibid., 20.  
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appraising particular entities rather than the Being of these entities, thereby continuing 
to neglect the ontological difference. For Heidegger, then, the question of Being per se 
was not treated in such a way that it would have overcome the ontological difference. 
This meant that from Heidegger’s perspective, Western philosophy may be seen as the 
history of the forgetting of Being.  
Vattimo, underlines the significant role of values in Heidegger’s understanding 
of nihilism. Values are the medium through which we understand the things we 
encounter in the everyday world. If we take the example of a lamp, it is more than 
simply a certain size, weight, or appearance. We might attempt to describe the ‘more’ 
in terms of usefulness or purpose. In the lamp’s case this is its capacity to provide light. 
What we are actually doing in taking from the lamp what belongs to it and replacing 
this with a value is an attempt to restore what we have taken away. This process applies 
to Being and how it has not been appreciated in Western philosophy. “For Heidegger, 
Being is annihilated insofar as it is transformed completely into value.”49 Our 
awareness of Being is thought of in terms of value. “He [Heidegger] describes nihilism 
as the stagnation of our awareness of Being in an anthropocentric table of values.”50 
We arrived at this point through Plato and the Theory of Ideas, which, as it developed, 
led to the forgetting of the ontological difference. Plato’s Theory of Ideas or Forms 
maintains that alongside the visible world of sights and sounds, there is another 
invisible one that gives it being. This is the world of Forms or Ideals such as Beauty, 
Temperance, and Courage, among others. The Forms themselves are unchanging, 
abstract, and ideal. An object has a characteristic because it participates in the Form of 
 
 
49 Ibid, 20. 
 
50 Ruth Irwin, “Heidegger and Nietzsche: The Question of Value and Nihilism in Relation to 
Education.” Studies in Philosophy and Education 22(2003): 227-244, at 228, emphasis original.  
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that characteristic; a painting, for example, is beautiful because it participates in the 
Form of Beauty. Objects may be categorized as being similar because they participate 
in the same form. We can only have genuine knowledge of things that are perfect and 
unchanging, i.e., Forms.51 Being, then, is replaced by a concern with value. Values 
became the forum of discourse on Being, albeit one that, for Heidegger, entraps us in a 
philosophical cul-de-sac with regard to the question itself of Being. As values have 
taken a prominent place in our discussion of the question of Being, they are a significant 
feature of Heidegger’s understanding of nihilism.  
 
2.2.2 Vattimo’s Reading of Nihilism through Nietzsche and Heidegger 
For Vattimo, Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s respective understandings of nihilism are 
complementary. There is a certain amount of agreement between them with regard to 
nihilism. For Vattimo, Nietzsche’s understanding contributes to Heidegger’s, which 
concentrates on the ontological difference and the forgetting of Being. Acknowledging 
this means recognizing that “nihilism is the process of the eroding of foundations, the 
loss of objective values, the dissolution of the strong characteristics that metaphysics 
has always attributed to Being.”52 Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s contributions to a 
discourse on nihilism form the basis of Vattimo’s own discussion. Indeed, he maintains 
that nihilism can now be taken as a combination of these respective positions.  
Vattimo claims that Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s respective understandings of 
nihilism are largely in agreement. This is due to the way in which nihilism manifests 
 
 
51 See R.M. Dancy, Plato’s Introduction of Forms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) and William A. Welton, Plato’s Forms: Varieties of Interpretation (Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2002). 
 
52 Marta Frascati-Lochhead, Kenosis and Feminist Theology: The Challenge of Gianni Vattimo 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). 
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itself. “Over and above the differences in their theoretical approaches to the question, 
Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s respective arguments are also in agreement with regard to 
the contents—that is, the ways of manifesting itself—of nihilism.”53 For both 
philosophers, nihilism’s manifestation may be seen in its relation to values. In 
Nietzsche’s case, it may be summed up with his dictum that God is dead, or, the 
devaluation of the highest values. “For Nietzsche the entire process of nihilism can be 
summarized by the death of God, or by the devaluation of the highest values.” 54  God 
is, for Nietzsche, an example of a supreme or ultimate value. Our society is built on 
such constructs or values that are created to fulfil a particular need. God, for example, 
is a construct that is created to fulfil a need for security. As we are in different social 
circumstances in today’s society than when the ‘fable’ of God was created out of a need 
for protection, we can no longer maintain this fable. To say, then, that God is dead is to 
say that this construct has fulfilled its purpose and we may allow the dissolution of this 
value. For Vattimo, Heidegger’s understanding of nihilism focuses on Being, which is 
transformed into value. “For Heidegger, Being is annihilated insofar as it is transformed 
completely into value.”55 Nihilism, then, is a concern of Being itself. Vattimo maintains 
that although for Heidegger is seems possible and desirable to go beyond nihilism, 
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2.2.3 Dissolution of Being in Exchange-Value 
Vattimo acknowledges that there may be some difficulty in appreciating the connection 
between Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s treatment of nihilism. He believes that this can 
be achieved best through their respective approaches to values. In particular, Vattimo 
turns to the exchange of values in order to show the affinity between Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. This exchange refers to the relative value of one commodity against the 
worth of another. For Heidegger, nihilism is the reduction of Being to exchange value.57 
This is so since Being is replaced by value and loses its intrinsic quality and, instead, 
becomes hostage to a subject who acknowledges this value. “Nihilism would therefore 
be, in the Heideggerian sense, the illegitimate claim that Being, instead of existing in 
an autonomous, independent, and foundational way, is in the power of the subject.”58 
Examining this claim in terms of exchange-value allows us to better see the connection 
between Heidegger’s understanding of nihilism and Nietzsche’s.  
For Vattimo, Heidegger’s view of nihilism can coincide with Nietzsche’s because 
of the transvaluation of values. This is summarised in the highest value par excellence, 
namely, God. The Torinese sees this transvaluation as a process of liberation. With the 
death of the highest values, other values can take on their true natures, which is “the 
capacity for convertability, and an indefinite transformability or processuality.”59 The 
highest values no longer act as a limit on other values. For both Nietzsche and 
 
57 Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 21. “Il nichilismo . . . è la reduzione dell’essere a valore di 
scambio” (Gianni Vattimo, La fine della modernità [Milan: Garzanti, 1985], 29). See also Daniel 
Barbiero, “A Weakness for Heidegger: The German Root of Il Pensiero Debole,” New German Critique 
55 (1992): 159-172. 
58 Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 21.  
 
59 Ibid. “Solo là dove non c’è l’istanza terminale e «intermittiva», bloccante, del valore supremo-
Dio, I valori si possono dispiegare nella loro vera natura, che è la convertibilità, e 
trasformabilità/processualità indefinite” (La fine della modernità [Milan: Garzanti, 1985], 29). 
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Heidegger, then, nihilism may be understood as the triumph of exchange-value over 
use-value.60 While the exchange-value refers to the worth of one commodity over 
against another, the use-value refers to the commodity as a utility. In other words, the 
use-value of a commodity rests in its ability to satisfy needs and wants according to its 
properties. Vattimo explores further the relationship between values and Being by 
examining some philosophical currents that he believes are indicators of twentieth 
century culture and its response to the emergence of nihilism.61  
One such current is Marxism, which in is various theoretical forms has strived 
toward a response to nihilism on a political plane. “Marxism . . . has dreamed about the 
recovery at a practical/political level, prior to a theoretical one, of use-value and its 
norms.”62 One of the principles of a socialist society was to liberate work from the 
negative characteristics that are typically associated with commerce. This was supposed 
to come about by means of a separation from the cycle of consumerism, meaning that 
the products would retain a relationship of fundamental identity  with their producer.63 
It failed, however, because the more the ideology struggled to free itself from the 
negative characteristics of alienation, the more it turned to increasingly complex 
political systems to achieve this. Ultimately, these political interventions only served 
to make the ideology more problematic, failing to achieve its goal.  There is a common 
thread running through much of the thought that dominates European culture.  Not only 
Marxism, as outlined, but phenomenology and early existentialism, among others, are 
 
 
60 Ibid., 22.  
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united by what Vattimo calls “a resistance to the accomplishment of nihilism.”64 He 
believes that this strand of thought has even appropriated a tradition that originally 
began as an alternative to this line of thinking. This tradition originated with 
Wittgenstein, specifically during the period in which he wrote the Tractatus, and 
continued through the twentieth century in the development of Anglo-Saxon analytic 
philosophy.65 In this tradition there was an effort made to develop an ideal zone of use-
value, where the dissolution of Being into value did not occur.66  
In reality, however, Vattimo maintains that the various strands of thought 
dominating European culture fail to realise that nihilism is now the only avenue open 
to us in terms of a future for philosophy. “Nihilism arrives at the phase of its 
accomplishment, that it reaches its extreme form, by consuming Being in value. This is 
the event that finally makes it possible, and necessary, for philosophy today to 
recognize that nihilism is our (only) chance.”67 The consumption of Being in exchange-
value, or, the transformation of the real world into a fable is nihilistic even to the point 
that ir leads to a “weakening of the cogent force of ‘reality’.”68 This weakening of the 
‘reality’ of our world echoes Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God, that long 
process of leave-taking, of saying goodbye to the metaphysical constructs that act as 




64 Ibid., 23. 
 






68 Ibid, 27. 
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2.3 Vattimo and the Crisis of Humanism 
In his exploration of the connection between Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s work 
Vattimo turns next to the crisis of humanism. This section explores the link that Vattimo 
perceives between the death of God and the crisis of humanism. I will examine the use 
of Verwindung the German word that Vattimo claims conveys the sense of healing of 
convalescence. Finally, the section finishes with a discussion of the Ge-Stell.  
 
2.3.1 The Crisis of Humanism 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, European culture, in particular, is reeling 
from a succession of setbacks. These include the turning of socialism into dictatorship 
and the use of technology as an instrument of war (as opposed to being used to 
humankind’s well-being).69 Outbreaks of violence, at local and global levels, contribute 
to the crisis of humanism. Such realities lead to a loss of faith in humankind, which is 
further aggravated by our refusal to resolve the underlying issues, even though we have 
the means to do so.  
Vattimo examines this crisis of humanism through the nexus of Heidegger’s and 
Nietzsche’s thought. He begins the discussion with a humorous remark, “God is dead, 
but man isn’t doing so well himself.”70 This joke, he maintains, is a reflection of the 
situation that provides the backdrop to the crisis of humanism. There is a connection 
 
 
69 See Abraham Edel, “Where is the Crisis in Humanism?,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 
22, no. 85 (1968): 284-95. According to Abraham Edel, various events have marked our culture for the 
worst. These include the descent of Nazism into genocide, socialism in the Soviet Union ending in 
dictatorship, and scientific technology, instead of assisting humankind, becoming an instrument of war. 
Edel considers our placement within social structures as another contributing factor to the reasons for 
the crisis of humanism. The reason for this is that we feel increasingly standardized, not only within 
social structures, but by role-patterns, tastes, and reactions which serve only to limit our development as 
an individual. In addition, there are increasing outbreaks of violence within communities and on the 
larger global scale to be a contributing factor.   
 
70 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 31.  
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between the death of God and the crisis of humanism. “Humanism is in crisis because 
God is dead.”71 We can no longer appeal to any such foundation to assist us in resolving 
matters. 
For Vattimo, Heidegger’s Über den Humanismus is a key text in the discussion 
of the crisis of humanism. He believes that it is the first text to draw attention to, and 
open up an awareness of, the crisis of humanism.72 Indeed, for Heidegger, humanism 
is, in fact, synonymous with metaphysics. This is so since it is only in the perspective 
of metaphysics as a general theory of the Being of entities that humanity can find a 
foundation for its culture. Of course, this general theory thinks of Being in objective 
terms, thereby forgetting the ontological difference. Nonetheless it provides the general 
framework from within which we can ‘construct’ and educate through Bildung.73 
“There is no humanism without the bringing into play of a metaphysics in which the 
human subject determines a role for itself which is necessarily central or exclusive.”74 
The fate of humanism and metaphysics, Vattimo claims, are henceforth intertwined. 
Should one of these decline, then the other will follow suit. “For this reason the death 
 
 
71 Ibid, 32, emphasis original.  
 
72 See Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 32. 
 
73 Ibid., 32. Bildung is a German term for which there is no direct translation in English, although 
it is usually translated as culture, formation, self-cultivation, and cultural process. Here, Bildung is a 
German word for education, culture, formation, and it corresponds to a tradition of self-cultivation. There 
are two main foundations to the process of Bildung. The first is the cultura animi tradition found in 
Hellenism, which is a type of spiritual cultivation based on the idea that it is possible for persons to shape 
their own soul. The second foundation is the Imago Dei. This is rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
in which humankind are created in God’s image. The linguistic roots of Bildung are found in this 
tradition. “Bild” means image and in its derivative forms are the idea of a formative process. Bildung as 
a creative process in which a person develops or shapes their own self and also their cultural environment. 
A second characteristic is that during the process of Bildung a person seeks to improve or advance their 
life. See Pauli Siljander, Ari Kivelä, and Ari Sutinen, Theories of Bildung and Growth: Connections and 
Controversies Between Continental Educational Thinking and American Pragmatism (Rotterdam, DEU: 
Sense Publishers), 2012.  
 
74 Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 32. 
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of God, which is at once the culmination and conclusion of metaphysics, is also the 
crisis of humanism.”75 With Nietzsche, metaphysics has arrived at the moment of its 
decline, and with it humanism has fallen into crisis. This is what Heidegger has 
determined for us.  
 
2.3.2 Humanism and Technology  
The crisis of humanism is not only connected to metaphysics but also to technology. 
So much so, in fact, that for Vattimo the technological dimension of the crisis has 
consumed all aspects of its discourse. Specifically, technology displaces humanistic 
cultural constructs in favour of those based on scientific rationality. It is, he notes, 
precisely this displacement that brings about the very changes in society that Adorno 
critiques. For Adorno, capitalist production is the very reason that there is such inaction 
in the face of human suffering, such as poverty and hunger, among others. He maintains 
that technological and scientific advancement means that humankind possesses the 
power to eradicate, or at least ameliorate, such issues. However, what we have is 
capitalism dominating the social order, creating pockets of wealth and power.76  
For Vattimo, the debate between the natural sciences and the sciences of the spirit 
that developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is a significant 
reflection of the crisis of humanism.77 The natural sciences gained increased 
 
 
75 Ibid., 32-33. 
 
76 See Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy After Adorno (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) for more on Adorno and social theory. See also M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (1947), ed. G. S. Noerr, trans. E. Jephcott, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).   
  
77 Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 34-35. The debate concerning Geisteswissenschaften and 
Naturwissenschaften developed during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, 
particularly in German academia. These terms are usually translated as the human and the natural 
sciences. A debate over the methodology between the two sciences occurred between Wilhelm Dilthey 
and Wilhelm Windelband, who “defends the nomothetic (law-governed) foundations of the physical or 
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significance and created a perception that other areas of human knowledge, outside the 
realms of quantifiable data, must be safeguarded against the rationalization of the 
sciences. The natural sciences were seen to be a threat, and the sciences of the spirit 
sought to protect what was specific to our humanity but irreducible to the field of natural 
science. Vattimo holds that philosophy responds to the threat posed by the crisis of 
humanism (and technology) in two ways. First, it focuses on the areas that lie outside 
the specifically scientific, and, secondly, it seeks to restore its own centrality. He looks 
to Husserl, who sees the crisis of humanism as being the result of a neglect of human 
subjectivity brought about by the growing emphasis on scientific and technological 
objectivity. In order to escape from the crisis, it is necessary to shift the focus once 
more to the central function of the subject. “Husserl’s subject continues to harbour no 
doubts about its own true nature, which is only externally threatened by an ensemble 
of mechanisms created by this same subject, but still capable of being reappropriated 
by it.”78 While the subject has set in motion science and technology, it cannot fail to 
recognise its own involvement in what it is attempting to overcome.  
For Vattimo, Heidegger’s understanding of humanism would seem to be the most 
“theoretically rigorous.”79 This is because it addresses the very nature of humanism 
itself as opposed to being concerned with questions of his historical realization.80 
 
natural sciences. Dilthey defends the “independence” of the human sciences.”  Windelband believed that 
there is, due to their methods, a distinction between the two sciences. The natural sciences use the 
nomothetic methods as they seek to discover law-like properties. The social sciences are not interested 
in this, but in the more unique aspects of an experience or case. For Dilthey, the subject matter of each 
science acts as their distinguishing feature. For example, the main distinction happens to be their separate 
categories, that of the ‘natural,’ and that of the ‘human spirit.’ Lydia Patton, “Methodology of the 
Sciences,” in The Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth Century German Philosophy eds. Michael N. Forster 
and Kristin Gjesdal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 595.  
 
78 Ibid., 35. 
 
79 Ibid., 37. 
 
80 See Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 36. 
 
 95  
Heidegger’s understanding of the crisis of humanism is, broadly speaking, the stance 
taken by Expressionism. This is a movement that emerged as a response to the growing 
unease arising from humankind’s increasingly fractured relationship with the world. It 
was accompanied by the loss of a feeling of authenticity and spirituality. New 
technologies and mass urbanization altered the individual’s worldview and artists 
reflected on the impact of these developments on the individual by portraying their own 
emotions in their work. The focus shifted, if you like, from the external to the internal. 
Instead of art simply being a depiction of or reaction to external scenes, artists were 
now called upon to summon a vision from within themselves. The techniques involved, 
such as swirling brushstrokes, were meant to convey the emotional state of the artist as 
they reacted to the world around them. The artist’s feelings became the new criterion 
for assessing the work. Vastly different from the Impressionist renderings of idyllic 
landscapes, or middle-class leisure outings in the city, the Expressionists depicted 
alienated individuals, including prostitutes. Their art became a form of social criticism, 
a comment on capitalism’s role in the emotional distancing of individuals in urban 
settings. Expressionism impacted on dance, drama, literature, sculpture, and 
architecture.81 While Heidegger’s understanding of the crisis of humanism is linked to 
the artistic movement of Expressionism, Vattimo claims that he was influenced in 
addition by philosophers such as Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler, and the early Ernst 
Bloch, amongst others. Vattimo’s main focus is on Spengler and Jünger. Spengler’s 
 
81 Expressionism “arose in a period in which analyses of the alienation, reification, and 
dehumanization of the individual, and the fragmentation of the human personality, has become 
widespread” (Douglas Kellner, “Expressionism, Industrial Capitalism, and the Crisis of Subjectivity” in 
Art and Humanist Ideals: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. William Kelly [Australia: Macmillan Art 
Publishing, 2003], 51). Expressionism “sought an inward realm of retreat, whereby individuality and 
humanity could be preserved, protected against assaults from a repressive society and a destructive socio-
economic order” (ibid). For more on expressionism see Ashley Bassie, Expressionism (New York: 
Parkstone Press International, 2014), and Dietmar Elgar, Expressionism: A Revolution in German Art 
(Köln: Taschen, 2002). 
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Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918) and Jünger’s Der Arbeiter (1932) are like two 
bookends that mark the beginning and the end of the period in which this crisis fully 
develops.82 These works are important in that they emphasize the historical and social 
components of the crisis of humanism.83 These components, Vattimo claims, are 
missing from other, theoretical works, and can clearly be seen here.84 The crisis is above 
all a crisis of Eurocentrism and of the “bourgeois” model of Bildung. In contrast to the 
‘bourgeois’ Bildung, both Spengler and Jünger put forward a sort of ‘military’ ideal of 
existence. Spengler advocates a technological, scientific, and economic organization of 
the world. “The most suitable activities for humanity are no longer those that involve 
the creation of works of art or of thought, for these are characteristically adolescent and 
youthful in nature.”85 This culminates in the establishment of an authority that it 
essentially militaristic in nature.86 Jünger focuses on the life of the industrial worker, in 
which, what he terms ‘the war of materials’ finds its highest ideal in the model of the 
worker (as opposed to the soldier). “The exaltation of the ‘war of materials’ . . . gives 
weight to the ‘mechanical’ aspects of reality.”87 The worker’s individuality is lost, 
becoming a cog in the wheel of production. The industrial worker is “no longer an 
individual, but a moment in an ‘organic’ process of production.”88 As the workers are 
 
 




84 Ibid.  
 
85 Ibid., 37-38. 
 
86 Ibid., 38. 
 
87 See Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 38.  
 
88 Ibid.  
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no longer concerned about existence, they become ‘flexible’ and “detached from any 
reference to the self.”89 Although these two ideals may appear to be simply a contrast 
to the bourgeois Bildung, they are significant in that they respond to the provocative 
call of modern technology, while running the risks that such a response entails.90  
In order to make sense of the crisis, Vattimo draws on Heidegger. Specifically, 
Vattimo holds that the crisis of humanism may be interpreted as an aspect of the crisis 
of metaphysics.91 Both crises may be described in terms of a Verwindung, which 
Vattimo claims suggests an “overcoming” as in a resigning oneself to something, 
accepting (another’s judgement), or a recovery from an illness.92 Heidegger does not 
use this word frequently; it appears primarily in Identität und Differenz, in one passage 
from Holzwege, and in an essay in Vorträge und Aufsätze.93 Vatimo claims that prior 
to Heidegger we may see the use of this idea of Verwindung in Nietzsche’s work, even 
though Nietzsche did not actually use the word itself. Instead, he spoke in terms of 
healing or convalescence. The crisis of humanism may be described in terms of 
Verwindung; namely, as an overcoming, which is a recognition of belonging, a healing 
of an illness, and a taking of responsibility.94 For Vattimo, it is only through the 
 
 
89 Ibid., 38. 
 
90 See ibid., 38.  
 
91 Ibid., 40.  
 
92 Ibid. The word Verwindung literally means distortion, twisting, deformation, etc. It is derived 
from the verb verwinden, which means to twist, to deflect, to get over, etc.  
93 Gianni Vattimo,  ""Verwindung": Nihilism and the Postmodern in Philosophy," Substance 16, 
no. 2 (1987): 7-17. 
94 See ibid., 40.  
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viewpoint of that which both belongs to, and yet remains relatively outside, the 
humanistic tradition that we may make sense of it and take responsibility for it.95 
The Verwindung of both the crisis of metaphysics and the crisis of humanism may 
only take place through a relationship with the Ge-Stell. The word, Vattimo notes, refers 
to a pedestal, shelves, or framework. Heidegger, however, treats it in his own way, as 
a compound of Ge and Stell. “Heidegger treats it [the word Ge-Stell] as a composite of 
Ge and Stell, by analogy with words like Ge-birg, in which the prefix Ge placed before 
Birg, Berg (mountain) has the idea of ‘together’, so that Ge-birg is a range of 
mountains.”96 Ge-Stell treats stellen, or ‘setting in place’ in a similar way so that it is in 
the ensemble, or collection, of ‘setting in place’. For Heidegger, the technical world is 
the one in which Being is set in place.97 According to Vattimo, everything, then, that is 
in the world is connected to stellen in all its various forms. Stellen may, for example, 
be her-stellen (producing), vor-stellen (representing), be-stellen (ordering), and so on.98 
Ge-Stell, in English, usually means a framework, but Vattimo suggests using “im-
position” where the hyphen indicates a particular ‘etymological’ use of the term and 
provides and echo of ‘setting in place,’ suggesting an inescapable urgency.99 The 
technical world as the world of planned production is an example of Ge-Stell.100 “Ge-
 
 
95 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 39. 
 
96 Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, 169.  
 
97 Ibid. Italics reflect original.  
 
98 Ibid.  
 
99 Gianni Vattimo,  ""Verwindung": Nihilism and the Postmodern in Philosophy," 11. 
See also Gianni Vattimo, “Toward an Ontology of Decline” in Recoding Metaphysics: The New 
Italian Philosophy ed. Giovanna Borradori (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988) pp. 63-76. 
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Stell represents for Heidegger the totality of the technological “setting,” and of the 
summoning, provoking and ordering that constitutes the historical/geschicklick essence 
of the technological world.”101 In its essence technology is the fulfilment of 
metaphysics since metaphysics has always understood Being as the foundation of 
reason.102 “Metaphysics has always understood Being as a Grund or a foundation which 
assures the rule of reason and of which reason always assures itself.”103  Technology is 
not only a part of the process that produces metaphysics, but represents its most 
advanced development.  
It is in the very nature of technology that the defining traits of metaphysics 
and humanism — which both had previously kept hidden from view — 
should be brought out into the open. This unveiling and disclosing is at once 
the final moment, the culmination, and the beginning of the crisis of 
metaphysics and humanism.104 
 
Vattimo considers that the unveiling and disclosure of the traits of metaphysics and 
humanism in technology to be the beginning and the culmination of the crisis of 
humanism and of metaphysics.105 In fact, he deems this moment to be a gift of Being, 
consisting of a “sending-forth, a mission and an announcement.”106 It is precisely for 
this reason that the crisis of humanism is a call to Verwindung; it is not, he maintains, 
an overcoming of humanism, but rather a healing in which humankind acknowledges 
that humanism remains our destiny.107 The Ge-Stell is not only the place where 
 
 
101 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 40. Geschicklich is commonly translated as “fateful.” 
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metaphysics and humanism come to an end, but it is also the announcement of the event 
of Being, the Ereignis as its place of giving-forth beyond the limits of the forgetfulness 
of metaphysics. 108 “The Ereignis alludes to an event in which Being occurs as a game 
of ‘appropriation’, eigen meaning ‘proper.’ In Ereignis man is appropriated (vereignet) 
to Being, while Being is consigned (zugeeignet) to man.”109 In the Ge-Stell, then, Being 
and humankind are united in a reciprocal trans-appropriation, and the framework, or 
im-position in which this trans-appropriation takes place stands in contrast to the 
alienation of technology.110 The history of metaphysics is the history of the forgetting 
of the ontological difference, in other words, the history of the forgetting of the 
difference between Being and beings, which is equally the forgetting of Being as 
Ereignis. It appears, however, to be so only when reviewed from the dis-location in 
which Ge-Stell locates us.111 The Ereignis may only be understood in these terms from 
within the location of the Ge-Stell as it is within the framework of the Ge-Stell that this 
trans-appropriation occurs. Vattimo affirms that while the Ereignis may mark out the 
forgetting of the ontological difference, it allows for Being to be understood in terms 
other than as foundation, allowing for a ‘position,’ rather than foundation. “Everything 
amounts to ‘position,’ every foundation is founded in turn and man lives within the arc 
of this foundation.”112 The cycle of transpropriation highlights the very difference that 
has been forgotten within the metaphysical tradition. Being and beings are caught in a 
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transitive cycle, one constantly leading back to the other. “Being is what beings are, it 
is the Being of beings, while beings in their turn are to be defined only as the beings of 
Being, those beings that have Being, that are.”113 When we think of Being and beings 
in this way, it highlights the connectedness between them. It means that we bypass the 
metaphysical thought of ‘Being as foundation,’ which reduces Being and beings to a 
metaphysics of beings, and we realise that both are transitive.114 To consider technology 
within this setting means to keep in mind the Verwindung of humanism and refrain 
from treating technology as another foundation of that could impose its own reality on 
the world. Everything in the technical world can be manipulated by humankind, who, 
in turn, are themselves in danger of manipulated.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced some of the principal points in Heidegger’s work that underpins 
Vattimo’s own. I began by outlining how Heidegger came to examine the problem of 
Being, including a discussion of the three volumes that Vattimo believes played a key 
role in the structuring and development of Being and Time.  This led to a consideration 
of Being in relation to temporality. Here, Heidegger’s term Dasein was also discussed.  
Next, I examined the ontological difference through Vattimo’s reading of 
Derrida. The ontological difference, or the difference between Being and beings, is 
fundamental to Heidegger’s work. Vattimo analysis of the ontological difference 
contrasts Heidegger against Derrida. This discourse led to a consideration of 
Heidegger’s thought on nihilism, which focused primarily on Being. Indeed, for 
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Heidegger nihilism is the forgetting of Being, in which the ontological difference is 
erased. I discussed values (the medium through which we understand the things we 
encounter in the everyday world) as for Heidegger our awareness of Being is trapped 
in values, which contributes to our inability to discuss the question of Being. Values 
are important for Vattimo, as they are a common ground between Nietzsche and 
Heidegger’s understanding of nihilism.   
The exploration of the relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche’s work 
brought about a reflection on the crisis of humanism. As outlined in the chapter, 
Vattimo believes that not only is there a link between the death of God and the crisis of 
humanism, but that there is also a connection to technology.  
 The discourse paved the way for the introduction of Verwindung, a German 
word, which, for Heidegger, is used in the sense of a healing of convalescence. Vattimo 
believes that it is through Verwindung that the crisis of humanism may be understood 
in Heidegger’s thought.  Finally, leading on from Verwindung, the last section focused 
on the healing of the crisis of humanism. This was discussed in relation to the Ge-Stell 
as allowing technology to reveal the traits of humanism and metaphysics, which 
Vattimo maintains is a gift of Being. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the 
Ge-Stell, not only as unveiling but also in terms of the Ereignis, which may be spoken 























Deceit and Desire: Girard’s Mimetic Theory 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The preceding chapters examined some of the philosophical foundations on which 
Vattimo bases his work, focusing on the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger.   
Continuing in the same vein, this chapter focuses on another scholar whose writings 
greatly influence Vattimo. The academic in question is René Girard, formerly Professor 
Emeritus at Stanford University. As Vattimo draws heavily on Girard’s work, it is 
necessary to have an understanding of the same in order to fully appreciate the manner 
in which Vattimo utilizes it.  
The chapter introduces Girard’s theory of human behaviour, known as ‘mimetic 
theory.’ This discussion leads to an exploration of the violence that occurs when 
multiple desires converge on the same object. Girard concentrates on the connection 
between culture, violence, and religion. He believes that primitive religion is centered 
on violence and the need for society to protect itself from the violence that arises from 
mimetic desire. Central to this discussion, and indeed to this chapter, is Girard’s 
scapegoat mechanism, which, as we shall see, is the means by which societies safely 
channel violence in order to protect themselves. Furthermore, he focuses on 
understanding religion in the light of the conflict that stems from mimetic desire.  
The final focus of the chapter is Girard’s understanding of the Gospel texts. These 
accounts are different to the mythic, which conceal the workings of the scapegoat 
mechanism. The Gospels reveal these workings, laying them bare to us. They depict a 
God that wishes to put an end to violence. The Gospels can be read and understood as 
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the beginning of a process of desacralization, through which we ought to change our 
relationship to violence. In particular, this process of desacralization will prove to be 
significant for Vattimo’s own appropriation of Girard. Vattimo understands this process 
in revelatory terms; it is the ongoing education of humankind, breaking away from 
violence inherent to the natural, sacrificial religions. What Vattimo takes from Girard’s 
work is the idea of the incarnation as the dissolution of the sacred as violence. While, 
ultimately, he goes beyond this premise, Vattimo owes much to Girard’s theses.  
 
3.1 The Collapse of the Autonomous Self 
 Girard’s work deals with what can be described as the collapse of the autonomous self. 
Human behaviour is guided by imitation. Essentially, another determines our desires 
for us. This is Girard’s mimetic theory, which is explored in this section. Beginning 
with its discovery, in the works of five European novelists, the section moves to explore 
the potential for rivalry that is inherent to mimesis. Continuing, metaphysical desire is 
discussed. This occurs when the being of another is the object of desire. The hatred that 
arises with the loss of the autonomous self is the central focus of this section.  
 
3.1.1 Mimetic Theory 
Mimetic theory is a theory of human behaviour particular to René Girard. The word 
‘mimetic’ comes from the Greek mimētikos meaning ‘imitation,’ which is itself derived 
from the verb mimeisthai, or ‘to imitate.’ Girard realized that our behaviour follows a 
particular pattern. He believes that human behaviour is guided by imitation. For 
instance, we learn from one another by imitation. Our languages, gestures, and social 
behaviours are learned from following another’s example. Girard opts to use the word 
‘mimetic’ or ‘mimesis’ rather than ‘imitation’ as he claims that the latter implies a 
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conscious effort to duplicate someone else’s behaviour, as opposed to mimesis, which 
is an unconscious form of imitation. It is rarely the case that we consciously decide to 
copy another’s behaviour, although there are exceptions, such as replicating how 
another dresses. Mimesis, as a form of unconscious imitation, is usually the norm. An 
infant, for example, does not decide consciously to copy an adult’s gestures or sounds.  
While working on his first book, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel (1959), Girard 
realized that desire is mimetic. He is careful to maintain a distinction between needs 
and desire. Needs are preconditioned by biology and are essential requirements. Our 
needs are easily identifiable. Food, water, and shelter, for example, are needs. 
Essentially, needs are things that we must have in order to survive. In contrast, desire 
is more complex than need. The objects of desire are a product of culture and therefore 
are infinitely varied. Our instincts guide us in order to satisfy our biological needs, yet 
do not direct our desire. As we do not instinctually desire, we do not have a desire that 
we can truly call our own. Rather, we borrow our desire from others. It is the Other’s 
representation of these objects of desire that make them desirable to us.1  
Deceit, Desire, and the Novel deals with the works of five European novelists; 
Stendhal, Proust, Dostoevsky, Flaubert, and Cervantes.2 It was while examining these 
author’s writings that Girard noticed a common thread running through their works. 
Each novelist dealt with human desire in terms of mimesis, illustrating how another 
determines our desire for us. Girard draws on Miguel Cervantes’ Don Quixote to 
support this claim. The title character, Don Quixote, is an avid reader of courtly 
 
1 Majuscule reflects Girard’s use of the word ‘Other’ to refer to the other persons whose desires 
we borrow. See René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans. 
Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1965). See also Pierpaolo Antonello and Heather 
Webb, Mimesis, Desire, and the Novel: Rene Girard and Literary Criticism (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 2015). 
 
2 Girard originally taught French language and literature at Indiana University. 
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literature. Obsessed with chivalrous ideals from his reading, Quixote aspires to become 
a knight errant like Amadis de Gaul, who is one of the more prominent fictional 
characters in Quixote’s books. By taking de Gaul as his model, Quixote allows the 
fictional character to determine for him the objects of his desire. In permitting de Gaul 
to effectively choose his desire for him, Don Quixote surrenders his own autonomy and 
independence.  
I want you to know, Sancho, that the famous Amadis of Gaul was one of 
the most perfect knight errants. But what am I saying, one of the most 
perfect? I should say the only, the first, the unique, the master and lord of 
all those who existed in the world . . . I think . . . that, when a painter wants 
to become famous for his art he tries to imitate the originals of the best 
masters he knows; the same rule applies to the most important jobs or 
exercises which contribute to the embellishment of republics; thus the man 
who wishes to be known as careful and patient should and does imitate 
Ulysses, in whose person and works Homer paints for us a vivid portrait 
of carefulness and patience, just as Virgil shows us in the person of Aeneas 
the valour of a pious son and the wisdom of a valiant captain; and it is 
understood that they depict them not as they are but as they should be to 
provide an example of virtue for centuries to come. In the same way 
Amadis was the pole, the star, the sun for brave and amorous knights, and 
we others who fight under the banner of love and chivalry should imitate 
him. Thus, my friend Sancho, I reckon that whoever imitates him best will 
come closest to perfect chivalry.3 
 
The passage illustrates Don Quixote’s willingness to surrender his own autonomy and 
take Amadis de Gaul as his model. Here, Quixote’s desire to imitate de Gaul is clear, 
the text making it plain that Quixote believes that he will come close to attaining his 
chivalrous ideals if he can faithfully imitate de Gaul.   
Girard discovered, upon his reading of the five novelists, that desire does not have 
a linear structure. Instead, it is triangular. If it were the case that desire followed a linear 
 
3 Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote, chapter 25, as quoted in René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and 
the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Translated by Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1965, 1. Originally published as Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque (Paris: Editions 
Bernard Grasset, 1961). For a brief sketch of Girard’s works and theory, see P. Dumouchel, 
‘Introduction,’ in Violence and Truth, ed., P. Dumouchel, (London: The Athlone Press, 1996). For an 





formula, it would be that A (the subject) desires B (the object); Don Quixote (A), for 
example, desires to be a perfect knight errant (B). Instead, desire has a triangular 
structure; A desires B because of C. Thus, Don Quixote (A) desires to be a perfect 
knight errant (B) because of Amadis de Gaul (C). The third point, C, is known as the 
model or mediator as it is point C that models, or mediates, the subject’s desire.4 Here, 
Amadis de Gaul is the model or mediator as he directs Don Quixote’s desire.  
When more than one person desires a particular object rivalry may occur. The 
possession of the object is a determining factor. If the object is something that can be 
shared, then rivalry will not be an issue. Learning a language is an example of a process 
whereby rivalry does not occur. A single individual cannot possess exclusively a 
language, and, as the language can be shared, this means that if more than one person 
desires to learn that language then rivalry will not ensue. Conflict will not arise if the 
object can be shared. By contrast, when more than one person desires an object that 
may be exclusively possessed then rivalry may occur. Generally, conflict arises when 
the object cannot be shared. Girard draws on Stendhal’s novel The Red and the Black 
as an example of a situation where rivalry takes place. Keeping in mind the triangular 
structure of desire, A (the subject) desires B (the object) because of C (the mediator), 
we see how two of Stendhal’s characters, M. de Rênal and M. Valenod, illustrate how 
rivalry emerges. M. de Rênal (the subject) is the mayor of Verriéres. M. Valenod (the 
mediator/model) is another wealthy, influential man living in the same village. M. de 
Rênal wishes to engage Julian Sorel (the object) as a tutor for his children. His desire 
to engage Julian is not out of any concern for his children’s education, but only because 
he thinks that M. Valenod also wishes to hire Julian. As it is feasible that M. Valenod 
could employ Julian, he becomes a rival. The rivalry is evident when it comes to the 
 
4 See Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard (London: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd, 2004). 
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financial aspect of the negotiations. M. de Rênal makes a generous offer for Julian’s 
services, because he mistakenly believes that M. Valenod is doing the same. So great 
is M. de Rênal’s desire to hire Julian that he continues to increase his already-generous 
offer in order to thwart M. Valenod. “The ever-increasing price that the buyer is willing 
to pay is determined by the imaginary desire which he attributes to his rival.”5  
It is the distance between subject and mediator that determines whether or not 
rivalry occurs. Girard identifies two categories of mediation that take distance into 
account. We speak of external mediation when the distance between subject and 
mediator is great enough to prevent them from coming into contact with one another, 
and, thereby preventing rivalry or conflict. The distance is not solely geographical but 
may also be intellectual or social. In Cervantes’ novel, for example, Amadis de Gaul 
will never be Don Quixote’s rival. This is because De Gaul is a fictional character and 
the distance between him and Don Quixote can never be reduced, meaning that rivalry 
cannot ensue. In contrast, we speak of internal mediation when the distance between 
the subject and mediator is not great enough to prevent rivalry from occurring. M. de 
Rênal and M. Valenod’s rivalry is a prime example. “Valenod is the richest and most 
influential man in Verriéres, next to M. de Rênal himself. The mayor of Verriéres 
always has the image of his rival before his eyes during his negotiations.”6 Both men 
occupy a similar social sphere in the same village and so the distance between them is 
not sufficient to prevent rivalry from taking place.  
For Girard, ressentiment (resentment) is the outcome of internal mediation. It 
arises from suppressed feelings of hate and envy that have not been acted upon. It stems 
 
5 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 6.  
 




from the repression of negative emotions, such as hate and revenge, which are a part of 
human nature and occurs particularly when these emotions are strongly roused but, for 
various reasons, are also repressed. This is usually down to some form of inadequacy 
on the part of the individual, such as physical or mental weakness, or fear.7 According 
to Girard, internal mediation is responsible for what he asserts to be a type of 
‘psychological self-poisoning.’8  The subject’s desire for the object is, he claims, really 
a desire directed toward the mediator. “The impulse toward the object is ultimately an 
impulse toward the mediator.”9 In external mediation the subject is happy to proclaim 
their admiration for the mediator. Take, for example, Don Quixote, who openly 
worships Amadis de Gaul. However, in internal mediation the subject tries to conceal 
their admiration for the model. The subject’s admiration for the model is actually halted 
by the model’s possession of, or own desire for, the object desired by the subject. In 
Dostoevsky’s novella Notes from the Underground, for example, the character known 
as the underground man competes with his peers for the same social space. He admires 
his fellows, yet, at the same time, loathes them, gate-crashing a banquet to which he 
was not invited in order to be near to them.  
Smiling scornfully, I paced backwards and forwards on the side of the 
room opposite the sofa, along the wall from the table to the stove and back. 
 
7 See Max Scheler, Ressentiment (Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1998). Girard believes 
that all the characteristics that Scheler describes in his understanding of ressentiment are the product of 
internal mediation, although Scheler was unaware of the dynamic of mimetic desire.  
It is of note that Girard takes issue with Nietzsche’s particular understanding of ressentiment. For 
Nietzsche, it is the essence of Christianity. Girard, however, disagrees. He acknowledges that 
ressentiment is an outcome of Christianity, but it is not its essence. It is the outcome of Christianity in 
the sense that Christianity has not succeeded in eliminating violence, but only diminished it. 
“Ressentiment is the manner in which the spirit of vengeance survives the impact of Christianity” (René 
Girard, “Dionysus versus the Crucified,” MLN, Vol. 99, No. 4 (1984): 816-835. 825). See Friedrich 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans, Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1969). For more on Girard’s understanding of ressentiment, see Stefano Tomelleri, 
Ressentiment: Reflections on Mimetic Desire and Society (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 
2015).  
 
8 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 11.  
 




I was trying with all my might to show that I could do without them; 
meanwhile I purposefully made a clatter with my boots, coming down hard 
on the heels. But it was all in vain; they didn’t even notice. 10 
 
For the subject, the mediator’s own desire for, or possession of, the object is a clear 
indication that the model bears hostility towards the subject. The mediator’s occupation 
of the social sphere that the underground man wishes to be a part of is proof, for the 
underground man, of the mediator’s hostility. This perceived hostility does not prevent 
the subject from continuing to admire the model. It reinforces the subject’s belief that 
the model considers the subject to be inferior. The subject, then, vacillates between 
feelings of deep reverence and awe and feelings of immense hatred toward the 
mediator. “Only someone who prevents us from satisfying a desire which he himself 
has inspired in us is truly an object of hatred.”11 The mediator’s original role, in which 
the mediator was a model to be imitated, becomes secondary. Consequently, the 
mediator’s secondary role, as an obstacle to the subject, becomes primary and the 
subject views the mediator solely as an obstacle or rival. “Now the mediator is a shrewd 
and diabolical enemy; he tries to rob the subject of his most prized possessions; he 
obstinately thwarts his most legitimate ambitions.”12 For Girard, ressentiment sums up 
the experiences of the subject as the result of internal mediation. “The impassioned 
admiration and desire to emulate stumble over the unfair obstacle with which the model 
seems to block the way of his disciple, and then these passions recoil on the disciple in 
the form of impotent hatred.”13  
 
10 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Underground Man, quoted in Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd, 2004), 26-27. For further discussion of Dostoevsky’s 
underground, see René Girard and James G. Williams, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor 
Dostoevsky (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2012). 
 







3.1.2   Metaphysical Desire and the Divine Inheritance 
Desire takes on a metaphysical aspect when the subject’s desire is directed toward the 
mediator’s being. “The object is only a means of reaching the mediator. The desire is 
aimed at the mediator’s being.”14 The subject is drawn towards a mediator, who appears 
to be superior to the subject in some way. The model may give the impression of 
enjoying a higher social status or of having more autonomy than the subject. The 
subject wishes to change their own being, desiring to absorb the particular quality that 
they so admire in the mediator. The object, then, is not the focus of the desire, and is 
nothing more than a means of attaining the mediator’s being. The subject believes that 
the metamorphosis of their own being will take place once they are in possession of the 
object. “Every hero of a novel expects his being to be radically changed by the act of 
possession.”15 
At surface level the root of metaphysical desire appears to be self-hatred. As the 
subject wishes to alter his or her own being, this implies an abhorrence towards 
particular personal qualities that they possess. Girard draws on Dostoevsky’s Notes 
from the Underground to illustrate this point. In the novella, an unnamed narrator, 
commonly referred to by readers as the underground man, relates his memoirs. It is 
certainly possible to accept that the underground man desires to change his being 
because of self-hatred. “The wish to be absorbed into the substance of the Other implies 
an insuperable revulsion for one’s own substance. The underground man is in fact puny 
and sickly.”16 His desire to absorb the mediator’s being is evident in the following.  
 
 








I composed a splendid, charming letter to him, imploring him to apologize 
to me, and hinting rather plainly at a duel in case of refusal. The letter was 
so composed that if the officer had the least understanding of the good and 
the beautiful he would certainly have flung himself on my neck and have 
offered me his friendship. And how fine that would have been! How we 
should have got on together! “He could have shielded me with his higher 
rank, while I could have improved his mind with my culture, and, well . . 
. my ideas, and all sorts of things might have happened.”17  
 
The passage illustrates the underground man’s desire to combine his own intelligence 
with the strength of the mediator, who is an officer that accidentally bumped into him 
in a billiard room. As the underground man is sickly and puny, it is easy to see why he 
desires to become more like the officer. Yet Girard claims that the individual’s hatred 
of a particular personal quality is not a sufficient source for metaphysical desire. “All 
heroes of novels hate themselves on a more essential level than that of ‘qualities.’”18 
What the subject truly hates is their own subjectivity. In allowing another to choose the 
object of their desire for them, the subject losest what Girard describes as a ‘most 
fundamental individual prerogative.’19 With autonomy surrendered, the individual 
questions his or her existence believing that there is no reason or purpose to it. 
Dostoevesky illustrates this curse perfectly with the character of Myshkin.  
He saw before him a dazzling sky, at his feet a lake, and all around a 
luminous horizon, so huge it seemed boundless. He gazed at the sight a long 
time, his heart torn with anguish. He remembered now having stretched out 
his arms to that ocean of light and blue and wept. He was tormented by the 
idea that he was separated from all that. What was this feast, this endless 
festival, to which he had so long felt himself drawn, ever since his 
childhood, without ever being able to participate in it? . . . Every being has 
a path and knows it; he comes and goes singing; but he, he alone knows 
nothing and understands nothing, neither men nor the voices of nature, for 
he is everywhere a stranger and an outcast.20 
 
 
17 Ibid.  
 
18 Ibid., 55. 
 






In contrast to the individual, who feels lacking in a purpose or reason for existence, 
everyone else’s existence appears to be more authentic and seemingly endowed with a 
happiness and passion. The individual is set apart from this happiness, filled with a self-
hatred that reduces the individual’s existence and surroundings to mere mediocrity. 
“The hero contaminates everyone and everything with which he is in contact.”21 Girard 
calls this subjectivity the curse of the individual being, of one who is set apart.22 For 
him, the characters in Stendhal’s, Proust’s, and Dostoyevsky’s works are portrayed as 
the victims of a ‘false promise’ that has left them devoid of their proper being, with the 
victims believing that the Other possesses all that they themselves lack. The root of this 
‘curse of the individual being’ does not lie within the individual. Rather, the cause is 
what Girard describes as the ‘false promise’ of metaphysical autonomy, which is a 
particular problem of modernity. “Modernity, with its spiritual bleakness and 
assimilation of everything to the politics of democracy, has exacerbated this perennial 
and universal phenomenon.”23 The ‘death of God’ promised metaphysical autonomy, 
leaving humankind to step up and fill the vacant place left by God’s ‘death.’ Girard 
claims that this elevation of humankind is both the foundation of every Western 
doctrine and the false promise of metaphysical autonomy that is responsible for the 
‘curse of the individual.’24 “For two or three centuries this has been the underlying 
principle of every ‘new’ Western doctrine: God is dead, man must take his place.”25 
 
21 Ibid., 56. 
 




24 See Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 56; see also Scott Cowdell, René Girard and Secular 
Modernity: Christ, Culture, and Crisis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013).  
 




There is an extraordinary sense of pride and expectation for humankind within this 
promise, yet it turns out to be false. “The more deeply it [the promise of metaphysical 
autonomy] is engraved in our hearts the more violent is the contrast between this 
marvelous promise and the brutal disappointment inflicted by experience.”26 Each 
individual realizes that it is impossible to live up to this divine inheritance of 
metaphysical autonomy, yet the individual is unable to share this experience with the 
Other. This is due to the belief that each person alone is suffering from this subjectivity.  
The divine inheritance, then, becomes a burden as each individual believes that the 
promise of autonomy is true for the Other. Unable to universalize their experience, the 
individual shoulders the burden of subjectivity alone, attempting to conceal it from the 
Other: “everyone thinks that he alone is condemned to hell, and that is what makes it 
hell.”27 Even if the individual realizes that this hell, which is created by the illusion of 
autonomy, is not just theirs alone, pride prevents them from speaking out. The 
individual’s silence is guaranteed by the feelings of fear and shame that would be 
brought about by the exposition of this failure to the Other. It is this very silence that 
sustains and perpetuates the false promise, as each person continues to proclaim the lie 





26 Ibid., 56. 
 
27 Ibid., 57. Andrew O’Shea notes that our inner life is based on self-deception, and that, for 
Girard, humankind’s attempt to take over from God results in the fragmentation of the soul. The 
individual can no longer trust in the self but, instead, follows a mediator.  “In this world every statement 
designed to justify human’s existence as noble and worthy rings so hollow that they must dig even deeper 
into the illusory substance of their being to try, in vain of course, to compensate for the profound sense 
of being out of joint” (Andrew O’Shea, Selfhood and Sacrifice: René Girard and Charles Taylor on the 




3.2 Propitiatory Religion  
This section focuses on the repercussions arising from the rivalry that is inherent to 
mimesis. It will explore the connection between mimetic violence, religious, and 
cultural development. At the heart of Girard’s work is the connection between violence 
and the sacred, which he considers to be the foundation of religion. His particular 
understanding of this foundation is explored here in the light of primitive religion. An 
exploration of the scapegoat mechanism provides an understanding of how violence is 
played out in communities and how myth conceals the reality of what has taken place.  
 
3.2.1 Violence and the Sacred 
Girard develops his theory of mimetic desire by studying the repercussions of the 
rivalry that arises when desires converge on the same object. For this second phase of 
his study, he turns from literature to cultural anthropology, still examining it through 
the lens of mimesis but from within a broader framework.28 Rather than continuing to 
concentrate on the limited interactions of literary characters, he shifts his focus to 
primitive societies and the connection that he sees between cultural formation, religion, 
and violence. Girard believes that violence is central to understanding religious and 
cultural development.  
The French scholar’s second volume, Violence and the Sacred, explores the link 
between sacrifice, violence, and the pivotal role that they play in society. “Violence is 
the heart and secret soul of the sacred.”29 Sacrifice acts as a buffer between the 
 
28 For more on the sacred through the lens of literary fiction, see Cesáreo Bandera, The Sacred 
Game: The Role of the Sacred in Modern Literary Fiction (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1994). Bandera’s book examines literary fiction and the sacred through a Girardian 
lens.  For more on Girard and myth, see Richard J. Golsan,  Rene Girard and Myth: An Introduction. 1st 
paperback ed. (New York: Routledge Ltd, 1993). 
29 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred. Translated by Patrick Gregory. New York: 




community and the conflict that proceeds from internal mediation. Girard maintains 
that expiation has little or nothing to do with sacrifice. Instead of being a means of 
atonement, sacrifice’s purpose is to ensure societal harmony. Sacrifice, then, is 
society’s way of dealing with violence when it arises as the community as a whole 
suffers while its members are not at peace with one another. “When men no longer live 
in harmony with one another, the sun still shines and the rain falls, to be sure, but the 
fields are less well tended, the harvests less abundant.”30 Violence affects all aspects of 
the community, including its material success; all the quarrels that occur prevent the 
smooth running of the social order.  
The violence that arises from internal mediation cannot be prevented. However, 
the ritual framework surrounding the sacrificial act channels the violence safely, 
preventing it from spilling unchecked into the community. The framework’s ability to 
fulfil this function rests on two characteristics that operate conjunctively, namely, 
substitution and misunderstanding. If it is necessary, substitution allows society to 
protect its own members by allowing a surrogate victim to be chosen as a sacrifice. The 
community members select the surrogate victim, diverting the violence away from the 
original victim and allowing the violence to fall on another. The surrogate may not be 
a member of the community in which the conflict has arisen; “society is seeking to 
deflect upon a relatively indifferent victim, a ‘sacrificeable’ victim, the violence that 
would otherwise be vented on its own members, the people it desires most to protect.”31 
Certain criteria must be adhered to in order for the substitution to work. The victim 
must be carefully selected. If the wrong victim is chosen the ritual will be ineffective 
 
 
30 Girard, Violence and the Sacred., 8. 
 




and the violence will not be checked. The victim is deliberately chosen in order to avoid 
any further repercussion of violence. Those selected are normally individuals who are 
on the fringes of society, such as slaves, prisoners of war, and disabled persons. The 
victim does not share in the bonds that weave the rest of the community together, having 
little or no social ties.  Women, although certainly on the margins of society, however, 
are rarely sacrificed. Girard claims that this is due to familial connections as a woman 
retains connections to her clan even when she marries into her husband’s tribe. Thus, 
should she be sacrificed, there is a risk of reprisal from her own clan. Girard concludes 
that great care is taken with the victim’s selection in order to minimize the risk of 
vengeance or retribution. 
 The substitution requires a degree of misunderstanding in order to operate 
successfully. Once a surrogate is selected, the original victim must then fade into 
insignificance. The community’s focus must be directed away from the original, who 
carries the risk of vengeance or retribution, for example, from family members. Instead, 
the surrogate, who is the victim that is capable of satisfying violence’s ‘raging hunger’ 
without jeopardizing the community, must now be the centre of attention.32 For the 
violence to be successfully diverted in this manner, from one victim to another, the 
substitution must be obfuscated to a degree by removing the original sacrifice from 
plain view. “Its [the sacrificial substitution] vitality as an institution depends on its 
ability to conceal the displacement upon which the rite is based.”33 In Girard’s words, 
sacrificial substitution depends on a degree of misunderstanding; the efficacy of the 
sacrificial rite depends on the community lacking a full awareness of the substitution 
 
32 See Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 4.   
 




that has occurred 34 Yet, paradoxically, a small degree of awareness must remain, as 
without it the substitution could not actually take place. Girard draws on the Bible, 
specifically Genesis 27, in order to illustrate both substitution and misunderstanding in 
operation. Here, Girard uses the story of Isaac blessing his son, Jacob. The take begins 
with Isaac instructing Esau, his other son, to go hunting and to return to him with a 
savoury meant. He intends to bestow his blessing on Esau on his return. Jacob, 
meanwhile, learns of Isaac’s intentions and turns to his mother, Rebekah, for help. She 
kills two goats, turning them into the savoury meat. As Esau is hairy and Jacob smooth, 
Rebekah then covers Jacob with goatskin. As Isaac’s sight is not good, when he feels 
the goatskin on Jacob’s arms and neck he is duped by the ploy. Thus, he gives Jacob 
his blessing instead of Esau. Here, the goats protect Jacob from the violence intended 
towards him in two ways. First, they provide Jacob with the meat that his father 
requires, meaning that Isaac gives Jacob his blessing, rather than a curse. Secondly, 
with Jacob wearing their skins, the animals act as a buffer, preventing violence from 
occurring between father and son. “They [the skins] serve as a sort of insulation, 
preventing the direct contact that could lead only to violence.”35 In this story we see 
two kinds of substitution; one brother is substituted for another and an animal is 
substituted for a person.36 The passage also illustrates the degree of misunderstanding 
required for the substitution to take place effectively. Girard believes that the first act 
of substitution, one brother for another, overshadows and half-conceals the second, that 










sacrificial quality; it claims to reveal one act of substitution while employing this 
substitution to half-conceal another.”37 
In order to operate successfully, Girard claims, sacrifice must take place within 
the sacrificial framework. If it occurs outside the ritualistic form, the sacrifice fails to 
dispel the violence within the community. Girard offers a Greek hero, Ajax, as an 
example. Ajax fought for the Greeks in the Trojan War and was second only to Achilles. 
When Achilles was killed in the fighting, Ajax returned his body and armour to the 
Greeks while another hero, Odysseus, held off the Trojans. A dispute arose over 
Achilles’ armour, as both heroes laid claim to it. The dispute was settled by a vote, with 
the Greek army awarding the armour to Odysseus. Enraged at their decision, Ajax 
planned to attack the Greeks. Instead, he slaughters a flock of sheep, mistaking them 
for the Greeks in his anger. Even though sacrifice is designed to halt the violence that 
arises from internal mediation, it only does so through structured, controlled channels. 
Even though sheep were commonly used in sacrificial rituals, Ajax is deemed to be a 
madman as he killed them outside of the sacrificial framework. Indeed, the framework 
acts as a restraint. As violence is contagious, with the potential to spread and to 
contaminate others, it is necessary to curtail it. “There is something infectious about the 
spectacle of violence.”38 It has a mimetic character; each violent deed is seen as a 
legitimate response to an ‘original’ act of violence, which may be real or perceived.39 
Violence is always believed to be initiated by an opponent, meaning that the 
responsibility lies with someone else. This allows for ‘tit-for-tat’ acts of violence, with 
 
37 Ibid., 6. 
 
38 Ibid., 31. 
 
39 See René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. Translated by Stephen 
Bann and Michael Metteer. London: Continuum, 2005. Originally published as Des Choses cachées 




each side blaming the other.40 Even individuals who were not involved in the original 
dispute may be drawn into the conflict. The only thing that can prevent violence from 
spreading is violence itself. “Only violence can put an end to violence, and that is why 
violence is self-propagating. Everyone wants to strike the last blow, and reprisal can 
thus follow reprisal without any true conclusion being reached.”41 Only a properly 
conducted sacrifice can break the cycle. Ritual, then, is simply a framework that permits 
the violence to fall on a victim from whom there will be no further reprisals. “Religion 
directs violence as a defensive force against those forms of violence that society regards 
as inadmissible.”42  
Violence, in Girard’s reading, has a dual nature, possessing both harmful and 
beneficial aspects. On the one hand, violence appears to be terrifying in nature as it is 
random, ruinous, and disorderly. This type of violence destroys the social order; it is 
the same kind of violence that allows for ‘tit-for-tat’ acts of reprisal to spread 
throughout the community. On the other hand, violence is beneficial as it restores peace 
to the group. This is the violence that takes place within the sacrificial framework, 
which acts as a restraint on any further violent outbreaks and reinstates order. “At times 
violence appears to man in its most terrifying aspect, wantonly sowing chaos and 
destruction; at other times it appears in the guise of peacemaker, graciously distributing 
the fruits of sacrifice.”43 Essentially, the method used to restore peace is the very same 
 
40 See Duncan Morrow, “Violence Unveiled: Understanding Christianity and Politics in Northern 
Ireland After René Girard’s Rereading of Atonement,” in Mimesis and Atonement: René Girard and the 
Doctrine of Salvation, eds. Michael Kirwan and Sheelah Treflé Hidden (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2017), 135-153.  
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as the violent acts that it seeks to overcome: violence is used to check violence. “Ritual 
is nothing more than the regular exercise of ‘good’ violence.”44 For Girard, the dual 
nature of violence is best understood by religion, and, in particular, the symbolism of 
and treatment of blood is an example of the paradoxical nature of violence. “Blood 
serves to illustrate the point that the same substance can stain or cleanse, contaminate 
or purify, drive men to fury and murder or appease their anger and restore them to 
life.”45 Primitive societies generally attempt to avoid any contact with blood, unless it 
is within the context of a sacrificial act. Girard claims that this is due to its connection 
to violence.46 In times of peace blood is not a common sight, however, during times of 
conflict and violence blood is shed. “When violence is unloosed . . . blood appears 
everywhere—on the ground, underfoot, forming great pools. Its very fluidity gives form 
to the contagious nature of violence.”47 The blood spilt by violence is allowed to dry 
and congeal on the victim, becoming dark and rough. By contrast, the blood spilt in a 
ritual is bright and free flowing. It is not allowed to dry on the victim but is carefully 
removed.48 In the same paradoxical way in which violence puts an end to violence, 
blood itself is required to purify blood. The blood of the sacrificial victim purifies the 
contaminated blood, cleansing the community. In order to illustrate the duality of blood 
Girard draws from Euripides’ Ion. In this passage, we see the queen, Creusa, explaining 
 
44 Ibid., 38. 
 
45 Ibid., 38. 
 
46 This is particularly true, for Girard, in the case of menstrual blood. Frequently, primitive 
religions believed menstrual blood to be impure. The French scholar maintains that this impurity is to do 
with menstruation’s link with sexuality. Often, violence is at the heart of sexuality: for example sadism, 
masochism, and rape. In childbirth, the death of mother, child, or both is possible. Violence may also 
arise as the result of incestuous or adulterous relationships. “Sexuality leads to quarrels, jealous rages, 
mortal combats. It is a permanent source of disorder even within the most harmonious of societies” 
(Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 36).   
 
47 Ibid., 35. 
 
48 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 38. 
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to her slave the significance of two drops of blood that she has in her possession. Both 
drops fell from the Gorgon, Medusa, when she was slain by Perseus, yet both have 
different attributes. 
Creusa: When the fatal blow was struck a drop spurted from the hollow 
vein. . . . 
Slave: How is it used? What are its properties? 
Creusa: It wards off all sickness and nourishes life. 
Slave: And the other drop?  
Creusa: It kills. It is made from the Gorgon’s venomous serpents. 
Slave: Do you carry them mixed together or separate? 
Creusa: Are good and evil to be mixed together? Separate, of course.49 
 
It is possible for the distinction between pure and impure to become blurred. The two 
final lines of dialogue between Creusa and the slave hint at such a thing. The two drops 
of blood that Creusa possesses must be carried separately lest they mingle. Should they 
do so, there would no longer be any distinction between them and the difference 
between pure and impure would be eroded. The pure blood’s efficacy, then, would be 
destroyed. “As long as purity and impurity remain distinct, even the worst pollution can 
be washed away; but once they are allowed to mingle, purification is no longer 
possible.”50 The same is true for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ violence; once the difference between 
them has been erased then violence cannot be purified. Sacrificial violence, which takes 
place within a ritual framework, and nonsacrificial violence, which occurs outside the 
ritual framework, bear a close resemblance to each other. Violent acts that are 
prohibited in society may be permitted within the context of ritual. The ritual 
framework provides a distinction; the sacrificial violence is good, as this is controlled 
 
 
49 See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 39; see also Euripides, Ion, trans, George Gilbert Aimé 
Murray (London: George Allen & Unwin; New York Oxford University Press, 1954; Project Gutenberg, 
2011), 78-80:1003-1017. https://gutenberg.ca/ebooks/murrayeuripides-ion/murrayeuripides-ion-00-
h.html. Although Girard draws on Euripides’ Ion, he has omitted any bibliographical details. I have 
provided a reference to a freely available version of the text, accessible online, and included the location 
of the lines that Girard discusses here. 
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and may be safely watched, while the nonsacrificial, which is uncontrolled and unsafe 
as it does not operate within a set framework, is bad. The sacrificial process is a finely 
balanced system; any interference with, or failure to adhere to its regulations, prevents 
it from functioning properly. If, for example, the sacrificial victim is too close to the 
community, there will be no distinction between the violence taking place throughout 
the community and the ‘good’ violence of the ritual. The rite, then, is rendered 
ineffectual and is unable to check the violence that threatens to engulf the community.  
 
3.2.2 The Sacrificial Crisis and the Scapegoat Mechanism  
The sacrificial process is a finely balanced operation, with the efficacy of the process 
resting on the careful selection of the victim. Any deviation from the correct criteria 
prevents the sacrifice from working properly. If, for example, a victim is chosen that 
has ties to the community then the repercussions will be disastrous. The distinction 
between the ‘good’ violence and ‘bad’ is erased, meaning that there is no longer any 
differentiation between the controlled, purifying violence of sacrifice and the 
uncontrolled, impure violence that takes place outside the ritual framework. Murder 
and sacrifice are rendered one and the same.  
Girard claims that once the distinction between sacrificial and nonsacrificial 
violence is obliterated then all other differences within the community are erased.51 The 
sacrificial crisis, which is the loss of distinction, affects the entire social order. The 
community is not only threatened by physical violence, but also by the erosion of its 
very foundations. Primitive societies depend on cultural distinctions for order and 
peace: when the religious framework flounders, then the resulting sacrificial crisis is a 
 




threat to the harmony and stability of the entire social order. The French scholar draws 
on Oedipus the King as an example of the sacrificial crisis’ effect on the social order.52 
Many acts of violence occur throughout the Oedipus myth; “at the core of the Oedipus 
myth . . . is the proposition that all masculine relationships are based on reciprocal acts 
of violence.”53 Originally, Laius casts out Oedipus, fearful that he will die at Oedipus’ 
hands. Even with this preventative measure, the prophecy is fulfilled and Oedipus is 
responsible for Laius’ death. Further violence erupts between Oedipus, his brother in 
law Creon, and the blind prophet Tiresias. The familial differences in the myth are 
erased. Oedipus, for example, is both son and husband to Jocasta. Differences are 
erased within the community too, for example, with Oedipus and Tiresias. In their roles, 
as king and prophet, Oedipus and Tiresias are the spiritual leaders of Thebes. Pitted 
against one another, Oedipus threatens to expose Tiresias as a failure and false prophet; 
Tiresias retaliates by challenging Oedipus. It is easy to see the exchange as one that 
takes place solely between two individuals, yet, due to their respective positions, it is 
one that has implications for the entire community. It is not just the individuals that 
suffer; because both Tiresias and Oedipus are figures of authority the institutions that 
they represent also suffer. “Although the targets are the individuals, it is the institutions 
that receive the blows. Legitimate authority trembles on its pedestal, and the combatants 
finally assist in the downfall of the very order they strove to maintain.”54 The conflict 
 
52 Oedipus the King is a play by Sophocles, performed, approximately, during the 430’s BCE. 
The play opens with the citizens of Thebes pleading with their king, Oedipus, to save them from the 
plague that is sweeping through the city. While attempting to find a cure, Oedipus discovers that Laius, 
the former king of Thebes, whom he killed unintentionally, is his father. Not only has Oedipus killed his 
father, but also, in marrying Jocasta, Laius’ widow, he has married his own mother. For an edition of this 
play, with introduction and commentary, see, P. J. Finglass, Sophocles: Oedipus the King. Cambridge 
Classical Texts and Commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
 
53 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 50.  
 




becomes more intense. “The institutions lose their vitality; the protective façade of the 
society gives way; social values are rapidly eroded, and the whole cultural structure 
seems on the verge of collapse.”55 Girard maintains that the social order is founded on 
distinctions. Due to this,  when these distinctions are erased the stability and harmony 
of the entire social order is threatened. “[The] cultural order is nothing more than a 
regulated system of distinctions in which the differences among individuals are used to 
establish their ‘identity’ and their mutual relationships.”56 In primitive religion 
differentiation gives stability to a community. Girard uses the example of the treatment 
of twins in primitive societies to illustrate this point. The terror inspired by twins often 
leads to one, or both, of them being put to death. He believes that it is the dread of 
violence that drives the community, or, in some cases, the parents, to do so. Twins 
frequently look very similar to one another and often share a cultural identity.57 It is, he 
claims, the lack of differentiation between twins that gives rise to the fear of violence. 
Even the manner in which twins are put to death is an indication of this fear. No direct 
physical violence is used, for fear of contamination or revenge, instead, they are usually 
abandoned, left somewhere outside the community, and exposed to the elements. Their 
deaths are inevitable due to the exposure. Due to their dying in this fashion, the 
community is safe in the belief that there will be no reprisals.  
Mimetic desire is at the heart of the sacrificial crisis. Internal mediation occurs 
when the distance between the subject and mediator is not sufficient to stop them from 
coming into contact with one another.  The distance acts as a buffer, preventing conflict 
 








from arising between the subject and mediator. In the case of internal mediation there 
is not enough distance to prevent rivalry or conflict from occurring. The distance is not 
only geographical but may also be intellectual or social. Once all distinctions are eroded 
there are fewer obstacles to prevent conflict from transpiring and so the discord 
increases. When the subject desires a particular object, this is known as acquisitive 
mimesis. However, as the rivalry intensifies the object does not remain at the centre of 
the contention; there is a shift to metaphysical desire, as in the place of an object, the 
rivals now desire prestige or recognition. The rivals are locked into a bitter fascination 
with one another.58 Shakespeare’s play, Troilus and Cressida is a prime example of the 
shift from acquisitive desire to metaphysical; it is also an illustration of the rivals’ 
fascination with each other.59 The play’s subject is the futility of the Trojan War. 
Initially, the Greeks and Trojans battle over Helen, whom the Trojans abducted. 
However, Helen does not remain the focus of desire. As the war drags on and Helen 
ages, the focus shifts from the acquisitive to the metaphysical; rather than fighting for 
Helen, both sides are fighting for the prestige of winning.60  
At the height of the sacrificial crisis we find what Girard calls ‘doubles.’61 The 
doubles are the antagonists who are caught in the crisis. The object of desire has faded 
away and the antagonists are firmly focused on each other. In their attempts to establish 
difference between themselves they succeed only in becoming increasingly 
indistinguishable from one another. The antagonists’ struggle for difference simply 
results in each imitating the other and the erosion of difference in the social order means 
 
58 For further information see Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard, 42. 
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that any antagonist may be the double of any other at any time. “As the crisis grows 
more acute, the community members are transformed into ‘twins,’ matching images of 
violence . . . they are each doubles of the other.”62 Although the sacrificial crisis results 
in the erosion of difference, paradoxically, in the case of the doubles, the differences 
are never completely erased as their relationship is based on a system of reciprocity. 
Each antagonist trades blows with the other, and this successive trading of blows means 
that they do not occupy the same position at the same time. Rather, they occupy it 
successively. “The reciprocal relationship between the characters is real, but it is the 
sum of nonreciprocal moments. The antagonists never occupy the same positions at the 
same time, to be sure; but they occupy these positions in succession.”63 The faster the 
antagonists trade blows with each other, the faster they successively occupy each 
position. Eventually, all distinctions between them appear to be erased.  To those on 
the outside, there is effectively no difference between those striking the blows and those 
receiving them. In contrast, the antagonists usually fail to realize the reciprocal nature 
of their relationship and only recognize the differences between one another. The 
collapse of the social order transforms the normal, everyday into a monstrous blend of 
things that under normal circumstances are distinct; the doubles are trapped in a state 
in which their differences are not entirely erased, but instead are mixed up and 
disordered.64 Primitive societies fear the double as the double appears at the height of 
the sacrificial crisis when the entire social order is under threat. Anything that could 
 
 
62 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 83, emphasis original. Each antagonist’s actions closely 
resemble that of the other. “They make the same gestures, they have the same desires and the same 
thoughts” (René Girard, ‘Dionysus and the Violent Genesis of the Sacred,’ trans. Sandor Goodhart in 
Boundary 2, Vol. 5, no.2 [Winter, 1977], 487-506, here, 491). 
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potentially produce a double was looked upon with dread. Imitative magic, for example, 
such as voodoo, was feared.65 The voodoo dolls are an example of imitative magic as 
they are a simulacrum or double of an adversary. Voodoo’s adherents believe that what 
is done to the doll figure is also done to the person that it represents. Great care was 
taken in some societies with hair or nail clippings, or indeed with any body part that 
could be used as a potential double.  
The scapegoat mechanism is a process that re-establishes the social order. For 
Girard, there are, currently, three distinct meanings to the term ‘scapegoat.’ The first is 
the biblical meaning, derived from Leviticus 16. Here, we see a ritual performed on the 
Day of Atonement, in which one goat has the sins of the community laid upon it and is 
banished to the wilderness. A second goat is then sacrificed. ‘Scapegoat’ refers to the 
first goat and its purpose. The second is the anthropological meaning of ‘scapegoat’ as 
there are similarities between the Leviticus ritual and those in other cultures. The term 
was used, freely, in connection with the other rituals, based on the belief that guilt and 
suffering could be transferred (usually to an animal). Recently, Girard notes, 
anthropologists believe that no such distinct type of ritual can be recognized. Due to an 
inability to clearly define such practices the term ‘scapegoat’ now carries an air of 
disrepute in anthropological circles.66  Thirdly, the term has a psychosocial meaning. 
Here, the term is used to denote victims of unwarranted violence.67 The French scholar 
uses the term scapegoat in this psychosocial, everyday sense, as an individual who is 
 
65 See René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. 
 
66 René Girard, ‘Generative Scapegoating,’ in R.G. Hamerton-Kelly ed., Violent Origin: Walter 
Burkert, René Girard and Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1987), 74. 
 
67 See René Girard, ‘Generative Scapegoating,’ in R.G. Hamerton-Kelly ed., Violent Origin: 
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blamed for the faults or wrongdoings of others. For Girard, the scapegoat mechanism 
breaks the cycle of reciprocal violence that occurs at the peak of the sacrificial crisis. 
Indeed, the violence may be described in terms of a vicious circle that is difficult to 
break free from. “Once a community enters the circle, it is unable to extricate itself. We 
can define this circle in terms of vengeance and reprisals.”68 The uncontrolled violence 
raging throughout the community must be diverted in order to break the cycle and 
restore peace. The double has a significant role to play in the restoration of harmony. 
All the antagonists are interchangeable; as all difference between them has been erased 
this means that any antagonist, at any time, may take the place of another. One is chosen 
and acts as a surrogate for all the others; “a single victim can be substituted for all the 
potential victims, for all the enemy brothers that each member is striving to banish from 
the community.”69 By this, Girard means that it is possible for any one of the doubles 
to take on the collective hatred of all the others.70 The antagonists’ hatred is transformed 
into a single, collective force that is aimed towards one individual; Girard calls this 
surrogate victim a scapegoat. This process, then, by which the crisis is resolved is 
known as the scapegoat mechanism. The scapegoat is held responsible for causing the 
conflict that threatened to engulf the entire social order. It is not necessary for the victim 
to be guilty. Any flimsy pretext, or rumour, is enough to convict the victim. Mimesis 
cements the guilty verdict as, one by one, the group unites to apportion blame to the 
victim.  
The slightest hint, the most groundless accusation, can circulate with 
vertiginous speed and is transformed into irrefutable proof. The corporate 
sense of conviction snowballs, each member taking confidence from his 
neighbor by a rapid process of mimesis. The firm conviction of the group 
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is based on no other evidence than the unshakable unanimity of its own 
illogic.71 
 
It is simply the case that the group unites, directing all their hatred and anger towards 
one individual. Although any one of the antagonists may be chosen, once the victim is 
selected the decision is final and will not be reversed. The victim is expelled from or 
destroyed by the community. It is an immediate and final solution to end the outbreak 
of violence that threatens to destroy the entire social order.  
 
3.3 Things Hidden: Sacrifice and Christianity 
Here, I delve deeper into the connection between religion and violence. Beginning with 
a discussion of ritual and prohibition, the section moves to explore the difference 
between myth and persecution texts. The earlier accounts of the scapegoat mechanism 
are the mythic accounts in which the workings of the scapegoat mechanism are 
shrouded from view. The persecution texts are later texts, in which the mechanism’s 
workings are not fully concealed. As we progress through the various accounts, Girard 
turns his attention to the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures. He examines both the Old and 
New Testaments in the light of the scapegoat mechanism, paying close attention to the 
desacralizing purpose of the Gospels.  
 
 
3.3.1 Religious Foundations 
Girard claims that in order to gain a better understanding of religion it must be examined 
in the light of the conflict brought about by mimesis. He focuses particularly on 
religious rites and prohibitions, maintaining that they exist solely because of the conflict 
 




arising from mimetic desire. Prohibitions exist in order to prevent violence from 
occurring.72 He maintains that primitive cultures have a better understanding of 
violence than we do currently. In the contemporary world, the judicial system prevents 
us from seeing an act of violence in its wider context. By this, he means the contagion 
of violence, whereby, the smallest dispute has the potential to seriously disrupt the 
existing social order. In fact, the judicial system operates in the same way as sacrifice 
in the sense that is it designed to limit any vengeance or reprisals. Given that the 
decision made by the presiding judge is presented as final, the judicial system normally 
restricts vengeance to a single act of reprisal. Due to this limiting effect, the wider 
context, in which violence threatens the community, only becomes visible if there is a 
breakdown in the judiciary system that reduces its efficacy. In contrast, primitive 
societies, rather than taking an act of violence as an isolated incident, take the imitative 
and reciprocal character of violence into consideration. An act of violence, far from 
being isolated, has the potential to escalate and become something far more than a 
single crime. Religious prohibitions function as a preventative measure. 
When all antimimetic prohibitions are considered as a whole . . . it becomes 
apparent that they correspond roughly to the steps of an escalation of 
mimetic contagion that threatens more and more members of the 
community and tends towards progressively more aggravated forms of 
rivalry over objects which the community is incapable of dividing 
peacefully: women, food, weapons, the best dwelling-sites, etc.73  
 
 
72 Prohibitions may be both religious and nonreligious. Imitative behaviour, for example, such as 
the repetition of another’s words or gestures may be prohibited by primitive societies. In this section, 
however, the discussion will focus on religious prohibitions.  
 
73 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 19. Girard uses the term ‘acquisitive mimesis’ to describe 
what takes place when people desire the same object with a view to appropriating it. The quotation 
provides examples of different objects, such as food and weapons, which all act as varying sources of 
acquisitive mimesis; they are limited resources and so individuals will struggle to acquire them for 
themselves. When the struggle escalates, eventually the object is no longer the focus of the struggle and 
violence is the end in itself. This is what Girard describes as ‘conflictual mimesis.’ See David Pan, 
Sacrifice in the Modern World: On the Particularity and Generality of Nazi Myth (Evanston, Illinois: 




While violence itself is forbidden, very often behaviour that may lead to violence is 
considered taboo. Many societies have prohibitions in place, for example, regarding 
sexuality. Sexual offences pose a real risk of violence, with significant potential to 
cause conflict within society. Violence may arise from deeds such as incest, adultery, 
rape, and sadism, for example. Childbirth, which is a consequence of sexual relations, 
is fraught with danger as death is a very real possibility for both parent and infant.74 
While prohibition forbids the violence of the mimetic crisis, ritual replicates it. 
Paradoxically, the ritual allows what is disallowed by the prohibitions. Although it is 
strictly taboo in normal circumstances, incestuous relations, for example, may take 
place during the ritual.75 The purpose of ritual is to take the very transgressions that 
would cause conflict in the community and to transform them so that the community 
peacefully collaborates together. “In order to reproduce a model of the mimetic crisis 
in a spirit of social harmony, the enactment must be progressively emptied of all real 
violence so that only the ‘pure’ form is allowed to survive.”76 In ritual the communities 
engage in the very transgressions that they fear, but in a safer form, in order to prevent 
the transgressions from occurring outside the protective structure of the ritual 
framework.  
 Generally, a ritual concludes with a sacrifice. This may not be limited to the 
slaughter of an animal but may include exorcism or mutilation.77 The sacrificial 
 
74 See Girard, Things Hidden.  
 
75 As an example of rituals involving sexual taboos, the Jaiminiya Brahmana describes the go-
sava. In this ritual the sacrificer plays the part of a bull. He is allowed to urinate and defecate wherever 
he chooses, as a bull would. During his time as a bull, in direct contravention of normal prohibitions, he 
must also have sexual relations with members of his own clan, including his mother and sister. See David 
M. Knipe, Vedic Voices: Intimate Narratives of a Living Andhra Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015).  
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conclusion to the ritual fulfils a similar function to that of the scapegoat, who acts as a 
surrogate victim at the height of the sacrificial crisis. In the same way that the 
community draws together to direct their hatred towards the scapegoat, they unite in 
the immolation of the sacrificial victim. Ritual safely replicates the mimetic crisis and 
concludes, similarly, with the sacrifice of a surrogate victim. “Where previously there 
had been a chaotic ensemble of particular conflicts, there is now the simplicity of a 
single conflict: the entire community on one side and on the other, the victim.”78 The 
sacrifice unites the community at the expense of the victim, who is, of course, chosen 
to minimize the risk of further violence.  
Girard believes that ritual is based on an original, or founding, murder that took 
place in the past. The ritual is not designed simply to re-enact or commemorate but 
rather to reproduce the effects of that murder. The reason for this reproduction is that 
at some point a crisis occurred, bringing chaos and unrest to the community. During 
this conflict a murder would have taken place, which would have brought about both 
the resolution of the crisis and the unification of the community. “In this light, ritual 
becomes comprehensible as an attempt to avert the real threat of crisis: the crisis would 
be reproduced not for its own sake but for the sake of its resolution.”79 After the murder 
has taken place and the crisis is resolved, harmony descends on the community. The 
group is blind to their own involvement and holds the victim responsible for both the 
newfound sense of calm and for the preceding events of the crisis. The victim, as a 
 
 
78 Ibid., 24. According to Rowan Williams, the rivalry itself helps to unite the community. The 
elimination of the victim ensures that the obstacle between the community and the desired object is 
removed.  “Rivalry itself creates a community of sorts, and its culmination comes at a point where a 
whole ensemble of rivals comes to agree that all are being denied possession of what they desire by one 
paradigm possessor. To eliminate that one person secures, de facto, access to what is denied by all the 
others” (Rowan Williams, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology ed. Mike Higton 
[Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007], 173). Emphasis original.  
 




consequence of appearing capable of bringing both disorder and order, becomes a deity 
and is deemed sacred. The victim, or deity, is believed to possess not only the 
knowledge of what transgressions originally triggered the crisis but also the knowledge 
of the solution. As the deity is believed to pass on this knowledge to the community, 
this explains why prohibitions and rituals are in place. “It is logical to believe that the 
terrifying aspects of the epiphany is designed to impress in all hearts and minds the 
rules that the deity wants established.”80 Girard also believes that the victim’s newfound 
status as a deity also lays the foundation for the ‘first outlines’ of transcendence.81 He 
claims that as the victim is reputed to bring both death (the murder during the crisis) 
and life (with the resolution of the crisis) to the community then the victim must surpass 
the normal limits of the human condition.82 As the deity establishes the rules and 
resolutions that the community must abide by, this explains why religion is at the heart 
of primitive societies. “All cultures attribute their foundation to supernatural powers 
which are also believed to demand respect for the rules that they transgress, and to 
sanction their transgression with the most terrible punishments.”83 The punishments are 
not simply some superstitious delusion but are in fact all too real. If the prohibitions are 
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83 Ibid., emphasis original. Religion, then, operates on the basis of a misunderstanding. The 
community do not realise what is truly taking place. The misunderstanding paves the way for religious 
and cultural diversity as it allows for a variety of practices. Even though all of these practices fall under 
the umbrella of ritual and prohibition, they are all an attempt to prevent or dispel violence. Girard believes 
that we must look beneath the surface of what is presented to us in order to discover the reality of the 
religious foundations underneath. He likens the sacred to Johann Joachim Becher’s theory of phlogiston, 
which was an early attempt (1669) to explain what is now known as oxidation. Becher thought that 
phlogiston, a non-existent chemical, was released during combustion, leaving behind ash as the 
‘dephlogisticated’ substance. For Girard, both the sacred and the theory of phlogiston are attempts to 
explain a very real phenomenon, although in both cases one must delve deeper in order to gain a better 
understanding of these phenomena. “Phlogiston does not exist any more than the sacred, yet the theory 
of phlogiston allowed for a relatively exact description of certain aspects of the real phenomenon of 
combustion” (René Girard, Things Hidden, 45).  
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ignored the community then faces a real risk of plunging back into the cycle of 
vengeance and violence once more. Therefore, religion, for Girard, is an immense effort 
to keep peace within the community, prohibiting violence and dispelling it when it 
occurs.  
 
3.3.2 Myth and Persecution Texts 
For Girard, both earlier and later accounts of the scapegoat mechanism at work describe its 
principal structural traits. He distinguishes between earlier accounts, which are found in 
mythology, and later ones, such as texts from the Middle Ages. Although both types of 
account describe the phenomena of collective violence, there is a key difference between 
them. In myth, the workings of the scapegoat mechanism are obscure; all the elements of its 
workings are there but are not made clear to the reader. In the later accounts, the workings 
of the mechanism are clearer. The later accounts are, according to the French scholar, 
persecution texts rather than myths. He believes that myths are no longer produced due to 
society’s increasing awareness of collective violence and ability to decipher it in the myths. 
Due to this awareness persecution texts, instead of myths, are produced.84 For Girard, myth 
gives way to the persecution text due to society’s increasing awareness of collective violence. 
This growing awareness did not cease with the introduction of persecution texts. “Medieval 
texts of persecution . . . can be situated in an intermediary zone between mythology and the 
more radical demythification of which we ourselves are capable.”85 He emphasizes that the 
consciousness of collective violence is not a seamless transition from unawareness to 
 
 
84 See Girard, Things Hidden, 126. 
 
85 Ibid., 127.  
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awareness, but, instead, is a process of discovery varying from culture to culture. He believes, 
for example, that it is highly visible in Judaeo-Western society.86  
Girard believes that mythology only partially reveals the workings of the scapegoat 
mechanism. In order for this mechanism to work effectively and put an end to the conflict 
that might arise within a community, there must be an element of misunderstanding. The 
substitution of one victim for another requires a degree of misunderstanding in order to 
operate successfully. The community’s focus must be directed away from the original victim 
and focused on the new. For the violence to be successfully diverted in this manner, from 
one victim to another, the substitution must be obfuscated to a degree, removing the original 
sacrifice from plain view. In addition to the misunderstanding required for the victim’s 
substitution, the mechanism requires a degree of misunderstanding with regard to the group’s 
involvement in the process. The group lays all responsibility for both the disorder of the crisis 
and the subsequent restoration of order on the part of the victim, yet it remains blind to its 
own involvement in the crisis. Mythology follows the same pattern of misunderstanding. All 
the essential elements of the scapegoat mechanism at work are present in the myth, yet the 
account carefully avoids any acknowledgement of what is truly taking place.  
As a starting point for his analysis, Girard takes Claude Lévi-Strauss’ analysis of two 
myths in order to demonstrate the simultaneous awareness and concealment of the 
mechanism.  
 I can show you analyses in the work of Lévi-Strauss that concern the 
founding murder itself, that reveal the principal structural traits involved, 
without demonstrating any awareness of what is being shown or any 
understanding of the fact that they are in the process of revealing the 










He draws on two myths that Lévi-Strauss discusses in his work Totemism, both 
recounting the story of a collective murder.88 The myths come from two different 
societies, one from the Ojibwa Indians and the second from the Tikopia. The Tikopia 
come from a small island in the Pacific Ocean that is now grouped with the Solomon 
Islands, while the Ojibwa come from North America. Although the two tribes are some 
considerable distance apart, Girard is certain that both myths recount how a mimetic 
crisis occurred and was resolved within the respective communities. In both myths, 
strangers described as gods visit the tribes. Lévi-Strauss’ account of the Ojibwa myth 
reads as follows:  
The five ‘original’ clans are descended from six anthropomorphic 
supernatural beings who emerged from the ocean to mingle with human 
beings. One of them had his eyes covered and dared not look at the Indians, 
though he showed the greatest anxiety to do so. At last he could no longer 
restrain his curiosity, and one occasion he partially lifted his veil, and his 
eye fell on the form of a human being, who instantly fell dead ‘as if struck 
by the thunderers.’ Though the intentions of this dread being were friendly 
to men, yet the glance of his eye was too strong, and it inflicted certain death. 
His fellows therefore caused him to return to the bosom of the great water. 
The five others remained among the Indians, and ‘became a blessing to 
them.’ From them originate the five great clans or totems.89 
 
In the Ojibwa myth, a group of strange gods, who emerge from the sea, visit the clan. Even 
though he appears to be friendly and does not intend to do any harm, one of the visiting gods 
kills a member of the tribe. The myth tells us that the five other gods join forces, sending the 
sixth god back to the great water for his transgression. Girard believes that this myth tells the 
story of a murder, and, in this story, the sixth god dies by drowning as he is returned to the 
‘great water.’ In the Tikopia account, Tikarau, a strange god, visits the tribe.  
 
88 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney Needham (London: Merlin Press, 1964). Girard 
draws directly from Lévi-Strauss’ accounts and analyses of the myths.  
 
89 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney Needham (London: Merlin Press, 1964), 19, 
quoted in René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World trans. Stephen Bann and 




A long time ago the gods were no different from mortals, and the gods were 
the direct representatives of the clans in the land. It came about that a god 
from foreign parts, Tikarau, paid a visit to Tikopia, and the gods of the land 
prepared a splendid feast for him, but first they organized trials of strength 
and speed, to see whether their guest or they would win. During a race, the 
stranger slipped and declared that he was injured. Suddenly, however, while 
he was pretending to limp, he made a dash for the provisions for the feast, 
grabbed up the heap, and fled for the hills. The family of gods set off in 
pursuit; Tikarau slipped and fell again, so that the clan gods were able to 
retrieve some of the provisions, one a coconut, another a taro, another a 
breadfruit, and others a yam. Tikarau succeeded in reaching the sky with 
most of the foodstuffs for the feast, but these four vegetable foods had been 
saved for men.90 
 
In the Tikopia account, a strange god, named Tikarau, steals from the community of local 
gods by pretending to fall in order to abscond with the goods. He flees and the local gods 
give chase. Tikarau then falls for a second time.91 As far as Girard is concerned, this is 
Tikarau’s final fall. Girard refers to Raymond Firth’s account of the same myth.92 In this 
version, Tikarau launched himself into the sky from the edge of a cliff and is revered as a 
god because of this feat. For the French scholar this is enough; this is an account of Tikarau’s 
death in a fall from the cliff. In both accounts, the victims, or gods, are accused of certain 
crimes; the unnamed god killed an Indian and Tikarau stole the totemic plants belonging to 
the local gods.93 The actions of both strange gods threatened the communities as a whole, 
which justifies their expulsions. Not only are their actions sufficient to unite the wrath of the 
community against them, but they also fit the criteria required for the surrogate victim or 
scapegoat. In both myths the gods are visitors from outside the community and without any 
 
90 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney Needham (London: Merlin Press, 1964), 25-
26, quoted in René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World trans. Stephen Bann and 
Michael Metteer (London: Continuum, 2005), 106 
 
91 Girard points out that in Lévi-Strauss’ text the line reads ‘cette fois, Tikarau tomba pour de 
bon’ (Girard, Things Hidden, 107).  
 
92 See Raymond Firth, Tikopia Ritual and Belief (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). 
 
93 Girard believes that the plants represent the theft of the entire cultural order. See Girard, Things 




ties to it. As the unnamed god is blind and Tikarau limps, due to these infirmaries, they would 
have lived on the fringes of society. The myths illustrate the element of misunderstanding 
that is required in order for the scapegoat mechanism to work effectively, as, even though all 
the elements of the mechanism are present, the myths carefully avoid acknowledging the 
truth of what takes place. The accounts conceal the violence that occurs, hiding it from plain 
sight.  
 The persecution texts are similar in structure to the mythic accounts of the scapegoat 
mechanism in that the principal structural traits of the mechanism are present in the text. Like 
the mythic accounts, they still distort the workings of the mechanism but not to the same 
extent as myth. They still contain the same elements of the scapegoat mechanism at work 
that the mythic accounts do. There is a crisis, perhaps a flood or famine, which causes chaos 
and weakens the social order. Some sort of violent crime is committed, one which is read as 
a direct attack on the social order. It may be the breaking of a sexual taboo or the murder of 
an authoritarian figure. The blame is laid upon an individual, or group; social or ethnic 
minorities are particularly susceptible to persecution.94 Again, the criteria for the surrogate 
or scapegoat are upheld in this type of persecution story. The blame is always placed on those 
who are on the fringes of society. There is, however, a significant difference between the 
mythic and persecution accounts. In the mythic, the victim is sacralized. In contrast, there is 
 
94 René Girard, The Scapegoat. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 17. 
Originally published as Le Bouc émissaire (Paris: Editions Grasset, 1982). In addition to those who may 
be part of an ethnic or religious minority, or have some form of handicap, the wealthy may be at risk of 
persecution. “Crowds commonly turn on those who originally held exceptional power over them . . . The 
rich and powerful exert an influence over society which justifies the acts of violence to which they are 
subjected in times of crisis. This is the holy revolt of the oppressed” (Girard, The Scapegoat, 19).  Girard 
uses the French queen, Marie Antoinette, as an example. Not only was she Austrian by birth, marking 
her as a foreigner, but also faced accusations of incest at her trial.  For an anthropological account of a 
regicide conducted by a community, see S. Simonse, ‘The Killing of the Queen of the Pari,’ in Kings of 
Disaster, S. Simonse (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992). In this account, the Queen is accused of being a drunkard 





either a poor attempt at sacralization or else none at all in the persecution texts.95 As an 
example of a persecution text, Girard puts forward a work by the French poet and composer 
Guillame de Machaut, who survived the plague, the Black Death, which swept through 
Europe during the fourteenth century. For his purposes, Girard is only interested in the 
opening of the poem, The Judgement of the King of Navarre.96 The poem opens with de 
Machaut’s account of a crisis in which a series of catastrophic events occurred.  During this 
crisis he fears for his life and eventually seeks refuge in his house awaiting a resolution. 
“There are signs in the sky. People are knocked down by a rain of stones. Entire cities are 
destroyed by lightning.”97 People died until, eventually, the crisis was resolved and normal 
life could resume. Although some of the events are highly improbable, Girard does not doubt 
that some catastrophe occurred. He believes that de Machaut is actually speaking about the 
Black Death, even though de Machaut does not name it. “Medieval communities were so 
afraid of the plague that the word alone was enough to frighten them. They avoided 
mentioning it as long as possible.”98 The poet blames the Jews for the catastrophe, claiming 
that they poisoned the drinking water to ensure that the populace fell ill. His account also 
describes the slaughter of the Jews in retaliation for what they had done, which Girard points 
 
95 Girard, Things Hidden, 127.  
 
96 Guillame de Machaut was a fourteenth century poet and composer. Having trained as a clerk, 
he eventually rose to the position of secretary to the King of Bohemia, John of Luxembourg. With the 
King’s aid, he also became a canon of Reims Cathedral Chapter. In addition to his office at Reims, De 
Machaut gained other canonical posts at Amiens, Arras, and St-Quentin. Due to a papal bull issued by 
Pope Benedict XII in 1335, de Machaut had to relinquish his posts in Arras and Amiens as the Pope 
restricted the number of appointments that an individual could hold. For more on de Machaut and his 
works, see Deborah L. McGrady and Jennifer Bain, eds. A Companion to Guillaume de Machaut (Leiden: 
Brill, 2012), and Anne Walters Robinson, Guillame de Machaut and Reims: Context and Meaning in his 
Musical Works (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
 
97 Girard, The Scapegoat, 1. 
 




out is based on a real event. Girard quotes the passage from de Machaut’s poem concerning 
the Jews.  
After that came a false, treacherous and contemptible swine: this was shameful 
Israel, the wicked and disloyal who hated good and loved everything evil, who 
gave so much gold and silver and promises to Christians, who then poisoned 
several rivers and fountains that had been clean and pure so that many lost their 
lives; for whoever used them dies suddenly. Certainly ten times one hundred 
thousand died from it, in country and in city. Then finally this mortal calamity 
was noticed.  
He who sits on high and sees far, who governs and provides for everything, did 
not want this treachery to remain hidden; he revealed it and made it so generally 
known that they lost their lives and possessions. Then every Jew was destroyed, 
some hanged, others burned; some were drowned, others beheaded with an ax or 
sword.99 
 
Here, we see no sign of the sacralization that characterizes the mythic accounts. The Jews 
are blamed for the crisis, turned upon and massacred, but they are not credited with uniting 
the community once the crisis is resolved. Unlike the mythic accounts of collective violence, 
there is no attempt to veil the violence behind the sacralization of the victim. “These texts 
are much easier to decipher than myths because the transfiguration of the victim is much less 
powerful and complete than myth.”100 The persecution texts do not use the figure of a god to 
conceal what has taken place.  Without the sacralization of the victim in the persecution texts 
the workings of the scapegoat mechanism are easier to decipher.  
Girard sees an evolution taking place between the mythic and the persecution text. He 
is enthusiastic about this evolution, believing that it represents an improvement with regard 
to humankind’s intellectual and ethical development. He believes that as our awareness of 
collective violence and the workings of the scapegoat mechanism grow, there is a price to 
pay for this understanding. The French scholar believes that our awareness reduces the 
 
99 Guillame de Machaut, Oeuvres, Sociéte des anciens textes français, vol. 1, Le Judgement du 
Roy de Navarre (Paris: Ernest Hoeppfner, 1908), pp. 144-145 as quoted in René Girard, The Scapegoat 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 2. 
 




efficacy of the scapegoat mechanism, leading to an increase of recurring outbreaks of 
violence. As the mechanism becomes increasingly ineffective the violence itself may 
escalate, with the crimes themselves becoming more heinous in a futile attempt to resolve 
the sacrificial crisis.101 There is, in addition, a significant risk of increasing the number of 
victims in an effort to counteract the ineffectuality of the mechanism. Girard believes that 
totalitarian movements and the violence associated with them are prime examples of a 
community attempting to resolve the crisis through violent means; “entire categories of 
human beings are distinguished from the rest of humanity and are singled out for 
annihilation.”102 There is, however, the potential to use the knowledge of the workings of the 
scapegoat mechanism in order to disengage from violence.103 It is no longer possible to 
conceal the arbitrariness of the victim behind the facade of myth and ritual. This means that 
myth and ritual can no longer be produced. Instead, we have persecution texts. “Myth and 
ritual can no longer grow and spread. One can only find intermediate, mixed phenomena that 
are increasingly transparent to criticism; there can be read as persecution.”104 The persecution 
texts then, due to the increasing awareness of the workings of collective violence, are 
evidence of an inability to produce a true myth; the community cannot be united through 





101 Ibid., 128. 
 
102 Ibid., 128-129. 
 
103 Ibid., 127. 
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3.3.3 Desacralization in Progress 
Girard developed his theory of the scapegoat mechanism by examining the accounts of 
collective violence present in myth. Although these accounts describe the workings of 
the mechanism, they do not openly declare the reality of the collective violence that 
takes place. When he turned his attention to the persecution texts, the French scholar 
found evidence of a growing awareness of collective violence. Even though the 
persecution texts do not acknowledge the collective violence that takes place they do 
not sacralize the victim; this makes it easier for the reader to understand what it truly 
taking place in the account. Girard believes that the loss of a transfigured victim is a 
clear indication of an ongoing process of desacralization; “a society that replaces myth 
by an awareness of persecution is a society in the process of desacralization.”106 
Society is undergoing this process precisely because of our awareness of the workings 
of the scapegoat mechanism. Girard believes that this growing awareness has been 
present in history, for quite some time, as a long process of change that is not yet 
complete. Our awareness of the mechanism has deconstructed our religious and 
cultural foundations to the detriment of the sacrificial order. “It [humanity] is no longer 
capable of producing idols of violence around which it might achieve unanimity.”107 
As the victim is no longer sacralized we are no longer capable of achieving unity 
through sacrificial rites. Sacrifice’s efficacy is inexorably diminishing.  
Girard believes that religion is responsible for setting the process of 
desacralization in motion. Specifically, he claims that it is the Judaeo-Christian 
 
106 Girard, Things Hidden, 126. 
 




scriptures that demythologized religion’s violent foundations.108 Girard examines both 
the Old and New Testament in the light of this claim. The Old Testament contains 
many of the elements of collective violence that we find in mythology and in 
persecution texts. First, it contains accounts of communities in crisis, for example, 
Sodom and Gomorrah, two cities in which the inhabitants were so sinful that it resulted 
in their destruction by fire (Genesis 19).109 Secondly, we see several examples where 
collective violence is directed towards one individual. Girard offers an account of 
Jacob’s wrestling with the angel in Genesis 32 as an example. Jacob meets a stranger 
on a riverbank where they wrestle through the night until daybreak. He then refuses to 
let the stranger go until he gives Jacob his blessing. Girard believes that this is an 
account of a conflict between doubles because the angel is firstly called a man; it is 
only after he is defeated that the stranger is described as a God. “In other words, the 
combat of doubles results in the expulsion of one of the pair and this is identified 
directly with the return of peace and order.”110 Thirdly, we see the development of 
prohibitions and rituals in the Old Testament accounts. After Jacob is finished 
wrestling with the angel a prohibition is established forbidding the eating of the thigh 
muscle near the hip socket. This is prohibited because during the conflict the angel 
struck Jacob there, displacing it. There is, for Girard, a vital difference between the Old 
Testament and the mythic and persecution accounts. Collective violence is condemned 
 
108 Girard maintains that the mechanism cannot be understood in purely secular terms. He 
believes that the mechanism can only be understood in terms of Christian revelation. “My ultimate 
purpose is to show that this special Christian revelation can and must be approached in rational terms, in 
terms of the Gospels’ own critique of all human religion” (René Girard “Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: 
A Conversation with René Girard by Rebecca Adams” in Religion and Literature, 25 (2), 1993, 20-33, 
31). 
 
109  Girard offers other examples of conflict in the Old Testament, such as the ten plagues of 
Egypt. See Girard, Things Hidden, 142. 
  




in the Old Testament, which does not occur in either the mythic accounts or persecution 
texts.  The French scholar, as an example of this condemnation, turns to the narrative 
of Cain and Abel (Genesis 4). Following the established pattern of the scapegoat 
mechanism, Cain murders his brother Abel and then founds an entire community. A 
prohibition is put in place, with vengeance wreaked sevenfold on anyone who commits 
murder. The key difference between the Cain and Abel narrative and the mythic and 
persecution accounts is that the narrative contains a moral dimension that the others 
lack. “The condemnation of the murder takes precedence over all other considerations. 
‘Where is Abel they brother?’”111 Cain’s behaviour is condemned in this text, even 
though, in the aftermath of the murder, calm is restored. He has murdered and he is 
presented to us as a murderer.112 The narrative, unlike the myths and persecution texts, 
takes the part of the victim and does not side with the persecutors. The victim’s defence 
is not specific to the Cain and Abel narrative but occurs throughout the Old Testament, 
particularly in the psalms. The psalms do more than take the part of the victim; they 
give the victim a voice. Unlike the mythic and persecution accounts, the psalms allow 
the victims the freedom to express their suffering and to curse their persecutors. “These 
texts are the first in human history to allow those who would simply become silent 
victims in the world of myth to voice their complaint as hysterical crowds besiege 
them.”113 Even though the Old Testament is more revealing than either the mythic 
 
111 Ibid., 147.  
 
112 Ibid. Girard claims that few scholars have properly engaged with this dimension of the Biblical 
texts. He believes that, in his work Ancient Judaism, Max Weber has come the closest to acknowledging 
that these texts, in contrast to the myth and persecution texts, take the part of the victim and condemn 
the persecutors.  See Max Weber, Ancient Judaism, trans H.H Garth and D. Martindale (Illinois: Free 
Press, 1952) and Girard, Things Hidden, 167. 
 
113 René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning. Translated byJames G. Williams. Herefordshire, 
England: Gracewing, 2001, 116. Originally published as Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair (Paris: 




accounts or persecution texts, it is not free from collective violence. It lends voice to 
the victims, but, nonetheless, the sacrifices and prohibitions still continue. Indeed, the 
Ten Commandments, which are a set of prohibitions, are found in the Old Testament 
(Exodus 20:1-17). Girard focuses on the second half of the Commandments, as he 
believes that numbers six to nine specifically prohibit acts of violence, or acts that may 
lead to violence, forbidding murder, adultery, theft, and calumny. The tenth and final 
commandment differs, however, in that it specifically prohibits a desire, rather than an 
act.114 It reads as follows; “you shall not covet your neighbor’s house; you shall not 
covet your neighbor’s wife, or male or female slave, or ox, or donkey, or anything that 
belongs to your neighbor” (Exodus 20:17). Girard claims that the word ‘covet’ is 
misleading; it should, he maintains, simply be translated as ‘desire.’ For him, the 
commandment is not just about the house, the slave, or the donkey. He believes that 
the commandment began as a list of items that could be a source of conflict, with the 
lawgiver quickly realizing that the list was endless. The one constant is the neighbour; 
“one always desires whatever belongs to that one, the neighbor.”115 This final 
commandment, the French scholar argues, demonstrates an understanding that it is the 
mimetic nature of desire that leads to conflict. 
Girard believes that the full truth of the scapegoat mechanism is revealed in the 
New Testament, particularly in the Gospels. The Gospels differ to myth and 
persecution texts in that they are non-sacrificial. “The Gospels only speak of sacrifices 
in order to reject them and deny them any validity.”116 He claims that there is nothing 
 
114 Ibid, 7. 
 
115 Ibid., 9, emphasis original.  
 
116 Girard, Things Hidden, 180, emphasis original. Simon Taylor notes that because of the 
concealing nature of the scapegoat mechanism, we were not capable of freeing ourselves from it by 
ourselves. “We literally need to be saved from the salvation offered by scapegoating, because there is no 
way that we can see on our own that it is a murderous lie” (Simon J. Taylor, “Save Us From Being Saved: 
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in the Gospel texts that present Jesus’ death as a sacrifice. The God presented in the 
Gospels, for example, is not a violent one.117 There is no duality surrounding God here. 
This is a God who is not responsible for any conflict that may arise within a 
community. The following text, Girard believes, depicts a God that is not only is 
unassociated with violence, but wishes to see an end to violence altogether.  
You have heard that it was said, “You shall love your neighbour and hate 
your enemy.” But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who 
persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for 
he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just 
and on the unjust (Matthew 5:43-45).118  
 
With this nonviolent God, reconciliation, then, does not require any form of sacrifice. 
In fact, by refusing to place the blame for the ills and conflicts present in society on 
God, the Gospels differentiate God from the deities found in primitive religions. God 
cannot be considered one of these deities as He cannot be held responsible for the 
conflict that may arise within a community The deities are deemed sacred because they 
 
Girard’s Critical Soteriology” in Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, And Culture no. 12-13, 
[2005-2006]: 21-30, here, 23-24).  
 
117 In mythology the birth of a god is usually a violent event. The Gospels present Jesus’ birth as 
nonviolent. In contrast, in mythology, the birth of a god always contains an element of violence; “the 
birth of the gods is always a kind of rape” (Girard, Things Hidden, 220). Semele, for example, was the 
mortal mother of the Greek God Dionysus and the mistress of Zeus, the ruler of the Olympian gods. 
Semele became pregnant and, out of jealousy, Hera, Zeus’ wife, sowed doubt in Semele’s mind about 
Zeus’ divinity. Bound by an oath, Zeus agreed to appear to Semele in his divinity. Although he tried to 
spare her, showing her the least of his glory, she perished. Dionysus was rescued from the ashes of her 
body and sewn into Zeus’ thigh until he was ready to be born. Later, Dionysus brought Semele out of 
Hades and brought her to reign on Mount Olympus as the goddess Thyone, presiding over the frenzy 
produced from his revels. There are many stories of a god having sexual relations with a mortal woman 
to produce a hero. These stories, Girard observes, always contain violence.  
In every case we find the doubling effects, the mad oscillation of differences, and the 
psychotic alternation between all and nothing. These monstrous couplings between men, 
gods, and beasts are in close correspondence with the phenomenon of reciprocal violence 
and its method of working itself out. The orgasm that appeases the god is a metaphor for 
collective violence.117 (Girard, Things Hidden, 220) 
In contrast to the violence of the mythic births, the virgin birth is non-violent. The relationship between 
God, Mary, and the Angel is peaceful; there is no history of violence between them.  Another crucial 
difference between the mythic and Gospel accounts is the absence of sexual references in the Gospel 
account. “The fact that sexuality is not part of the picture corresponds to the absence of the violent 
mimesis with which myth acquaints us in the form of rape by the gods” (Girard, Things Hidden, 221). 
 




are considered responsible for both the breakdown and return of order within a 
particular society. “The Gospels deprive God of his most essential role in primitive 
religions—that of polarizing every thing mankind does not succeed in mastering, 
particularly in relationships between individuals.”119 By portraying a God that is 
detached from violence, the Gospels highlight both the role of violence in primitive 
religions and the desacralization of the victim. “It is precisely because this role is 
abandoned that the Gospels can pass for having established a kind of practical 
atheism.”120 For Girard, then, the God of the Gospels signifies a change in humankind’s 
engagement with violence. This is a God that requires the cessation of violent practices, 
as, due to the awareness of the workings of the scapegoat mechanism, humankind’s 
conflict cannot now simply be resolved by recourse to a mechanism that produces a 
violent deity.  
The Passion narrative does not conform to the established pattern of the 
scapegoat mechanism. Instead of attempting to conceal collective violence, the Passion 
may be read as the full revelation of the scapegoat mechanism at work. The narrative 
contains an account of mimetic contagion in operation. Mark’s account of Peter’s 
denial offers the best example of this contagion in operation. Although Peter is loyal 
to Jesus, being the only one that follows him after his arrest, once he encounters the 
crowd’s hostility in Jerusalem, he is incapable of resisting the contagion and he denies 
Jesus. Girard unpacks the account of Peter’s denial in Mark 14:66-72, believing that 
the mimetic contagion adds a complexity to a scene in which it appears that Peter is 
simply being asked to acknowledge that he is in Jerusalem with Jesus. The answer, 
however, is not so straightforward. Although Peter certainly was with Jesus, this is no 
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longer the case. Jesus has been arrested and the other disciples have scattered; with the 
arrest their community has been dissolved.121 Peter is displaced, no longer belonging 
to a group. According to Girard, Peter joins the crowd at the fire in the courtyard for 
more than heat. He joins them because his own community no longer exists and, 
deprived of that, he is seeking another to which he can belong. The fire not only allows 
the servant girl in the story to see Peter but it also highlights that he is not a member of 
this community. It is Peter’s attempt to belong, in joining the group around the fire, 
which incenses the servant girl so much that she calls on Peter twice to confirm his 
association with Jesus. Peter is an outsider and this fire and this community is not his. 
By calling on him to acknowledge his association, she highlights that Peter does not 
belong and is intruding on their group. Her goal is to unite the group in order to drive 
Peter away and she succeeds in rousing the crowd against this stranger encroaching on 
those who actually belong in the courtyard, such as the other servants of the household. 
The scene clearly shows mimesis at work. The servant girl acts as a model and, when 
her initial example is not followed, she repeats herself the second time in order to make 
it more effective. “She emphasizes her own role of model and details mimetically what 
she expects from her companions.”122 We clearly see the servant girl triggering the 
collective violence in this milieu as, finally, the others in the courtyard follow her 
example and turn on Peter.  
The Passion narrative clearly shows Jesus’ substitution for all the other 
potential victims that could be chosen instead. Mark 15:6-15 recounts the scene in 
which Pilate offers to execute Barabbas and release Jesus instead. In fact, Barabbas is 
 
121 See Girard, The Scapegoat, 150.  
 




an ideal candidate. His death will not transgress any laws as he has already been 
condemned and, as a result, his death would serve to limit the disorder threatening the 
social order.123 From Pilate’s own point of view, as governor, it would be better if he 
did not submit to the crowds’ demands. However, the mob refuses Pilate’s offer and, 
instead, demands Barabbas’ release. The crowd is unanimous in their decision; the 
victim has been chosen and the selection is final. “The time for substitutions is over, 
and the moment of violence has sounded. Pilate understands this. When he sees that 
the crowd rejects Barabbas, he immediately hands over Jesus.”124 It is all too clear that 
the mob will not be satisfied until they receive a victim and Pilate succumbs to the 
crowds’ wishes. Both Pilate and Peter share a commonality; they are caught in the 
mimetic contagion that sweeps through the Passion narrative with both of them making 
Jesus the victim so as not to become victims themselves. “The best way not to be 
crucified, in the final analysis, is to do as everyone else and join in the crucifixion.”125  
Girard argues that the Gospels use Satan to represent mimetic contagion. Satan 
acts as both model and obstacle; he encourages desires that breach prohibitions, yet also 
acts as an obstacle preventing the subject from obtaining that desire. “The seducer of 
the beginnings is transformed quickly into a forbidding adversary.”126 Matthew 16:21-
23 gives an account of Jesus’ foretelling of his death and resurrection. In this pericope 
Jesus rebukes Peter for expressing his disapproval of the events to come, reprimanding 
him with the words “’Get behind me, Satan! You are a stumbling block to me; for you 
are setting your mind not on divine things but on human things’ (Mark 16:23).” The 
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French scholar’s reading of this passage places Peter in Satan’s shoes, as, in this case, 
Peter wishes to become a model for Jesus. Peter’s desire, however, is one of a worldly 
ambition that would allow Jesus to forego the suffering ahead. The results would be 
disastrous. “If Jesus were to turn away from his Father to follow Peter, he and Peter 
both would quickly fall into mimetic rivalry, and the venture of the kingdom of God 
would melt away in insignificant quarrels.”127 Satan not only represents mimetic 
contagion but also the scapegoat mechanism. In order for Satan’s kingdom on earth not 
to be torn apart by the conflict arising from mimetic rivalry he must have the power to 
dispel this violence. Girard believes that this ability is the reason why Satan is given 
the title of prince. He expels himself through the scapegoat mechanism, restoring order 
so as to prevent complete destruction. This ability not only protects but also renders 
Satan indispensable as disorder dispels disorder.128 It is important to bear in mind that 
as Satan corresponds to mimetic rivalry and the scapegoat mechanism he is not one 
individual deity but many, representing all those who have fallen to its machinations. 
Satan is simply a name symbolizing the mechanism. “Because he designates the 
principal consequence of the single victim mechanism, the emergence of the false 
transcendence and the numerous deities that represent it, Satan is always someone.”129 
For Girard, the Cross triumphs over Satan. It does so because the Crucifixion reveals 
the full workings of the scapegoat mechanism without any falsification. Like the 
victims represented in mythology, Jesus is innocent. The Gospels, however, unlike the 
mythic accounts, do not conceal the truth of the persecution.  
[Christ has] canceled the accusation that stands against us with its legal 
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principalities and powers and made a public spectacle of them, drawing 
them along in his triumph (Col. 2: 14-15).130 
 
The principalities and powers here are simply another name for Satan, or the scapegoat 
mechanism. The accusation, Girard believes, is the false accusation laid upon the 
innocent victim. This time, the lie has been exposed, nailed to the Cross so that all may 
see. The revelation of the lie, for Girard, frees humankind from the bondage of the 
mechanism, revealing ‘things hidden since the foundation of the world.’131 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the key elements of Girard’s thought, focusing on the violence 
that arises from mimetic desire. This violence is central to understanding the role that 
religion plays in primitive violence. Violence is, after all, for Girard, at the heart of the 
sacred.  Indeed, prohibitions and rituals are designed specifically to keep violence in 
check and to prevent it from spilling over into the community. Without these checks, 
the very fabric of society is threatened.  
For Vattimo, Girard’s work is not simply a cultural anthropology. It is a reflection 
on the very origins and development of human civilization.132 Violence is at the centre 
of our development. The connection between violence and the sacred is fundamental. 
For Vattimo, Girard’s reading of the Gospels, however, is one which focuses on the 
dissolution of the sacred as violence. Girard’s argument that the Judaeo-Christian texts 
are responsible for the process of desacralization that is currently underway. It is here, 
 
130 Ibid., 137Bbrackets original. The three days between Jesus’ death and resurrection serves to 
highlight the difference between the Gospels and the myths. In the normal workings of the victimage 
mechanism, the community is filled with a sense of harmony and well being after the victim’s death, 
attributing to them the status of sacred. In the case of the Gospels, the crowd is left waiting; this death is 
not a sacrifice. See Girard, I See Satan.  
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in the Gospels, for the first time that the victim is not sacralised as the result of the 
scapegoat mechanism. The workings of the scapegoat mechanism are not obscured, but 
clearly visible. For Vattimo this is part of God’s education of humanity, an education 
that seeks to put an end to the violence inherent to the sacrificial religions.133 
 
 






The Dissolution of the Sacred 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Vattimo’s understanding of weak thought. It may, in part, be 
read as a reaction to the terrorism of the Brigate Rosse. However, not only may it be 
read in political terms, but also in a theological and philosophical light. Weak thought, 
ultimately, is Vattimo’s understanding and development of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
and Girard’s thought. Here, he melds his philosophical and political interests with the 
religious, producing his own particular reading of the incarnation. This reading allows 
Vattimo to understand secularization as a continuation of the process of weakening 
that began in the incarnation.  
 
4.1 Vattimo’s Theory of Weakening 
As weak thought is central to Vattimo’s work, it is necessary to have some 
understanding of the role it plays in his thought. This section focuses on weak 
thought’s development, paying particular attention to Vattimo’s thinking on truth. 
Particular attention here is paid to Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s influence. Their 
emphasis on nihilism and the end of metaphysics is of particular importance.   
 
4.1.1Weak Thought 
Since the early eighties, weak thought, or, il pensiero debole, has played a central role 




Pier Aldo Rovatti, in 1983.1 The expression ‘weak thought’ was originally drawn from 
an essay by Carlo Augusto Viano, who used the phrase ‘weak reason’ in ‘Reason, 
Abundance, and Belief’ in the volume Crisi della ragione, which was edited by Aldo 
Giorgio Gargani in 1979.2  Viano admits that, while perhaps he was one of the first to 
actually write on weak thought, he does not deserve any credit for the inception of this 
expression.3 He claims that ‘weak’ was already a part of the philosophical landscape 
of the time. Certainly, the first time that Vattimo uses the concept of weak thought is 
in his essay, “Toward an Ontology of Decline,” which interprets Heidegger’s ontology 
as one of weakening.4 Weak thought offers an alternative, modern way of thinking for 
the human sciences (and philosophy in particular) that is not focused on seeking 
credible answers to particular questions but, instead, allows for interpretations and 
reinterpretations of past premises. As a result, weak thought is an interdisciplinary 
movement that does not seek to impose one particular viewpoint over another, thereby 
encouraging dialogue between different fields or points of view. “It [weak thought] is 
 
1 Gianni Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, eds., Il pensiero debole (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1983).  
2 Carlo Augusto Viano, “La ragione, l’abbondanza e la credenza,” in Crisi della ragione, ed. 
A.G. Gargani (Turin: Einaudi, 1979).  
3 Carlo Augusto Viano, “The Irresistible Power of Weak Thought,” Iris II, no. 3 (April 2010): 
147.  
4 See Santiago Zabala, “Introduction: Gianni Vattimo and Weak Philosophy,” in Weakening 
Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed. Santiago Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queens 
University Press, 2007), 12. A translation of Vattimo’s essay, “The Ontology of Decline,” can be found 
in the edited volume, Recoding Metaphysics (Gianni Vattimo, “Toward an Ontology of Decline,” in 
Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy ed. Giovanna Borradori [Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988], 63-76). In this essay, Vattimo interprets Heidegger’s ontology as a weak 
ontology, or one of decline.  This is because interpreters continue to think of Heidegger’s thought 
concerning Being in metaphysical terms (see Santiago Zabala, “Introduction: Gianni Vattimo and 
Weak Philosophy,” in Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed. Santiago 
Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2007), 12. He believes that to read Heidegger in 
such a way is to read Heidegger as a thinker that calls for a return of, or to, Being (see Gianni Vattimo, 
“Toward an Ontology of Decline,” in Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy, ed. 
Giovanna Borradori [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988], 63). One can only speak of an 




by far the most interdisciplinary ‘movement’ in modern Italian social history, 
strangely disorganized and wary of issuing another specialized lexicon or staking out 
a series of methodological steps.”5 With its emphasis on hermeneutics, weak thought 
opposes any suggestion of setting up an alternative foundation that could be 
considered to be a better truth than what is already on offer.6 Weak thought’s 
originality lies in this refusal to offer an alternative truth, or foundation, with its focus, 
instead, on interpretation which “represents the most striking current of thought in 
Italian philosophy in the post-WWII period.”7 Weak thought, then, may be understood 
as another way of looking at rationality in postmodernity and it is perhaps best to 
speak of this manner of thinking “as an attempt to reconstruct rationality in a 
postmodern, postmetaphysical way.”8 Weak thought avoids any ‘strong’ claims to 
truth, as it professes that we cannot have any objective truth, given that our view of 
the world is already coloured by our history and culture.  
Vattimo intends to move contemporary construals of reality away from 
purely modern notions of reason, with their aggressive assertions about 
the ‘certainly true,’ the ‘really real’ and ‘absolute objectivity,’ with their 
insinuations that evidence and warrants are unproblematic concepts, 
readily available to settle questions of interpretative adequacy.9 
 
5 Peter Carravetta, “What is “Weak Thought”? The Original Theses and Context of il pensiero 
debole,” in Weak Thought, eds. Gianni Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, trans. Peter Carravetta (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2012), 3. 
6 For a comparison of weak thought and poststructuralism, which examines them both in the 
light of alternative foundations, see Giovanna Borradori, “’Weak Thought’ and Postmodernism: The 
Italian Departure From Deconstruction,” Social  Text 18, Postmodernism (Winter, 1987-1988): 39-49. 
Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/488689 Accessed: 15-
09-2016 09:50 UTC  
7 Peter Carravetta, “What is “Weak Thought”? The Original Theses and Context of il pensiero 
debole,” in Weak Thought, eds. Gianni Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, trans. Peter Carravetta (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2012), 1. See also Umberto Eco, “Weak Thought and the Limits of Interpretation,” 
in Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo ed. Santiago Zabala (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 37-56; and Dario Antiseri, Weak Thought and Its Strength, 
trans. Gwyneth Weston (Avebury: Ashgate 1996).  






As such, weak thought maintains that there is no truth or experience that may be 
considered free from historical or cultural conditions. Thus, the “experience with 
which we may begin and to which we must remain faithful is above all and largely 
that of the everyday, which is also and always historically qualified and culturally 
dense.”10 This way of thinking recognizes that we are shaped by the history and the 
culture from which we emerge, as “human rationality is profoundly contextualized 
and circumscribed, rather than autonomous and neutral.”11 Weak thought, then, for 
Vattimo, is a positive approach to the current conditions of existence, which are 
characterized by the end of metaphysics and the loss of strong foundations.  
 
4.1.2 Weak Thought and Truth 
Vattimo’s thought concerning truth in relation to weak thinking is heavily influenced 
by his reading of both Nietzsche and Heidegger. Specifically, it is their emphasis on 
nihilism and the end of metaphysics that guides Vattimo’s thought, such as 
Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God. Certainly, weak thought does not 
retain any sentimentality for metaphysics but, instead, focuses on overcoming it.12 
Indeed, Heidegger’s understanding of truth is central to Vattimo’s development of 
weak thought, particularly his emphasis on freedom; “The freedom that Heidegger 
identifies as the essence of truth may also, and perhaps exclusively, be freedom in the 
 
10 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” in Weak Thought, eds. Gianni 
Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, trans. Peter Carravetta (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), 40. Vattimo 
believes that there is no experience that may be considered ‘pure.’ Every experience is subject to 
historical and cultural conditions. Vattimo uses the example of art criticism to illustrate exactly what 
he means by this. The evaluation is not a ‘pure’ one; it arises “from a set of canons constituted 
historically by art and taste” (ibid). 
11 Guarino, Vattimo and Theology, 11.  





most ordinary sense: the freedom we live and act as members of a society.”13 This call 
to freedom is one of four ways in which Vattimo examines the experience of truth.  
Firstly, Vattimo believes that truth does not have a metaphysical nature. As the 
world is given to us as an already always, we already have certain understandings and 
ideas, or a pre-comprehension of the world. Thus, we can recognise the truth when we 
meet it “because in some way we know it already.”14 This pre-comprehension is not a 
complete understanding but, instead, is one that is open to possibilities and 
development. It also retains its original relation with the world as an articulation of an 
original comprehension as “the true . . . is the result of a process of verification that 
produces such truth through certain procedures always already given time and 
again.”15 Our experience of the world is never free from tradition but is shaped by it, 
as the world “plays itself out in horizons constructed by a series of echoes, linguistic 
resonances, and messages coming from the past and from others (others alongside us 
as well as other cultures).”16 For weak thought, rhetoric may be seen as the nature of 
the true, in the sense of a discourse between people. The term Verwindung 
encapsulates the idea of the freedom of truth perfectly, as it denotes a recovery from 
‘strong’ truths.17 Vattimo claims that this overcoming of strong truth is not only 
 
13 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 49. This is freedom in the sense 
that open dialogue is possible between individuals and groups. For a reading of Vattimo’s 
understanding of truth in light of Gadamer’s, rather than Heidegger’s, thought, see Gaetano Chiurazzi, 
“The Experiment of Nihilism: Interpretation and Experience of Truth in Gianni Vattimo,” in Between 
Nihilism and Politics: The Hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo, ed. Silvia Benso and Brian Schroeder 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 15-32. See also Gaetano Chiurazzi, “Pareyson 
and Vattimo: From Truth to Nihilism,” in The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, eds. Jeff 
Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2014), 179-190. 
14 Gianni Vattimo, Introduzione a Heidegger (Roma-Bari: Gius. Laterza &Figli Spa, 2000), 29.  
15 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 50. 
16 Ibid., 44-45. 
17 This is a German word that has several different meanings. It suggests a resignation towards 




evident in Heidegger’s work, but also in Nietzsche’s; “this relation of overcoming and 
distortion is already exemplified in Nietzsche’s announcement that God is dead.”18 
This announcement signifies a departure from Being’s equation with a foundation or 
stable structure.  “Verwindung is the most radical effort in terms of a ‘taking account 
of’ (presa d’atto) which is at once a ‘taking-leave of,’ for it neither conceives Being 
as a stable structure nor registers and accepts it as a logical outcome of a process.”19 
Being, then, cannot be a foundation as it is ‘already gone.’20 We can, however, speak 
of Being in terms of ‘destiny-forwarding,’ or ‘transmission,’ in the sense of a heritage 
or tradition. Consequently, due to this forwarding, or sending, it is not possible to 
sever all contact with metaphysical concepts. As such, postmetaphysical thinking 
“cannot avoid working with metaphysical concepts, declining and distorting them, 
entrusting itself (rimettendosi) back to and away from them, transmitting them as its 
own heritage.”21 This difficulty in avoiding metaphysical concepts leads to Vattimo’s 
second point concerning truth and weak thinking.  
Secondly, Vattimo considers the verification of what we perceive as truth. Such 
a verification takes place within the freedom that Heidegger describes in, On the 
 
word frequently; it appears primarily in Identität und Differenz, in one passage from Holzwege, and in 
an essay in Vorträge und Aufsätze (see  Gianni Vattimo, ““Verwindung”: Nihilism and the Postmodern 
in Philosophy,” SubStance 16, no. 2, Issue 53: Contemporary Italian Thought [1987]: 7-17). He 
believes that prior to Heidegger we may see the use of Verwindung in Nietzsche’s work, although 
Nietzsche did not actually use the word itself and spoke instead in terms of healing or convalescence. 
Vattimo believes that this is the sense in which Heidegger uses Verwindung. 
18 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 50. 
19 Ibid., 46. 
20 See Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 47. As Being is viewed as 
‘already gone,’ we cannot hold to it as a stable foundation. Vattimo notes, in The Adventure of 
Difference, that Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God bespeaks the end of the metaphysical 
foundation. He believes that this cannot be ignored as he sees this announement as destiny.  




Essence of Truth; specifically, “in the openness that On the Essence of Truth speaks 
about as the space of freedom both of interpersonal relations and of the relations 
between cultures and generations.”22 This ‘space of freedom’ acknowledges that we 
always begin from a particular bond, faith, or belonging to.23 Truth, then, is 
hermeneutical and verifiable only from the perspective of that particular bond, or 
background, to which one belongs. This brings us once more to Verwindung, which 
dispels any assumption that we have access to any objective ontos on, or a ‘really 
real.’24  Verwindung, then, frees us from the metaphysical frameworks that are still in 
place when we speak of Being in terms of destiny-forwarding, or sending. It does so 
by freeing them from the very thing that makes them metaphysical, which is the 
presumption that they are an objective foundation.25 “Once this presumption is 
dispelled these [metaphysical] categories become ‘valid’ as monuments, as a heritage 
evoking the pietas due to the traces of what has lived.”26 Vattimo maintains that pietas 
is another term that could encapsulate weak thought. For him, pietas is the love for 
the living, and of those traces received from the past. It is not meant in the Latin sense, 
which is a sense of familial devotion. Rather, it is in the modern sense, that of piety as 
devoted attention to that which has only a limited value and to which we give our 
devotion because it is the only value we know.27 In this light, pietas, then, “suggests 
 
22 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 50. See Martin Heidegger, “On the 
Essence of Truth,” in Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978), 
59-82 
23 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 50. 
24 See Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 47. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Si tratta di un attegiamento che possiamo anche chiamare di pietas, non tanto nel significato 
latino dove aveva per oggetto i valori della famiglia, ma nel senso moderno di pietà come attenzione 




primarily mortality, finitude, and passing away.”28 This, Vattimo maintains, means 
that to think of weak thought with regard to pietas, means to think of it in light of 
Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God. As such, supreme values are reduced 
to being simply symbolic formations rather than concrete foundations.29 
Thirdly, Vattimo believes that truth is derived from interpretation. It is important 
to note that, it is not because interpretation acts as a pathway to an absolute truth, but 
rather because truth is constituted through expression.30 Vattimo draws on Aristotle’s 
hermeneia, which deals with discursive articulation or interpretation. In Aristotle’s De 
interpretatione and De anima 3, he explores the manner in which reality is 
experienced and communicated in discourse. For him, interpretation in the sense of 
hermeneia refers to the intellectual formulation of a judgement on the truth or falsity 
of a thing.31 Aristotle maintained that the intellect holds meaning as statement; 
“‘interpretations’ are therefore not statements aiming towards a use — as is a prayer 
 
pur limitato, è l’unico che conosciamo: pietas è l’amore per il vivente e le sue tracce—quelle che egli 
lascia e quelle che porta in quanto le riceve dal passato. 
It is an attitude that we can call pietas, not so much in the Latin sense of the word where it has 
the values of the family as its object, but in the modern sense of piety as devoted attention to that 
which, however, has only a limited value and that deserves attention because this value, although 
limited is the only one we know. Pietas is the love for the living and its traces—those that are left and 
those carried since they are received from the past. Gianni Vattimo, Etica dell’interpretazione (Turin: 
Rosenberg & Sellier, 1989), 20.  
28 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 47. Andrzej Zawadzki notes that 
this may be a forerunner to Vattimo’s religious thought. See Andrzej Zawadzki, Literature and Weak 
Thought (Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH, 2013). For more on pietas, see Luca D’Isanto, “Gianni 
Vattimo’s Hermeneutics and the Trace of Divinity,” Modern Theology 10, no. 4 (October 1994). 
29 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 48. 
30 Ibid., 50. 
31 See Jussi Backman, “Hermeneutics and the Ancient Philosophical Legacy: Hermēneia and 
Phronēsis,” in The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, eds., Niall Keane & Chris Lawn (Sussex: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2016), 25. See also Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory 
in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1969), 21. For a more comprehensive volume on Aristotle’s formulation of truth, see Paolo Crivelli, 




or command — but rather statements of something that is true or false. Aristotle 
defines them as ‘speech in which there is truth and falsity.’”32 This is what Nietzsche 
develops considerably in his philosophy, as discussed in chapter one.  
Truth . . . first come into existence with the creation of a fixed and 
universally binding language, created in order to establish a firm 
foundation for social existence . . . Given this, truth needed to become 
solid and binding, something whose value was henceforth determined by 
the fact that it could be exchanged only in exceptional cases.33 
 
Truths are simply fables constructed by humankind in order to serve a purpose. Once 
it is no longer needed, the dissolution of a particular principle allows for another to 
take its place.  
Vattimo’s fourth point emphasizes weak thought’s acceptance of various strands 
of thought and tradition, which allows for dialogue and interaction to take place. In 
this ‘rhetorical’ conception of truth, “humans experience the fullness of its decline.  . 
. . Being can only appear to us as Über-lieferung, trans-mission, a dissolving into 
procedures, into ‘rhetoric.’”34 We respect these processes (transmission and destiny-
forwarding) because of pietas; it is because of our respect for the living and its traces 
that we acknowledge the dialogue that occurs between groups etc. As such, “there is 
not one pietas, but pietates that are historically determined and consist in the 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Wayne Klein, Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1997), 75-76. 
34 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 50. Vattimo notes that “tradition 
is the transmitting of linguistic messages that constitute the horizon within which Dasein is thrown as 
an historically determined project: and tradition derives its importance from the fact that Being, as a 
horizon of disclosure in which things appear, can arise only as a trace of past words or as an 
announcement that has been handed down to us. This transmitting or handing down is closely 
connected to Dasein’s mortality, for Being is an announcement that is handed down only because the 
generations of mankind follow one another in the natural rhythm of birth and death” (Vattimo, The 




development of truth on the basis of persuasive actions.”35 In the same way, there is 
not one truth, but many. ‘Truth’ is simply an agreement on topics of common use and 
when we inquire into truth, “we are in fact exploring the nature and extension of our 
agreement.”36 Therefore, it is only through language, through interpretation, and the 
process of interpreting and deciphering, that truth is formulated.37 
 
4.1.3 Weak thought and Kenosis 
Vattimo’s reading of kenosis as weakening is not only based on religious thought but 
also on the philosophical. It is underpinned by his understanding of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger.38 To begin with, his abhorrence of violence is at the core of his reading of 
kenosis as weakening. The years of unrest in Italy during the 1970s are, in part, to 
thank for this. Some of his students were arrested for participating in the strikes that 
took place at that time. While they were imprisoned, they wrote to Vattimo and it is 
this correspondence that caused him to rethink his reading of Nietzsche in regard to 
the liberated subject, or the Übermensch. Far from being ‘liberated subjects’, that 
Nietzsche writes about, the students would simply convince themselves that they 
were workers and join in the day’s “operations.”39 Obviously, they were not workers 
 
35 Robert T. Valgenti, “Weak Thought and the Recovery of Reason,” in Between Nihilism and 
Politics: The Hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo, eds. Silvia Benso and Brian Schroeder (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2010), 73.  
36 Franca D’Agostini, “Vattimo’s Theory of Truth,” in Between Nihilism and Politics: The 
Hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo, eds. Silvia Benso and Brian Schroeder (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2010), 33. See also David Edward Rose, “The Ethical Claims of Il pensiero debole: 
Gianni Vattimo, Pluralism and Postmodern Subjectivity,” Angelaki 7, no. 3 (2002): 63-78. 
37 Peter Carravetta, “What is “Weak Thought”? The Original Theses and Context of il 
pensiero debole,” 8. 
38 Emil Halloun, "Conflict Resolved: The Amity between Postmodern Philosophy and 
Theology in Gianni Vattimo’s Weak Thought," Open Theology 5, no. 1 (2019): 309-319. 




and Vattimo recognized this self-deception for what it was. He realized that the 
Übermensch could not be identified in the same way as his students, who were 
Leninist revolutionaries. The liberated subject, for Vattimo, is a weak subject.  
The aspect of all this which I would strongly wish to underline here is 
precisely the ethico-political dimension of demythologising the traditional 
revolutionary ideal and repudiating the use of violence. It was an attempt 
to remain faithful to the revolutionary attitude towards capitalist society 
without falling into Leninism.40  
 
Weak thought, then, may be understood in terms of Vattimo’s response to the 
terrorism and violence that was rampant in Italy at the time.  
 With regard to Heidegger’s thought, violence again is at the core. Vattimo 
equates metaphysics with violence, as he believes that, by forcing an ‘objective’ truth 
on the other, it effectively silences them. It does not acknowledge that there are 
cultural and societal influences that shape our backgrounds and understandings and 
that these are not universal, but highlights instead that they vary. He reads Heidegger 
through a Nietzschean lens with regard to this. In relation to Nietzsche, he focuses on 
the German philosopher’s thought concerning nihilism, in which the belief in ultimate 
truths comes to an end. For Nietzsche, truth is simply the product of our historicity. 
We belong to a particular time and place that gives us an appreciation for certain things 
and not for others. However, any philosophies that fall within the parameters of 
traditional metaphysics tend to strike us as being true, since we are already inclined to 
believe them, as they reflect our suppositions of the world around us.41 Truth is simply 
a perspective, or interpretation, that makes up our reality. As such, “there is no longer 
a ‘true world’ or, better, truth is reduced entirely to what is ‘posited’ by the human 
 
40 See Vattimo, “Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality,” 329.  
41 Gianni Vattimo, Dialogue with Nietzsche, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia 




being.42 Vattimo understands Heidegger’s thought in a similar way. While the focus 
is on Being, it may be viewed in a similar fashion. Metaphysics comprehends Being 
as something that may be understood in objective terms, forgetting the ontological 
difference. In identifying Being in these terms, as an object, we remain trapped within 
“the metaphysics of objectivity.”43 This inability to define and understand Being, other 
than in terms of an object, shapes Heidegger’s understanding of nihilism. Nihilism, 
then, for Heidegger, tolls the death-knell for metaphysics and, in turn, for the 
identification of Being with an object. Following Heidegger, Vattimo states that 
“nihilism . . . heralds the end of metaphysics, namely the thought . . . that identifies 
Being with the objectively given, the thing before me.”44 For Heidegger, in embracing 
nihilism as the end of metaphysics we embrace freedom. This is in the sense of 
emancipation from the constraints of ‘strong’ truths, as what we call ‘reality’ is 
pluralistic and not limited to one single foundation. This interpretation of Heidegger’s 
thought concerning metaphysics and Being is what the Italian philosopher terms 
‘weak ontology.’ 
 For Vattimo, the history of nihilism may be read, thanks to kenosis, in a 
religious light. Kenosis is the central event of Christianity and, for him, underpins the 
development of weak thought, even though it may also be read in a philosophical light. 
Clearly, at the heart of Vattimo’s thought concerning kenosis is St. Paul’s letter to the 
 
42 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, trans. Luca D’Isanto and David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 30.  





Philippians.45 This is, for P. Henry, the strongest and most renowned expression of 
Paul’s Christology.46 Indeed ‘kenoticism,’ which is the name for the theological 
explanation of the self-emptying of God inherent in the incarnation, comes from this 
text.47 The text begins by describing Christ’s pre-existence, which is his state of 
existence as one with God prior to the incarnation. This state is highlighted by the 
words that St. Paul uses; “though he was in the form of God” (Phil 2:6). Christ, 
however, did not regard this state of equality with God as a thing to be exploited,  
instead, he took the form of a slave, taking on human likeness. On this, P. Henry notes 
that it is “certain that in this second state he did not present himself in the majesty of 
the divine condition, but in the humility of its very real, very complete, and very 
apparent human condition.”48 For P. Henry, the wording that Paul uses in the text 
complements Christ’s lowering to the human condition and the “progression of the 
abasement, from step to step, is admirably marked by the choice of terms and the 
 
45 See Gianni Vattimo, Belief, trans. Luca D’Isanto and David Webb (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 39. See also Matthew Edward Harris, “Vattimo, kenosis and St. 
Paul,” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75, no. 4 (2014): 288-305. For a further 
discussion on kenosis in the thought of Levinas, Derrida, and Vattimo, see Marie L. Baird, “Whose 
Kenosis? An Analysis of Levinas, Derrida, and Vattimo on God’s Self-Emptying and the 
Secularization of the West,” Heythrop Journal XLVIII (2007): 423-437. See also Anthony C. 
Sciglitano Jr., “Gianni Vattimo and Saint Paul: Ontological Weakening, Kenosis, and Secularity,” in 
Paul in the Grip of the Philosophers, ed. Peter Frick (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 117-141. 
46 P. Henry, “Kénose,” in Supplément Au Dictionnaire De La Bible, vol.5, eds. L. Pirot, A. 
Robert, Henri Cazelles, et al.  (Paris VI: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1957), 8. 
47 P. Henry, “Kénose,” 8. C’est . . . l’expression la plus vigoureuse et la plus ramassée de sa 
christologie: c’est aussi, pour le nom tout au moins . . . le fondement d’une explication théologique 
célèbre de l’Incarnation: le kénotisme. Emphasis original. The text of Philippians 2:6-11  (NRSV) 
reads as follows: 6 who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as 
something to be exploited, 7 but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human 
likeness. And being found in human form, 8 he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of 
death—even death on a cross. 9 Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is 
above every name, 10 so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and 
under the earth 11 and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the 
Father. 
48 P. Henry, “Kénose,” 37-38. “Il est bien certain que dans ce seconde état il ne se présentait 
pas dans la majesté de la condition divine, mais dans l'humilite de sa très réelle, trés complète et très 




movement of the sentence. Although he is in a divine condition, Christ does not attach 
himself to his state of equality with God, but he takes the real condition of servant.”49 
What Paul does not say is that Christ exchanged one nature, or condition, for another. 
Paul acknowledges Christ’s retention of both natures and, in this passage, does not 
write of Christ as a servant of God, even though he takes on the real condition of, and 
appears as, servant, which is that of a man in the presence of the Lord.50 Certainly, 
kenosis may be regarded as the answer to the question, “what did the incarnation do 
to God?”51  
This self-emptying, or abasement, marks the distance between the divine and 
the human; “it is the distance between the divine ‘to be’ and the human ‘to be,’ but 
with the emphasis on the humble condition of man’s ordinary life, far removed from 
God’s splendor.”52 The chasm between Christ’s equality with God and the death that 
he suffered on the cross emphasizes this distance between the divine and the human. 
“Christ accepts the human condition to the point of suffering with us the humiliation 
of death, but his humiliation will be more marked than that of his brothers in humanity, 
for that death will be the death of the cross.”53 Indeed, it is Christ’s willingness to 
 
49 Ibid., 31. “La progression dans l'abaissement, d'échelon en échelon, est admirablement 
marquée par le choix des termes et le mouvement de la phrase. Bien qu'il soit en condition divine, le 
Christ ne s'attache pas à son état d'égalité avec Dieu, mais il prend la condition réelle de serviteur.” 
50 Ibid., 31-32. Paul ne dit pas que le Christ échange la condition divine pour la condition 
humaine, encore moins un nature pour une autre: il ne cesse pas d'être Dieu pour devenir homme. 
Emphasis original.  
51 Gerald O’ Collins, Incarnation (London: Continuum, 2002), 55. 
52 Jean Galot, SJ, Who is Christ?, 258. 
53 P. Henry, “Kénose,” 32. Le Christ accepte la condition humaine jusqu'à subir avec nous 
l'humiliation de la mort, mais son humiliation sera plus accusée que celle de ses frères en l'humanité, 




empty himself, to remove himself from the divine splendour, and to embrace the cross, 
that gives the incarnation the quality of humility.  
Vattimo connects his philosophical and religious thought through kenosis. He 
believes that the recognition of this connection offers us the opportunity to reflect on 
how we regard the sacred. Vattimo equates the self-emptying or abasement of God 
inherent in kenosis to the dissolution of metaphysics. 
The relation between the end of metaphysics and the Incarnation is, 
moreover, double. On the one hand, it is the end of metaphysics which 
enables a rediscovery of the core of the Biblical message (the Incarnation, 
God’s kenosis). On the other hand, the end of metaphysics is the 
culminating point of the movement initiated by the Incarnation, namely a 
movement of continuing dissolution, abasement, dismantling, 
weakening.54 
 
 Indeed, his reading of Philippians gives St. Paul a character of plurivocity.55 In this 
light, kenosis offers us the opportunity for a renewal of religious life, free from the 
violence of a metaphysical framework; “the end of metaphysics is also and above all 
the rebirth of the sacred in its many forms.”56 He believes that the dissolution of 
metaphysics, and the freedom of interpretation, or hermeneutics, that follows, is firmly 
rooted in the religious tradition. 
Modern hermeneutic philosophy is born in Europe not only because there 
is a religion of the book that focuses attention in the phenomenon of 
interpretation, but also because this religion has at its base the idea of the 
incarnation of God, which it conceives as kenosis, as abasement and, in 
our translation, as weakening.57 
 
 
54 Frederiek Depoortere, “Gianni Vattimo and René Girard on the Uniqueness of Christianity,” 
The Heythrop Journal 50, no. 5 (2009): 877-889. Quote page 878. 
55 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 48.  
56 Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002), 23. See also Randy J. C. Odchigue, "The Radical Kenotism of Gianni Vattimo and 
Interreligious Dialogue," Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 16, no. 2 (2006): 173-189. 




In recognizing the centrality of hermeneutics within the Western Christian 
tradition, we recognize the centrality and significance of interpretation, for 
hermeneutics “allows the many religious myths of humanity to be heard.”58 
Given the emphasis on hermeneutics, Vattimo claims that his understanding of 
Heidegger can be understood as a kenotic reading of the dissolution of 
metaphysics. The weak reading of Heidegger, as such, “was nothing but the 
transcription of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of God.”59 
For Vattimo, then, the weakening of Being is realized as kenosis. The 
weakening, or dissolution, of absolute truths that characterizes the end of 
metaphysics is nothing more than a continuation of the self-emptying of God 
that we see in Philippians 2:7. The Torinese maintains that, in this light, weak 
thought is faithful to the Christian religious experience.  
 
4.2 Secularization as a Continuation of Kenosis 
This section explores Vattimo’s thought on secularization as a continuation of 
kenosis. For him, it is not a process that should be considered negatively but, instead, 
ought to be viewed in a positive light, as it is a process that is fully aware of its sacred 
origins. Vattimo draws on Girard’s work in order to develop this thesis, which is 




58 Ibid.  
59 Vattimo, Belief, 36. See also Gianni Vattimo and Richard Kearney, “Anatheism, Nihilism, 
and Weak Thought,” in Reimagining the Sacred, eds. Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmermann (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2016). See also Ulrich Engel, “Philosophy in Light of Incarnation: 




4.2.1 A Positive View of Secularization 
For Vattimo, secularization is positively and firmly rooted within the Christian 
tradition. He wishes to move away from the more traditional understanding of 
secularization, which denotes a shifting away from religion.60 “This, as is well known, 
indicates the process of ‘drifting’ that removed modern lay civilization from its sacral 
origin.”61 Rather, he believes that secularization is the continuation of the process of 
weakening, that is, kenosis, as initiated in the incarnation. It should not be regarded 
negatively but, on the contrary, seen as intrinsic to the incarnation and to the Christian 
message. Secularization, then, is the way in which kenosis, as weakening, continues 
to realize itself increasingly clearly. “The ‘positive’ meaning of secularization is the 
idea that lay modernity is constituted above all as a continuation and desacralizing 
interpretation of the biblical message.”62 Indeed, our very civilization emerged from, 
and has been shaped by, the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Vattimo’s view of a positive 
secularization recognizes this background, both acknowledging and taking our 
Christian heritage into consideration, as we are “the heirs of a tradition that has 
absorbed ‘Christian’ values . . . this vision has its foundation in the idea . . . of 
 
60 The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked a shift in the use of the terms ‘secular’ and 
‘secularization.’ Prior to the treaty, ‘secular’ was used to denote priests who served outside a religious 
order. ‘Secularization’ referred to the dispensation of priests from their vows. After the treaty 
‘secularization’ refers to the process in which political authorities took control of territories 
relinquished by the Church.  By the end of the nineteenth century it was commonly associated with its 
current meaning, which holds secularization to be a process of social change in which religion loses 
its social and cultural significance. Religion’s role in society is restricted and little room is left for the 
supernatural.  
61 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, 41.  
62 Ibid. Vattimo takes Girard’s meaning of secularization, as “the effective realization of 
Christianity as a non-sacrificial religion.” However, this is only a starting point for Vattimo, he carries 
it further than Girard does. René Girard & Gianni Vattimo, ed., Pierpaolo Antonello, trans., William 
McCuaig, Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith: A Dialogue (New York: Columbia University 




incarnation, the kenosis of God, as Saint Paul calls it.”63 For Vattimo, secularization 
does not mean a shifting away from religion, but rather is fully aware of its sacred 
origins. Thus, it “is not the relinquishment of the sacred but the complete application 
of the sacred tradition to human phenomena.”64 As such, there are many processes 
taking place that may be linked to Vattimo’s positive view of secularization;  “for 
example, the transformation of state power, from the divinely sanctioned to 
constitutional monarchy up to contemporary representative democracies.”65 Vattimo 
argues that, while weakening may appear to be a more accurate description of these 
processes, he prefers to use ‘secularization’ to describe them “because it seems to 
underline the religious sense of all this process.”66 
Indeed, for Vattimo, secularization forms the relation between philosophy and 
the Christian message. He claims that it is precisely this weak reading of Christianity 
that allows him to connect his philosophical views with his religious roots. “This 
notion of weak ontology as the ‘transcription’ of the Christian message . . . allowed 
me to re-establish a continuity with my own personal religious origin.”67 This 
connection is not solely limited to his personal life but also applies to Western culture. 
Our culture has a distinctly Christian heritage, with many Christian values permeating 
society, such as charity, and the recognition of the relation between the Western 
Christian tradition and weakening, or secularization, provides a basis for further 
 
63 Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, 23-24.  
64 Ibid. Christianity truth and weakening faith. 28 
65 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, 42.    
66 Ibid. 
67 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, trans. Luca D'Isanto and David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 40. See also Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 




reflection on this matter. Certainly, the Torinese connects the Christian tradition to 
the philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger through weakening. He claims that 
Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God did not mean severing ties with faith. 
Indeed, he maintains that Nietzsche did not separate himself from all Christian ties; 
“when announcing the death of God, Nietzsche anticipates that the latter’s shadow 
will continue to be cast upon our world for a long time.”68 Furthermore, he connects 
Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God with Heidegger’s thought on the end 
of metaphysics in the belief that they carry similar meanings. “In Heidegger’s 
thought, the event of the end of metaphysics has basically the same meaning of the 
death of God: the moral God, in Nietzsche’s view, is ‘ueberwunden,’ overcome, or 
put aside.”69  
The link is possible because Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God is 
simply an announcement and not a strong ‘truth;’ whereby “Nietzsche is not putting 
forward an atheistic metaphysics, which would imply the claim to describe reality 
correctly as something from which God is excluded.”70 Metaphysics, for Heidegger, 
Vattimo believes, is synonymous with Nietzsche’s moral God, as both are 
representative of an objective world order: as announcements, neither can be 
ascertained objectively but are, instead open to interpretation; they are events to 
which we are called to respond. “The Nietzschean announcement of the death of God 
and the Heideggerian announcement . . . of the end of metaphysics can provide the 
general framework for characterizing late-modern experience.”71 Indeed, it is the late-
 
68 Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, 11. 
69 Ibid., 13. 
70 Ibid., 13.  




modern world that substantiates the connection between Nietzsche’s death of God 
and Heidegger’s end of metaphysics. “It is precisely the Babelic world of late 
modernity that ‘verifies’ the Nietzschean announcement of the death of God and the 
Heideggerian announcement of the end of metaphysics—which are identical in 
meaning—by legitimizing them.”72 In other words, our very existence has been 
transformed by a series of events, such as the nihilistic characteristics of technology 
and science, which allow for the renewal of religion through weak ontology. Vattimo 
credits the decline of metaphysics, the death of the moral God, and the resulting 
plurality, for the return of religion; “the liberation of metaphor has allowed 
philosophers to speak of God, angels, and salvation once again: it is only the pluralism 
of late-modern societies that has conferred visibility to religion.”73 This is, Vattimo 
believes, because there are no longer any strong reasons to be non-religious. As these 
reasons were connected to metaphysics, its decline has also brought about their 
demise.74   
 
72 Ibid., 15. By the “Babelic world,” Vattimo refers to the fragmentation of society that has 
contributed to the death of the objective world order. For example, the “pluralism of modern society” 
and the “proliferation of cultures” that make believing in one stable, objective world order impossible. 
73 Ibid.,19. Here Vattimo refers to Pascal, who, in his “Memorial,” wrote “God of Abraham, 
God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and savants.” As Romano Guardini notes, the God 
of Christian life is different to the God of philosophy. Guardini maintains that the God of the 
philosophers is the God of the absolute. The problem with this idea of God is that it is almost 
impossible to grasp; “this God is more absolute than man can conceive him.” This is because the 
“characteristic of this definition of God is that it attempts to grasp him in pure unconditionally, free 
from everything which could in any way mean limitation, finization, secularization, 
anthropomorphism.” In contrast to this, the God of Abraham etc. is the God of Jesus Christ; this is, 
according to Guardini, the “Living God.” The Living God “is precisely the being of whom one must 
say, if one wishes to speak of him truthfully: he comes, he acts, he speaks. God has confronted him as 
"This Person," and it is only possible to speak of such an encounter with the words found on every 
page of Holy Scripture.” All quotations from R. Guardini, Pascal For Our Time (New York: Herder, 
1966), 33-44. 
74 Amongst others, such reasons include scientific bases such as being unable to verify God’s 
existence. With the end of metaphysics, we cannot say that this is either ‘true’ or a ‘fact,’ as all strong, 
absolute thought has been overcome.  See also Santiago Zabala, “A Religion Without Theists or 





4.2.2 Secularization: An Ongoing Kenosis 
Vattimo continues to build on his theory of secularization as a continuation of the 
process of weakening begun in the incarnation. He draws on the work of René Girard 
in order to do so, stating that “if the natural sacred is the violent mechanism that Jesus 
came to unveil and undermine, it is possible that secularization . . . is precisely a 
positive effect of Jesus’ teaching, and not a way of moving away from it.”75 The 
natural sacred is the victim-based, sacrificial religions that Girard has illustrated in 
his work, in particular, by looking at mythology. At first, it appears that Christianity 
continues in the same manner in these victim-based religions, with Jesus as the 
victim, crucified on the Cross. Girard, however, argues to the contrary, claiming that 
Christianity breaks with this tradition. Jesus is not a victim; he did not die because he 
was yet another sacrificial victim. He died because, in order to put an end to it, he 
revealed the workings of the scapegoat mechanism. He was sentenced to death 
because this revelation was anathema to a society that was still deeply rooted in the 
sacrificial tradition. Indeed, the deep-rootedness of the sacrificial order is evident, as 
remnants remain present in the way that we speak about Christianity.  “The Christian 
churches continue to speak of Jesus as a sacrificial victim.”76  Certainly, though Jesus 
revealed the workings of the scapegoat mechanism in order to break the cycle, this 
goal has not yet been fully realized. “God’s education of humanity, which is 
proceeding towards an increasingly clear-cut break from the natural religions of 
sacrifice . . . has yet to be completed”77 In the same way, for Vattimo, kenosis is not 
 
75 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, 41. For more on Vattimo’s and Girard’s thought, see Frederiek 
Depoortere, Christ in Postmodern Philosophy: Gianni Vattimo, René Girard, and Slavoj Žižek (T&T 
Clark: New York, 2008).  





yet fully realized but, rather, is increasingly fulfilled through secularization. Indeed, 
by following Girard’s thought, he connects kenosis and secularization through 
violence. Girard furnishes this connection through his reading of the Gospel accounts 
as the revelation of the workings of the scapegoat mechanism. These workings were 
revealed in order to put an end to the mechanism by making humankind aware of the 
cycle of violence inherent to the mechanism, whereby “Jesus’ incarnation did not take 
place to supply the father with a victim adequate to his wrath; rather, Jesus came into 
the world precisely to reveal and abolish the nexus between violence and the 
sacred.”78 For Vattimo, then, at the heart of the incarnation is a vocation of 
weakening, kenosis, the weakening of the violence at the heart of the scapegoat 
mechanism. In this light, secularization is a continuation of this dissolution of 
violence that was begun by Jesus with the incarnation.  
Having drawn on Girard’s work in order to make the connection between 
kenosis and secularization, Vattimo makes a further step. He equates the violent, 
natural sacred with metaphysics, noting that the natural sacred “is violent insofar as 
it attributes to such divinity all the predicates of omnipotence, absoluteness, eternity 
and ‘transcendence’ . . . in short, Girard’s violent God is from this standpoint the God 
of metaphysics.”79 He equates this God of metaphysics with the God of whose death 
Nietzsche spoke; “the dissolution of metaphysics is also the end of this image of God, 
 
78 Ibid., 37. See also Michel, Andreas, “The Strength of Weakness: Vattimo and Gauchet on 
Secularization,” in Radical Secularization?, eds. S. Latré, W. Van Herck and G. Vanheeswijck (New 
York and London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 67-82.  
79 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, 39. Girard limits the natural sacred to a victim based mechanism 
requiring sacrifice. He does not include God’s attributes to the natural sacred, and it is here that 
Vattimo moves outside the bounds of Girard’s thesis. See also Erik Meganck, “‘Nulla in Mundo Pax 
Sincera ...’ Secularisation and violence in Vattimo and Girard,” International Journal of Philosophy 




the death of God of whom Nietzsche spoke.80 This dissolution does not mean that the 
way is now clear for a recovery of the ‘Christian God.’ It simply pushes aside natural 
religion. For Vattimo, the incarnation is an announcement, and in the same way as 
Nietzsche’s death of God and Heidegger’s dissolution of metaphysics are an 
announcement of the ontology of weakening, so too is the incarnation.  
God’s abasement to the level of humanity, what the New Testament calls 
God’s kenosis, will be interpreted as the sign that the non-violent and non-
absolute God of the post-metaphysical epoch has as its distinctive trait the 
very vocation for weakening of which Heideggerean philosophy speaks.81 
 
Vattimo views this reading of weak ontology as a “‘transcription’ of the Christian 
message” as an event.82 It allows him to understand secularization as an event that 
takes place within the framework of Christianity, linked to both the incarnation and 
to the dissolution of metaphysics. The Torinese believes that this has much to offer 
philosophy; “the basis for a critical reflection on the forms that the sacred has taken 
in our time.”83 As our society has come out of, and has been shaped by, the Christian 
tradition, secularization is important to any discussion of the philosophical debate 
concerning the end of metaphysics and of the sacred in modernity; “if the mode in 
which the weakening of Being realizes itself as the kenosis of God, secularization 
shall no longer be conceived as abandonment of religion but as the paradoxical 
realization of Being’s religious vocation.”84 Although our civilization may be 
 
80 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, 39. 
81 Ibid. Here, Vattimo references Philippians 2:7, which reads; “but emptied himself, taking the 
form of a slave.”  
82 Ibid., 40 
83 Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, 23.  




considered a post-Christian society, its roots lie firmly within the Judeo-Christian 
Scripture and it has been, for Vattimo, significantly shaped by this foundation. 
 
4.3 Conclusion  
This chapter focused on Vattimo’s understanding of weak thought. It may, in part, be 
read as a reaction to the terrorism of the Brigate Rosse. However, not only may it be 
read in political terms, but also in a theological and philosophical light. Weak thought, 
ultimately, is Vattimo’s understanding and development of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
and Girard’s thought. Here, he melds his philosophical and political interests with the 
religious, producing his own particular reading of the incarnation. This reading allows 
Vattimo to understand secularization as a continuation of the process of weakening 














































Myth and the Recovery of Religion 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The connection between philosophy and religion in modernity is a prominent theme 
in Vattimo’s work. Indeed, he understands this connection in a similar way to his 
supervisor, Luigi Pareyson, for whom the religious experience is primary. For him, it 
is impossible to consider religion outside the realms of lived experience. This is 
examined though the lens of myth. Thus, given myth’s significance for both 
philosophers, this chapter will move to explore Vattimo’s critique of the current 
philosophies of myth that dominate the current era. He maintains that these are wholly 
inadequate and incapable of accurately reflecting the current position concerning 
metaphysical constructs. Vattimo claims that a new comprehension of the 
relationship between religion and secularization is necessary as it is in a similar 
position to that of myth. He suggests that, currently, the return of religion may be 
marked by two types of return. This recovery is linked to the hermeneutics of the 
Christian tradition, which is examined here. Given the prominence that Vattimo 
places on hermeneutics in his work, the issue of limits arises. Finally, then, the chapter 
will examine charity as a limit to hermeneutics.  
 
5.1 Vattimo and Myth 
This section focuses on Vattimo’s understanding of myth, where the connection 
between philosophy and Christianity is examined through the lens of myth. In 




both understand the connection in a similar fashion. Following from this, I will 
examine Vattimo’s understanding of theories of myth, concentrating on his analysis 
of their suitability in the current era.  
 
5.1.1 Existentialism and Myth (Pareyson) 
As noted, Vattimo understands the connection between philosophy and Christianity 
in much the same way as that of his mentor, Luigi Pareyson, who he studied under at 
the University of Turin.1 Many of the themes present in Vattimo’s own writings, such 
as truth and interpretation, are also found in Pareyson’s. In Vattimo’s article, 
“Ermeneutica e secolarizzazione: A proposito di L. Pareyson,” he discusses some of 
these themes in light of Pareyson’s thought, and, in particular, is drawn to Pareyson’s 
‘actuality of existentialism.’2 Pareyson understands this a philosophy of the person 
meaning that questions regarding truth, freedom, and Being are always connected to 
the person. Because of this connection there cannot be an objective solution to 
philosophical problems.3 Thus, Pareyson’s work presents Vattimo with the outline of 
a philosophy that he builds on and enriches. “Although the book [Esistenza e persona] 
is rich in theoretical development that outlines the framework of a fairly ‘systematic’ 
philosophical position . . . it is this aspect that attracts the most attention in the current 
 
1 Vattimo studied philosophy under Luigi Pareyson in Turin. He chose philosophy in order to 
combine two of his main interests, namely, religion and politics. Pareyson supervised Vattimo’s thesis 
on Aristotle. After Vattimo finished his studies, receiving the Laurea in 1959, he became Pareyson’s 
assistant.  
2  Gianni Vattimo, “Ermeneutica e secolarizzazione. A proposito di L. Pareyson,” Aut Aut, no. 
213 (1986): 17-27. See Giovanna Borradori, ‘Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy,’ in 
Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy, ed. Giovanna Borradori (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988), 14. 




philosophical situation.”4 Vattimo claims that, at the time, it was relatively bold of 
Pareyson to connect Christianity and philosophy through existentialism, thereby 
making Christianity the central problem of philosophy.5  
Vattimo’s thinking concerning hermeneutics contains similarities to 
Pareyson’s, and particularly to Pareyson’s thought in Veritá e interpretazione.6 Like 
Vattimo, truth, for Pareyson, can only be accessed through openings that are subject 
to time and history.  
Also the interpretation is at the same time revealing and historic, because 
on the one hand the truth is accessible only through each single 
perspective, and on the other hand it is the same historical situation as a 
way of access to the truth; a truth cannot be revealed that is not already 
determined and formulated, a thing that only happens personally and 
historically.7 
 
It is only through interpretation that we may gain access to any understanding of truth; 
“the principal foundation of hermeneutics is precisely that the only adequate 
knowledge of the truth is interpretation.”8 Indeed, interpretation offers many paths of 
access to the truth, and all are equally valid, with none taking priority over another. 
In addition, none claim to provide the sole course to the truth. 
 
4 Gianni Vattimo, “Ermeneutica e secolarizzazione. A proposito di L. Pareyson,” Aut Aut, no. 
213 (1986): 17. “Sebbene il libro sia ricco di sviluppi teorici che delineano l’ossatura di una posizione 
filosofica abbastanza ‘sistematica’ . . . è uesto l’aspetto di esso che attira di pi l’attenzione nell’attualie 
situazione filosofica.” This essay is also printed in Vattimo’s Etica dell’interpretazione (Torino: 
Rosenberg & Sellier, 1989). The book Vattimo refers to here is Luigi Pareyson, Esistenza e persona 
(Genova: il melangolo, 1985).  
5 Ibid. “Era relativamente audace, allora, dare del problema del cristianesimo il problema 
chetrale della filosofia.” 
6 Luigi Pareyson, Verità e interpretazione (Milano: Mursia, 1971). 
7 Pareyson, Verità e interpretazione, 45. “Anche l’interpretazione è al tempo stesso rivelativa e 
storica, perché da un lato le verità è accessibile solo all’interno d’ogni singola prospettiva, e questa 
d’altra parte è la stessa situazione storica come via d’accesso alla verità; sí che non si può rivelare la 
verità se non già determinandola e formulandola, cosa che accade some personalmente e 
storicamente.”  
8 Ibid., 57. “Il principio fondamentale dell’ermeneutica è appunto che l’unica conoscenza 




Truth is accessible and obtainable in many ways, and none of these ways, 
as long as they are worthy of the name of interpretation, is favoured over 
the other, in the sense that claims the possession of the truth more 
exclusively or more accomplished, or in any way superior.9  
 
Pareyson’s discussion of hermeneutics furthers the connection that he makes between 
religion and philosophy. For Pareyson, Vattimo maintains, philosophy was the 
hermeneutics of religious experience, which Pareyson referred to as myth.10 Religious 
experience was presented, not through rational thought, but through other forms such 
as myth and poetry. Thus, for Pareyson, “the mythology of Christianity and the Christ 
Symbol provided the key to a true hermeneutic. Christ was the perfect symbol 
because he showed the partial and incomplete nature of all mythology.”11 Vattimo is 
of the opinion that the incarnation allowed myth to express each and every invisible 
and symbolic presence of the divine. As such, it does not render any particular one as 
obsolete, but permits a plurality of myths, acknowledging that they signify the 
divine.12  
Vattimo has a similar outlook to Pareyson in terms of philosophy and religion. 
It is impossible, for both philosophers, to consider religion outside the realms of 
historical and personal experience. As an abstract, religion ceases to be, as it is the 
lived experience that is the essence of religion. Thus, as Pareyson states, “it is part of 
the very existence of religion, that its existence is with those who profess it. For to 
 
9 Ibid. “La verità è accessibile e attingibile in molti modi, e nessuno di questi modi, purchè 
degno il nome di interpretazione, è privilegiato rispetto agli altri, nel senso che pretenda di possedere 
la verità in maniera esclusiva o piú compiuta o comunque migliore.” 
10 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 54. 
11 Ibid., 148. See Mary Anne Perkins, Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a 
Grand Narrative Since 1789 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2004). 
12 Vattimo acknowledges that this understanding goes somewhat further than Pareyson’s work 
permits. Nonetheless, he claims that the centrality he affords Christ here is not contrary to Pareyson’s 
premises. Christ’s relation to other myths, however, is Vattimo’s, rather than Pareyson’s. See Gianni 




explore its true nature it must be considered within a historical and a personal 
situation, as adopted by means of an existential choice inseparable from our personal 
and historical substance.”13 As part of his exploration of philosophy and religion as 
lived experience, Pareyson examines the problem of evil. In his essay, “Philosophy 
and the Problem of Evil,” he considers the problem of evil as an ontological problem 
rather than as an ethical issue. He claims that as evil is part of the human condition 
and is rooted in human nature, it ought to be examined ontologically. For Pareyson, 
the suffering of Christ confirms that the problem of evil is not so much an ethical 
issue as a religious one. As such, he critiques those forms of rationalist philosophy, 
such as logical positivism, that ignore the problem of evil as a problem of human 
nature.14 These philosophies fail to consider the problem of evil as a problem of 
human nature because they are too removed from other philosophies that do so. 
Existence, then, is considered in purely rational, scientific terms that fail to take lived 
experience into account. Pareyson claims that myth can bridge this gap between 
rationalist philosophy and lived experience, that evil and pain “concealed and 
silenced in the rational world of philosophy, are very present in the myth, in the 
deepest sense of the term, that is in art and in religion.”15 Philosophy ought to recourse 
 
13 Luigi Pareyson, Ontologia della libertà (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore s.p.a., 1995), 166. 
“Fa parte dell’esistenza stessa della religione il suo nesso esistenziale con chi la professa. Per 
prospettarla nella sua vera natura bisogno vedera come assunto all’interno d’una tradizione storica e 
d’una situazione personale, come adottata con unascelta esistenziale dalla nostra sostanza personale e 
storica.” 
14 Logical positivism held that all knowledge could be verified by scientific or logical analysis.  
15 Luigi Pareyson, Ontologia della libertà, 174. “Il male e dolore, occultati e fatti scomparire 
nel mondo ratzionalizzato della filosofia, sono invece ben presenti nel mito, nel senso profondo e 
intense del termine, cioè nell’arte e nella religione.” Some of Pareyson’s works have been collected 
and translated, including parts of Ontologia della libertà, in Luigi Pareyson, Existence, Interpretation, 
Freedom: Selected Writings, ed. Paolo Diego Bubbio, trans. Anna Mattei (Colorado: The Davies 
Group Publishers, 2009). I have opted to follow the full text of Pareyson’s original works and provide 




to, and recover, its own mythical foundations, as myth is a foundation for everything 
that is important for humanity.16 He is not calling for a renunciation of philosophy 
but, rather, for myth and philosophy to work together, as it is “precisely in and about 
the myth that philosophical reflection must intervene.”17 In order to do so, however, 
philosophy must change its usual scientific approach and adopt a more hermeneutical 
outlook.18 Like Vattimo, Pareyson seeks a philosophy that shifts away from the 
‘truths’ of metaphysics, focuses on interpretation, and allows for adequate reflection 
on experience. Philosophy must take care to respect the myth, allowing it to bring its 
meaning to light, “preserving and confirming its revealed character, aware that it says 
things that cannot be said in this way, that are important for philosophy itself that they 
are said.”19 The myth is not surpassed or exhausted by this reflection: on the contrary, 
through hermeneutic reflection the myth’s meaning is revealed and continuously 
interpreted. Thus, the “myth is for the logos at the same time, source, seat, starting 
point, start, stimulus, accompaniment.”20 This type of philosophical reflection, 
Pareyson maintains, is an existential ontology that has turned to the philosophical 
interpretation of religious experience. As such, he notes that, in any interpretation of 
religious thought, the ideas present in that thought remain “typically religious and 
 
16 Ibid., 157. “La fonte inesauribile d’ogni discorso che sia veramente importante e decisivo per 
l’umanità.” 
17 Ibid., 158. “Perché nel e sul mito è appunto la riflessione filosofica che deve intervenire.” 
18 Ibid., 158. “ Assumere invece un carattere ermeneutico, inteso a interpretazione un sapere 
preesistente col proposito di chiarirne gli intimi significati.” “Assuming instead a hermeneutic 
character, intended to interpret a pre-existing knowledge with the purpose of clarifying the intimate 
meanings.” 
19 Ibid., 179. “Essa ha il compito di rispettare il mito, salvaguardandone e confermandone il 
carattere rivelativo, consapevole ch’esso dice cose che non si possono dire che in quel modo, e ch’è 
importante per la filosofia stessa che siano dette.” 





cannot be considered philosophical in themselves.”21 Philosophy simply takes the 
religious elements and reflects on them in terms of human experience, allowing for 
both the believer and the non-believer to share in the reflection. In other words, “only 
philosophical mediation is able to explain to the non-believer, that is, in a way that is 
valid for all, what these ideas mean to the believer and can mean for humankind in 
general.”22 As the focus is on the human, the existential, Pareyson claims that the 
non-believer cannot but be interested in the religious ideas discussed by philosophy. 
 
5.1.2 Theories of Myth and Metaphysics  
Vattimo turns to myth in order to explore religion’s position in modernity. He claims 
that, given our increasing awareness that our society is built on metaphysical 
constructs, we need to re-evaluate our position concerning myth. “One of the most 
urgent problems faced by contemporary consciousness as it becomes aware of how 
the world is ‘fabled’ by the media and the social sciences is that of redefining its own 
position with regard to myth.”23 In his opinion, modern philosophy lacks an adequate 
theory of myth, as any sufficient philosophical reflection concerning myth should not 
rest on a metaphysical foundation, given that no “satisfactory theory of myth — one 
that would define its nature and its connection with other forms of relationship to the 
 
21 Ibid., 162. “Queste idee rimangone suistamente religiose, né si possono trattare come 
filosofiche di per sé.” 
22 Ibid., 180. “Ma solo la mediazione filosofica può spiegare al non credente, ch’è come dire in 
modo valido per tutti, ciò che quelle idee significato per il credente e possono significare per l’uomo 
in generale.” 
23 Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 28. Luca D’Isanto 
and David Webb note in their translation of Belief that Vattimo opts to use ‘fable’ instead of ‘myth;’ 
the published version of Nietzsche’s work should read “How the World at Last Became a Myth;” 




world — exists in contemporary philosophy.”24 Even though the current 
understandings of myth are inadequate, the term itself is widely used, even extending 
to political ideologies. Gorges Sorel, for example, gave myth a political function in 
1908, in Rèflexions sur la violence; “myth in politics as an agent capable of moving 
the masses.”25 Indeed, Vattimo takes issue with Claude Lévi-Strauss’ thought 
concerning myth. The anthropologist proposes that myth remains present in society 
today through music and literature. However, while this is a valid understanding of 
myth, Vattimo considers it to be a restricted one. He claims that myth is understood 
today in vague terms that simply places it over against the rational, scientific thought, 
thus reducing it to the “narrative and fantastic, playing on the emotions with little or 
no reference to objectivity.”26 In contrast to this understanding of myth, Vattimo 
draws on Ernst Cassirer’s 1923 work, Philosophie des symbolischen Formen, 
believing it to be the last great word on myth.27  
Wherever philosophy sought to establish a theoretical view of the 
world, it was confronted not so much by immediate phenomenal 
reality as by the mythical transformation of this reality . . . Long 
before the world appeared to consciousness as a totality of empirical 
things and a complex of empirical attributes it was manifested as an 
aggregate of mythical powers and effects.28  
 
Even though Vattimo describes Cassirer’s Philosophie des symbolischen Formen  in 
glowing terms, the work, for him, still fails to produce an adequate understanding of 
 
24 Gianni Vattimo, trans. Jon Snyder, “Myth and the Fate of Secularization,” RES: 
Anthropology and Aesthetics 9 (Spring, 1985): 29-35. Quote page 29. Accessed 11/02/2013 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20166721 
25 Vattimo, The Transparent Society, 28. 
26 Ibid., 29.  
27 See Vattimo, The Transparent Society, 29. 
28 E. Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms vol. 2 (1923), trans. R. Manheim (Yale University 




myth. This is because, here, myth is depicted as being prior to and more ‘infantile’ 
than science.29 Indeed, Cassirer understands myth to be part of an evolutionary 
process by which science replaces myth, thus relegating and confining it to the past.   
For Vattimo, due to the dissolution of metaphysics our understanding of myth 
has been plunged into ‘theoretical confusion’ as its metaphysical framework has 
collapsed.30 He highlights this uncertainty by discussing three views of myth that 
represent the typical viewpoints of our society: archaism, cultural relativism, and 
limited rationality, adding that all three are “born out of a rejection of the metaphysics 
of history . . . yet all three fail to formulate their position in theoretically satisfactory 
terms.”31 He claims that the failure to provide a satisfactory view of myth lies in the 
fact that they have simply pushed the metaphysical problem aside. As a result, these 
theories of myth are characterized by incoherency and confusion and fail to resolve 
the underlying problem of the metaphysical conception of history.32  
First, Vattimo discusses archaism, which rests on the premise that myth is a 
more authentic form of knowledge that is untouched by modern science, capitalism, 
and technology. Archaism is marked by a mistrust of science and technology, which 
are believed to destroy humankind’s relationships, both with one another and with 
nature. Science and technology are also connected to capitalism and its exploitative 
and imperialistic tendencies. The original point of departure for archaism was the idea 
that the study of humankind in non-historicist terms, and the structural study of myths 
and cultures, would destroy the Western idea of progress.  
 
29 Ibid., The Transparent Society, 30. 
30 See Vattimo, “Myth and the Fate of Secularization,” 30. 
31 Vattimo, “Myth and the Fate of Secularization,” 30. 




There was originally the idea that both a purely structural study of 
‘primitive’ myths and cultures and a general reconsideration of man in 
nonhistoristic terms . . . would destroy the Western myth of progress and 
its imperialistic and colonialistic implications.33  
 
 The driving force behind archaism, then, was the idea that this mode of thought 
would recover the relationship between humankind and nature, free from any 
scientific objectivization and its connections to the capitalist organization of work. 
Ecological concerns about the consequences of science and technology on both nature 
and the nature of humankind have, more recently, added to this critique. Archaism 
hopes to free us from the detrimental effects of techno-science through a renewed 
contact with myth. From this perspective, myth is seen as a more authentic and 
positive form of knowledge. The problem with archaism is that it calls for a 
restoration of traditional culture and is unable to produce any alternative view that 
does not require this. It idealizes and emphasizes our origins, failing to acknowledge 
that our current situation is, in fact, derived from these very same origins. For 
Vattimo, as our current condition is characterized by alienation and dehumanization, 
the question is why we would wish to return to the origins from which these 
conditions emerged.34 
Secondly, Vattimo discusses cultural relativism. This position maintains that 
the fundamental principles that define rationality are not absolute. These principles 
are relative, in that our ideas and understandings are true only within the conditions 
of our own cultural context. As such, this viewpoint reduces scientific rationality to 
being a shared belief, on the basis of which our culture is organized, rather than a 
truth or strong principle. It does not hold that either mythic or scientific knowledge is 
 
33 Vattimo, “Myth and the Fate of Secularization,” 30. 




superior to the other. Rather, it refuses to place them in opposition to one another.35 
This is because both types of knowledge share a common characteristic, in that they 
are “based on beliefs that form a part of lived experience and are not susceptible to 
scientific proof.”36 The issue with cultural relativism is, as Vattimo suggests, that it 
completely ignores the problem of history and it fails to acknowledge the 
impossibility of examining other cultures from an objective point of view. Thus, it is 
not possible, for example, for anthropologists undertaking field work to remain 
separate from the peoples that they study; “Rather they are involved in a dialogue, 
and once this is recognized it raises the problem of the common horizon within which 
it actually takes place.”37 This common horizon, then, is the problem of history that 
cultural relativism attempts to ignore, in the belief that it is possible to view other 
cultures as isolated objects.38  
Thirdly, limited rationality is the final theory of myth that Vattimo discusses. 
This particular view distinguishes myth from scientific knowledge by retaining its 
links to the original etymological sense of the term, which is narration.39 “Limited 
rationality describes that ensemble of cultural views that treats mythic knowledge, 
understood as narrative, as a more adequate form of thought for certain fields of 
experience.”40 He points out that, even though it emphasises the importance of mythic 
knowledge, it does not contest the validity of scientific knowledge. Again, limited 
 
35 Vattimo, “Myth and the Fate of Secularization,” 30. 
36 Ibid., 32.  
37 Vattimo, The Transparent Society, 38. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., 35.  




rationality ignores the problem of history. Originally, according to Vattimo, it was 
founded on a distinction between the sciences and humanities. However, although 
this distinction has diminished in recent years, limited rationality, problematically, 
ignores any such connection within the field of socio-historical sciences.  
The three theories of myth have one common denominator. All are born from 
the dissolution of metaphysical philosophies of history and all three fail to take this 
into account. This, for Vattimo, makes them theoretically inadequate. The problem 
with archaism, for example, is that it calls for a restoration of traditional culture and 
is unable to produce any alternative view that does not require this. It idealizes and 
emphasizes our origins, failing to acknowledge that our current situation is, in fact, 
derived from these very same origins. For Vattimo, as our current condition is 
characterized by alienation and dehumanization, the question is why we would wish 
to return to the origins from which these conditions emerged.41 Cultural relativism 
disregards the problem of historicity completely by ignoring the problem of 
separating cultural worlds from one another, and Vattimo describes the retrieval of 
other cultures as a dialogue; other cultures cannot be represented as isolated objects. 
They are within the common range of experience, which does away with the 
separation taken for granted by cultural relativism. Limited rationality is also guilty 
of avoiding the problem of historicity. It fails to recognize that, as it is a form of 
narrative, it is therefore best suited to certain fields of study such as mass culture and 
psychic life. However, although it is founded on a distinction between science and 
the humanities, in recent years this distinction has been called into question, and there 
is now a widespread idea that the natural sciences should be set within the field of the 
 




socio-historical sciences; thus, as the two fields can no longer be kept apart, it points 
to the disintegration of this distinction.42 Vattimo claims that if the metaphysics of 
history could respond to these issues, it would proffer a solution in the form of a 
unilinear vision of history as enlightenment and the liberation of reason.43 In other 
words, the idea that the course of history “could be thought of as enlightenment, as 
the liberation of reason from the shadows of mythical knowledge, has lost its 
legitimacy. Demythologization has itself come to be seen as a myth.”44 A unilinear 
vision of history is not feasible however, especially given that it is impossible to 
ignore other cultures and peoples who do not necessarily share the same views or 
goals. 
Demythologization focused on making sense of the mythical character of a 
superseded world view; focusing on the rational, rather than the supernatural. As we 
recognise that history is not a unilinear or universal process, Vattimo maintains that 
demythologization itself is now exposed as a myth.45 Our relation to myth, as a result, 
 
42 Vattimo, “Myth and the Fate of Secularization,” 33.  
43 Vattimo, The Transparent Society, 39. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Demythologization comes from the German Entmythologisierung, “stripping off myths” 
(Veli-Matti Karkkainen, Christianity: A Global Introduction [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker 
Academic, 2003], 122). Rudolf Bultmann’s essay on demythologization and the New Testament 
(Neues Testament Und Mythologie) was published in 1941. Rather than completely eliminating the 
mythological aspects of the New Testament, Bultmann argues that it should be reinterpreted 
existentially; in terms of one’s own personal existence. By demythologizing the New Testament its 
message may be rendered intelligible for humankind today; the mythical worldview contained in the 
text is no longer tenable. “Myth is Bultmann’s category for talking about things that cannot be dealt 
with in the confines of the language of history and scientific observations” (Ibid). Bultmann, however, 
does not believe that the kerygma must be abandoned, but that “the entire New Testament proclamation 
must be demythologized” (Heinrich Fries, “Demythologizing and Theological Truth,” in Rudolf 
Bultmann in Catholic Thought, eds. Thomas F. O’Meara O.P. and Donald M. Weisser O.P. [New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1968], 30). Bultmann wished to communicate the Gospel message in a 
manner in which it could be understood in modernity, yet in doing so he removed the mythical from 
the scientific and in this way hoped to expound the mythical. For Vattimo, it is impossible to believe 
that there is a universal history; there are many different cultures and peoples, which makes it clear 
that there cannot be an enlightenment, so to speak, or, as Vattimo puts it, a “liberation of reason from 
the shadows of mythical knowledge” (Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, 39). In effect, 




has changed. Our awareness of the dissolution of metaphysics means that our relation 
to myth cannot be returned to its former attitude, for to “go on dreaming with the 
knowledge that you are dreaming is not the same as pure and simple dreaming.”46 It 
would be naïve to think that we could simply return to our former relation, picking 
up where we left off, because, as it is, it remains marked by the experience. Thus, as 
we cannot return to our former viewpoints, we must instead forge a new theory of 
myth that acknowledges these errors and takes into account our historical experience.  
 
 
5.2 The Decline and Recovery of Religion  
Here, the focus is on the experience of religion as a return, or recollection of 
something thought forgotten. Vattimo claims that, even in a secularised culture, 
where religion is believed to be in decline, traces of religion are still present. This 
section explores this idea, focusing on the two primary ways in which Vattimo 
suggests that the return of religion is motivated. Finally, the section examines the 
relationship between religion and hermeneutics in the light of the connection between 




to the post-modern. It is evident in Nietzsche’s work, as it is a radical demythologization; there is no 
longer any strong ‘truth,’ but rather we experience the return of myth.   
46 Vattimo, “Myth and the Fate of Secularization,” 34. Vattimo paraphrases Nietzsche here. 
Here, Nietzsche’s words indicate the need to accept the world. His concept of the eternal recurrence 
came to him as a need to both explain and accept the world. This aphorism expresses "in a more 
forthright manner than ever before the world as Nietzsche then saw it—a world of appearance with no 
possibility of a ‘break-through’ to any ‘higher reality’—and his resolution to see this world as it had 
to be seen: as ‘acceptable’” (R.J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul and Louisiana State University Press, 1965; revised edition, Cambridge: Cambridge 




5.2.1 The Return of Religion: Two Forms of Return 
Secularization and religion are in a position similar to that of demythologization and 
myth. In much the same way that myth is marked by demythologization, so too is 
religion marked by secularization. As such, Vattimo claims that a new theory of myth 
that acknowledges this changed relationship is required. The same may be said for 
religion as, like myth, in a secularized culture the religious traces of its past are still 
present; but in a different form to how they were previously. Thus, a secularized 
culture is not a culture that has “simply left behind the religious contents of its 
tradition; it is one that continues to live them as a traces, as models that are hidden 
and disfigured but nonetheless profoundly present.”47 In the same way that our 
relation to myth must take into account our historical experience, so too must our 
relation to the religious. It is not a return to what was, but rather a “re-presentation of 
the core consciousness we had forgotten.”48 He maintains that it is important to 
acknowledge that the recovery of religion, like myth, signifies this fallen relation. 
However, it is not a case of making something present again that we have forgotten, 
as Vattimo does not believe that this is possible since it is marked by the experience; 
“it is less a case of recollecting the forgotten origin by making it present again than 
of recollecting that we have always already forgotten it.”49 As religion is now 
experienced as a return, the recollection of this forgetfulness is the sole authentic 
religious experience, and “something that we had thought irrevocably forgotten is 
made present again, a dormant trace is reawakened.”50 Vattimo attributes this re-
 
47 Ibid.  
48 Vattimo, Belief, 21.   
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., 22. Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace,” 79. Vattimo claims that ‘it is often said that 




presentation of religion to the current conditions of existence, which have brought 
about new issues and threats that face humanity.51  
Vattimo claims that there are two primary forms in which the return of religion 
occurs. In the first form, the return of religion is motivated by new global threats. For 
him, this particular motivation began immediately after the Second World War, 
brought about by the threat of atomic warfare.52 Although this threat may have 
diminished, there are others that have taken its place, with a particular issue being 
that of a possible ecological disaster. Currently, it seems to Vattimo, that ecological 
risks are of a more immediate concern than any threat of atomic warfare. Another 
threat, commonly found in more affluent societies, is, he suggests, a growing fear of 
the loss of the meaning of existence, characterized by a “true and profound boredom 
which seems inevitably to accompany consumerism.”53 This loss of the meaning of 
 
“The Trace of the Trace,” in Religion, eds. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998), 79. See also Jeffrey W. Robbins, In Search of a Non-Dogmatic Theology (Aurora: The 
Davies Group, 2003).  
51 Ibid. Vattimo references the fin-de-siècle state of anxiety as one of the conditions of existence 
contributing to the return of religion. These levels of anxiety are brought about by periods of rapid 
social change which result in people having to cope with new technologies and stimuli brought about 
by the same. 
52 See Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace, “80. See also Nancy K. Frankenberry, “Weakening 
Religious Belief: Vattimo, Rorty, and the Holism of the Mental,” in Weakening Philosophy, ed. 
Santiago Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 273-296. 
53 Ibid, Several scholars are concerned with the connection between boredom and consumerism 
in modernity: for example, Patrice Petro maintains that “with the rise of visual culture, mass society, 
mass production, and consumerism, boredom came to describe the modern experience of time as both 
empty and full, concentrated and distracted . . . if the division of labor produced sensory deprivation 
in the overload of repetition, so, too, did mass culture produce boredom in the distracted fullness of a 
leisure time become empty” (Patrice Petro, “Historical Ennui, Feminist Boredom,” in The Persistence 
of History: Cinema, Television, and the Modern Event, ed. Vivien Sobchack [London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996], 193). For Lutz Koepnick, “Baudelaire’s modernism maps modern life as 
fundamentally fragmented and petrified, and in so doing, uncovers the melancholy, boredom, and 
isolation that prevails behind the scenes of enthused consumerism” (Lutz Koepnick, Walter Benjamin 




existence is characterized by the increasing emphasis on identity, be it ethnic or 
other.54 
The second form of return is more philosophical, contrasting with the 
‘apocalyptic’ character of the first form.55 The second form is focused on more 
theoretical events. There is a concern that new developments, scientific and 
technological, have contributed to the breakdown of older systems, namely religion, 
which previously provided a foundation for our existence. Without religion, 
philosophical and critical thought are unable to fill the void created by the loss of the 
meaning and foundation that religion provides.56 Science and technology, then, take 
on a sort of ‘inhuman’ character, with developments that have spirited us away from 
our previous foundations.57 
The second form of return raises the issue of whether or not religion is 
inseparable from metaphysics; “whether, that is, one can think of God only as the 
immobile foundation of history from which everything arises and to which everything 
must return.”58 Vattimo is not of the opinion that a return to metaphysics will be 
 
54 See Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace, “80. 
55 Ibid., 81.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 61. Thomas Guarino notes that “the Torinese dyslogistically speaks of God as the 
“immobile foundation of history” [. . . ] and as an “immutable metaphysical plenitude” (Thomas G. 
Guarino, Vattimo and Theology [London: T&T Clark, 2009], 170. Guarino asks “are these not 
caricatures of a God who is preeminently inter-relational in his very existence (as three Persons)?” 
(Ibid). Vattimo uses these viewpoints in order to develop his discussion of religion as a return, 
particularly looking at whether or not religion is separable from metaphysics. Vattimo actually points 
out that “Christian theology is in its deepest foundations a hermeneutic theology: the interpretative 
structure, transmission, mediation and, perhaps, the fallenness do not concern only the enunciation, 
the communication of God with man; the characterize the intimate life of God itself, which therefore 
cannot be conceived in terms of an immutable metaphysical plenitude” (Vattimo, “The Trace of the 
Trace,” 88). If this were the case, Vattimo points out that then “revelation would merely be a 
‘subsequent’ episode and an accident, a quoad nos.” Given that Vattimo’s weak thought concerning 
secularization centers on both the incarnation and Jesus’ teachings, it is unlikely that he would reduce 




satisfactory if critical thought wishes to present itself as the genuine interpretation of 
the religious need in society. Thus, this “need is not adequately satisfied by a straight-
forward recovery of ‘metaphysical’ religiousness, that is, by fleeing the confusions 
of modernization and the Babel of secularized society towards a renewed 
foundationalism.”59 The Torinese claims that we must react in the manner of 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch; this overman is one who does not look to an other-
worldliness because of a dissatisfaction with this world but instead meets new 
challenges as they arise. The Übermensch sets aside the principles by which he was 
raised and develops his own interpretation of the world. For Nietzsche, those who do 
not follow suit are condemning themselves to a condition of slavery, and for Vattimo, 
this is exactly what happens if we return to God as a metaphysical foundation.60 If we 
do restore God as a metaphysical foundation, then we are simply returning to a 
condition that appeals only because it does not appear to be connected to the very 
condition that we wish to escape from. The reality is that this is merely a facade; it is 
no freer than the condition one wishes to shake off. If we return to God as a strong 
foundation, we are simply trying to escape metaphysics by recovering it in a former 
order.61 For Vattimo, it is the dissolution of metaphysics has contributed to the 
 
of the philosophers. This is in contrast to the living God, the God of Jesus Christ, from whom the 
essence of Christianity is inseparable (see R. Guardini’s, Pascal for Our Time). 
59 Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace,” 61. Vattimo, following in Heidegger’s footsteps, 
maintains that “technology and the production of commodities increasingly configure the world as an 
artificial world . . . there is no longer a measuring-stick to distinguish the real from the ‘invented’” 
(Vattimo, Belief, 31). The weakening of strong truths allows for the recovery, or return, of Vattimo’s 
particular brand of Christianity.  
60 See Vattimo, ‘The Trace of the Trace,’ 82.  
61 For Vattimo, we should not return to a metaphysical God. “The kenosis that is the original 
meaning of Christianity signifies that salvation lie above all in breaking the identification of God with 
the order of the real world, in distinguishing God from (metaphysical) Being understood as objectivity, 
necessary rationality, foundation” (Gianni Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, trans, William McCuaig 




rediscovery of religion, and it is “(only) because metaphysical meta-narratives have 
been dissolved that philosophy has rediscovered the plausibility of religion and can 
approach the religious need of common consciousness independently of the 
framework of Enlightenment critique.”62 For the Torinese, the dissolution of these 
metaphysical belief structures allows for the recovery of religion, as they no longer 
provide the over-arching framework of our beliefs.  
 
 
5.2.2 Recovery and Hermeneutics 
Vattimo claims that the recovery of religion in the present era is linked to the 
hermeneutics found within the Christian tradition. He argues that the Scriptures 
themselves are a mediated tradition, which allow for interpretation, and does not 
believe that these texts were ever meant to be static and unchangeable, given that they 
mark our religious experience. As they are handed down to us, through various 
generations and traditions, they are, in essence, hermeneutic.  Given that the religious 
experience is at the heart of these texts, for Vattimo the Scriptures are actually an early 
indication of the recovery of religion. He claims that, currently, we are living the 
return of religion in terms of the Hebraic-Christian tradition and that our religious 
experience is marked by these very texts. “It is often said that religious experience is 
an experience of leave-taking. But if this is true, the journey undertaken is most likely 
one of return . . . In religion, something that we had thought irrevocably forgotten is 
 
62 Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace,” 84. Here Vattimo draws on positivism, which is, in 
Western philosophy, generally any system that excludes metaphysics. Auguste Comte (1978-1857) is 
recognised as the founder of positivism.  See also Gianni Vattimo, “Nihilism as Postmodern 
Christianity,” in Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry, eds. John D. Caputo and Michael 




made present again.”63 The Christian tradition is one of transmission and mediation; 
indeed, its very structure is interpretative. For Vattimo, the Trinity perfectly illustrates 
the hermeneutical structure of the Christian tradition. The Spirit assists the reader by 
breathing life into the religious texts, facilitating interpretation, and guiding the reader 
on their hermeneutical journey.64 Any philosophy that calls, then, for the overcoming 
of metaphysics must recognize its relation to the Hebraic-Christian tradition, as its 
origin lies in this tradition. “The philosophy that responds to the call for the 
overcoming of metaphysics comes from the Hebraic-Christian tradition, and the 
content of its overcoming of metaphysics simply amounts to the maturing awareness 
of this provenance.”65 He is careful to note that the awareness of these religious origins 
does not mean that philosophy ought to abandon its own particular form and return to 
these origins, the reason being the Trinity, for the “Trinitarian God is not one who 
calls us to return to the foundation in the metaphysical sense of the word, but, in the 
New Testament expression, calls us rather to read the signs of the times.”66 He claims 
that as the Trinity focuses on the hermeneutical, the Christian tradition has rejected 
any metaphysical foundation. This rejection of metaphysics means that philosophy is 
not called to return to any particular foundation. 
 
63 Ibid., 79.  
64 See Vattimo, After Christianity, 60.  
65 Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace,” 89. For Vattimo the weakening inherent in the incarnation 
allows for the overcoming of metaphysics. It is, he states, “God’s abasement to the level of humanity,” 
(Gianni Vatimo, Belief, 39) and, as such, calls for us to “read the signs of the times” rather than “return 
to the foundation in the metaphysical sense of the word” (Gianni Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace,” 
90). See also Carmelo Dotolo, “The Hermeneutics of Christianity and Philosophical Responsibility,” 
trans. Robert T. Valgenti, in Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed. Santiago 
Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 348-368. 




Vattimo draws on Max Weber’s thought on the subject of capitalism, which 
provides a more practical application of hermeneutics to the religious experience. For 
Weber, the modern work ethic and orientation to success, which he calls the spirit of 
capitalism, has a religious origin. He claims that it originated within the Protestant 
tradition. According to Weber, the Protestant sects of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century gave work and material success a central place in their lives, meaning that any 
discussion “of the spirit of capitalism’s origins . . . must acknowledge this central 
religious source.”67 He admits that this is somewhat unusual today, given that we 
rarely examine human behaviour in terms of religion. Other factors, such as 
psychology, biology, and social class are more frequently used to explain human 
behaviour. If we are to understand others’ actions, however, we must look at the 
cultural context behind them. and seek to “understand the activities of others 
contextually by referencing to the world in which they lived and the nature of their 
motives for acting.”68 While, for Weber, religion is not currently a powerful influence, 
this was not always the case. For example, Stephen Kalberg maintains that, if Weber 
were alive today, it is entirely possible that he would consider the characteristics of 
work-obsessed American society as “secularized legacies of ascetic Protestantism.”69 
Indeed, Vattimo describes Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
as the fundamental text for a description of modernity as secularization.70 For Vattimo, 
Weber has applied the hermeneutical character of Christianity to capitalism, whereby 
 
67 Stephen Kalberg, “Introduction to the Protestant Ethic,” in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Stephen Kalberg (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2002), xi. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., xiii. Kalberg uses everyday expression as example to illustrate his point, such as 
working lunches, working vacations, and so forth.  




capitalism’s relationship to Christian ethics “is one of interpretative application rather 
than abandonment or polemical opposition,” and, according to Weber, “modern 
capitalism can be understood only as the outcome of the ethical principles of 
Protestantism.”71 This hermeneutical approach to capitalism may be viewed in the 
same light as Vattimo’s understanding of secularization, focusing on the spiritual 
interpretation of the biblical message rather than a literal reading. An interpretative 
application of the biblical message “situates it beyond the strictly sacramental, sacral, 
or ecclesiastical realm.”72 Indeed, Vattimo claims that Weber’s model of interpretative 
application may be extended and applied to the relationship between modernity and 
the Bible, as the sacred texts are central to Western hermeneutics.73 The Bible has 
been “the most eminent textbook for all Western interpretations of the world, from the 
perspective of politics to that of family life, up to the natural sciences.”74 For Vattimo, 
secularization offers us the chance to recover religion, not as a strong foundation, but, 
rather, as one that focuses on the existential, allowing for reflection on the religious in 
terms of our human experience.  
 
5.3 Vattimo’s Spiritual Age 
The final section of this chapter focuses on the model for Vattimo’s particular brand 
of religious experience, namely, Joachim of Fiore. The mystic’s Trinitarian division 




73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid. For more on Vattimo’s thought concerning hermeneutics and politics, see Paolo Flores 
D’Arcais, “Gianni Vattimo, or rather, Hermeneutics as the Primacy of Politics,” in Weakening 




Joachim’s Age of the Spirit. Given Vattimo’s emphasis on hermeneutics, the question 
of limits arises. The section examines the philosopher’s proposal that charity acts as 
this limit.  
 
5.3.1 A Spiritual Model 
Vattimo finds a model for living his particular religious experience in the work of the 
Calabrian abbot and mystic, Joachim of Fiore.75 Originally a Cistercian, Joachim left 
to found his own order in the Calabrian mountains. He saw himself as a catalyst for 
the reform of the Church, with his monastic order as the forerunner of this reform. 
Joachim devised a Trinitarian model of time, which divided time into three ages, with 
each age corresponding to a person of the Trinity. The first age was that of God the 
Father, which began with Creation and continued throughout the Old Testament. 
Law, awe, and slavery marked this age. The second was the age of the Son, which 
was characterized by grace, filial slavery, and guilt. This age began with the 
incarnation and continued for the duration of the New Testament. Joachim believed 
that this age would end during his own time, which was around the twelfth century. 
 
75 John M. Court, Approaching the Apocalypse: A Short History of Christian Millenarianism 
(London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 73. According to John Court Joachim only converted to the spiritual 
life at the age of 34. He made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land and in Jerusalem, at the Church of the 
Holy Sepulchre, experienced a vision. Court says that ‘an angel opened the text of the Apocalypse in 
front of him and sought to explain its meaning (72).’ On his return from Jerusalem, Joachim joined the 
Cistercians and eventually became an abbot. George Tavard notes in his Contemplative Church: 
Joachim and His Adversaries that it was after the Easter of 1186 when Joachim left the Cistercians 
and decided to become a hermit. Joachim’s life as a hermit was short-lived, as he unexpectedly gained 
several disciples. As a result, he set up his own monastic community in the Calabrian mountains. 
Although Tavard claims that the Cistercians were not best pleased with Joachim, he was very 
successful in his relations with those in power, both in Church and State. He had approval in his 
ventures from three popes, and he was also skilled in politics. Tavard notes that Joachim gained the 
protection of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, Henry VI became a benefactor, and Frederick II and Tancred 




The third age, marked by the Spirit, would be characterized by freedom and charity.76 
The third age would be a more perfect age, because as “the three divine Persons are 
one by nature and they always act together, so the two testaments must be 
complemented and perfected by a third, the yet unrevealed gospel of the Holy Spirit, 
which will necessarily be the last and eternal Gospel.”77 This third age was to be the 
final one, in keeping with the tripartite structure of the Trinity.  
Joachim viewed history as a process of spiritualization.78 It is due to this vision 
of history as a process of spiritualization that Joachim’s third age is characterized by 
freedom and openness. Vattimo maintains that it is similar to the openness and 
freedom found in his own reading of the incarnation as a process of weakening. 
“There is an openness to the future implicit in the dogma of incarnation.”79 This 
 
76 Vattimo writes in After Christianity (pp. 20-30) ‘three are the stages of the world indicated 
by the sacred texts. The first is the stage in which we have lived under the law; the second is that in 
which we live under grace; the third is one in which we shall live in a more perfect state of grace . . . . 
The first passed in slavery; the second is characterized by filial slavery; the third will unfold in the 
name of freedom. The first is marked by awe, the second by faith, the third by charity . . . . The first 
period regards the slaves; the second regards the sons; the third regards the friends . . . . The first stage 
is ascribed to the Father, who is the author of all things; the second to the Son, who has been esteemed 
worthy to share our mud; the third to the Holy Spirit, of which the apostle says, “Where the spirit of 
the Lord is, there is freedom.”’ Freedom is dependent on language; “discloses and reveals the reality 
of human beings, and to that extent makes them free.” Not only do people speak because they have 
something to communicate, but also because they have something to be answered. Language also 
discloses “the reality of human beings as beings stamped by origin, tradition, society, and mediation, 
as historical beings.” We are “indebted beings” as in order to learn how to speak we are introduced to 
various “relationships of belonging an communication.” As freedom is dependent on speech, 
humankind is dependent on the freedom of speech; this is evident in the words spoken by various 
freedom movements, such as “the Reformation with Luther’s words, ‘On the Freedom of the 
Christian’; the French Revolution under the sign of ‘Freedom, Equality, Fraternity’ the Communist 
Manifesto: ‘You have nothing to lose but your chains. Proletarians of all countries, unite!”” Heinrich 
Fries, Fundamental Theology, trans. Robert J. Daly, S.J. (Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1996), 220-221. Vattimo maintains that, philosophically, violence is the silencing of 
questions.  See Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, ““Weak Thought” and the Reduction of Violence: 
A Dialogue with Gianni Vattimo,” Common Knowledge 8, no. 3 (2002): 452-463. 
77 George Tavard, Contemplative Church: Joachim and his Adversaries, 23-24. 
78 Ibid. See also David Newheiser, "Conceiving Transformation without Triumphalism: 
Joachim of Fiore Against Gianni Vattimo," The Heythrop Journal 55, no. 4 (2014): 650-662. 




freedom rests on the understanding of salvation history as an ongoing process. “We 
can speak of prophecies of the future only because salvation history remains 
unfulfilled.”80 For Vattimo, salvation history encompasses the hermeneutical process 
in which the Scriptures are spiritualized. The emphasis here is on the spiritual, rather 
than the literal.  The history of salvation and the history of interpretation are, for 
Vattimo, very closely connected. Indeed, Joachim’s teachings inject what Vattimo 
calls a ‘historical rhythm’ into divine life as “it is not scandalous to conceive biblical 
revelation as an ongoing history in which we are implicated.”81 An ongoing salvation 
history appeals to Vattimo, as, while it carries all the implications of God’s action 
present in the world, it also means the continuation of the process of weakening that 
began in the incarnation. Due to the continuation of this process of weakening, 
revelation is hermeneutical rather than static and unchanging, where revelation is “the 
working out of the parable of the kenosis, the resolution of all claims into weakness—
obviously sanctioning, in the process, the continual and unending reinterpretation of 
both the Bible and Christian doctrine.”82 Joachim’s articulation of the Trinity in terms 
of history means that historicity, then, is constitutive of revelation.83 It is this 
historicity that connects Vattimo’s post metaphysical philosophy and Joachim’s 
division of time, equating the end of metaphysics with the Calabrian abbot’s third 
age, believing that both have the same event-like character. “The end of metaphysics 
 
80 Ibid., 24, 31. For Vattimo, secularization occurs within the framework of religious history; 
Joachim’s division of history according to the three Persons of the Trinity means that “historicity is 
constitutive of revelation” (After Christianity 31). Vattimo is particularly drawn to Joachim’s teachings 
because, for Joachim, “salvation history is still in progress” (After Christianity, 29). 
81 Vattimo, Belief, 48.  
82 Guarino, Vattimo and Theology (New York: Continuum, 2009), 132.  




is an event that announces itself and demands to be recognized, promoted, and 
realized, or at least to be explicitly clarified as the guideline for our choices.”84 
Joachim’s third age has this same character, as it, like the end of metaphysics, is a 
reading of the signs of the times. This gives the third age the quality of freedom, as 
we are called to act in the spirit of revelation and interpretation.  
Vattimo notes that other philosophers, such as Novalis, Schelling, and 
Schleiermacher, are also interested in Joachim’s idea of an ongoing, historical 
salvation. These philosophers, he claims, are somewhat in line with his own way of 
thinking about Joachim of Fiore’s Trinitarian division of history. Vattimo looks to 
Schelling, particularly to the German’s collaborative work, Aeltestes 
Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus.85 He maintains that the tone of Aeltestes 
is similar to Joachim’s, as it too announces the approach of a kingdom of freedom. 
“The advent of the kingdom of freedom that will be realized only on the basis of a 
‘sensible religion,’ understood as the ‘monotheism of the heart, the polytheism of the 
imagination and of art,’ and the ‘mythology of reason.”’86 The work, for Vattimo, 
echoes the hermeneutic and interpretative character of Joachim’s age of the Spirit. 
Although Joachim did not go quite as far in his work as Aeltestes did, given that it 
discussed the interpretation of sacred texts no longer being the sole domain of the 
clergy, the freedom inherent to Aeltestes is characteristic of the third age. Vattimo 
claims that the third age also has a contemplative character, given its emphasis on 
spiritualization. Aeltestes’ emphasis on the aesthetic is in keeping with the third ages’ 
 
84 Ibid.   
85 Although this work is attributed to Hegel, Vattimo claims that it was a collaboration between 
Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin.  




interpretative and contemplative character, where poetry, for example, “will reach a 
superior dignity, it will become in the end what it was in the beginning—the teacher 
of humanity.”’87 Novalis’ essay, ‘Christendom or Europe’, also echoes Joachim’s age 
of the spirit.88 Vattimo maintains that it too emphasizes the idea of the spiritual 
interpretation of Scripture as “the choice for Catholicism against Protestantism 
echoes Joachim’s tone to the extent that it is a choice against the strict literalism of 
the Bible.”89 Biblical literalism makes it difficult for the Spirit to do its work, and 
only from the ashes of the papacy and sectarianism Protestantism can a new, more 
intellectual religion spring forth. Vattimo admits that such a religion is, in part, his 
dream. He advocates a freer, more hermeneutical reading of Scripture, whereby the 
Bible should “not be interpreted literally, because each religious spirit should be able 




87 Vattimo quotes Schelling in After Christianity, 33. According to Thomas Rohkrämer, for 
Schelling reason ought to “reveal a deeper, more human essence behind the scientific analysis of the 
natural world” (Thomas Rohkrämer, A Single Communal Faith? The German Right From 
Conservatism to National Socialism [New York: Berghahn Books, 2007], 40). He maintained that a 
purely scientific view of the world would promote discord; instead the aesthetic sphere would bring 
together the natural and human world in harmony.   
88 Novalis’ political essay ‘Christendom or Europe’ was influenced by Schleiermachers’ 
Speeches on Religion and appeared in 1799. According to Margaret Mahony Stoljar, “both the 
Reformation itself and modern philosophy, that is, the French-inspired philosophy of the late 
eighteenth century, are held by Novalis to be deficient in their pursuit of rational or literal knowledge 
at the expense of mystery or the supernatural” (Margaret Mahony Stoljar ed and trans., Novalis: 
Philosophical Writings [Albany: State of New York University Press, 1997], 18). Novalis does, 
however, believe that this emphasis on reason has allowed a future where “poetry will open the door 
to all the riches of art and nature” (ibid). He is of the opinion that disciplines such as art, religion, 
philosophy, and science should work together since “if the golden age is to be realised then these 
discourses must flow together” (ibid, 19). 
89 Vattimo, After Christianity, 33.  
90 Ibid., 34. See also Teresa Oñate, “The Rights of God in Hermeneutical Postmodernity,” trans. 
Ileana Szymanski, in Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed. Santiago Zabala 




5.3.2 Charity as the Limit of Secularization 
As Vattimo’s view of secularization focuses on hermeneutics, the question of limits 
arises.  Given the emphasis on the spiritual, rather than the literal reading of the 
Christian message, it is necessary to ask if there is any criteria that will allow us to 
determine what constitutes a legitimate view of the same. That criterion, he claims, 
is charity, or caritas, the love of humankind that is inherent to Christ’s teachings.91 
He draws this criterion from the work of St. Augustine, from the precept ‘dilige et 
quod vis fac’ or ‘love and do what you will.’92 This injunction emphasizes the 
centrality of love within the Christian tradition and, as such, for Vattimo, acts as the 
only criterion on which to examine secularization.93  
Vattimo maintains that the New Testament particularly stresses the importance 
of love, pushing us to recognize it as a supreme principle.94 While acknowledging 
charity, the love of humankind, as a supreme principle may appear contradictory, 
given Vattimo’s emphasis on the end of metaphysics and the dissolution of strong 
claims to truth, this is not the case. In part, it is due to his understanding of truth, 
which is based on weak thought. It is a truth that is not based on an objective reality 
but, instead, on a set of premises. “[If] we understand truth not as the correspondence 
of the mind with the thing (the faithful description of a state of affairs) but instead as 
 
91 Erik Meganck, "God Returns as Nihilist Caritas: Secularization According to Gianni 
Vattimo," Sophia 54, no. 3 (2015): 363-379. 
92 This precept is often quoted as ‘ama et fac quod vis’ and is found in Epistolam Joannis 
ad Parthos (ad 413) tractatus 7, sect. 8. 
93 Vattimo, Belief, 64.  
94 Ibid. See also Pierpaolo Antonello, “Introduction,” in Christianity, Truth, and Weakening 
Faith: A Dialogue, ed. Pierpaolo Antonello, 1-22, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia 





a plausibility and persuasiveness that is linked to a set of premises . . . we meet a 
phenomenon of weakening again.”95 Truth, then, is more a consensus than an 
objective reality, which, he claims, places charity at the heart of this understanding 
of truth. The centrality of charity, however, is partly due to his reading of Donald 
Davidson’s work. Davidson’s writings are concerned with a problem arising from 
interpretation, with regard to belief and meaning, whereby we cannot simply interpret 
the spoken word without ascribing a belief to it, or taking into account the person’s 
mental state, and any accompanying gestures.96 When we listen to others, then, 
Donaldson suggests that we must adopt an attitude of charity and keep two principles 
in mind.  
In listening to others speak we charitably assume two things: (1) that the 
speaker holds to be true what it is she says; and (2) that the speaker does 
indeed believe and mean by the words she uses what I the listener mean 
and believe by those same words.97 
 
As we cannot know if we do indeed share the same beliefs or meanings as the other 
person, it is only through this attitude of charity that we may understand one another. 
“To charitably understand and live with one another is not necessarily to share 
meaning with others, but to assume that one can live with others despite any 
uncertainty that such sharedness exists.”98 Charity also invites us to think about the 
sharedness of the social world, as it allows us to set up a shared space in which 
interpretation takes place. It also acts as a constraint on the interpretation, as in order 
 
95 Vattimo, After Christianity, 50.  
96 See Kathrïn Glüer, Donald Davidson: A Short introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
97 Jarett Zigon, “Narratives,” in A Companion to Moral Anthropology, ed. Didier Fassin 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 217.  




to maintain the shared space there must be a certain degree of coherence between 
those involved.99 Caritas, then, while acting as an ultimate principle is not truly 
ultimate. It is not truly ultimate as it does not have the same peremptory character of 
metaphysics. Vattimo suggests that, philosophically speaking, the violence is the 
silencing of all questioning that is characteristic of metaphysics.100 Caritas cannot 
share this peremptoriness as it itself is an interpretation. For him, Jesus Christ himself 
is the interpretation of the Old Testament, revealing God’s love for his creatures.101 
It is an infinite, never-ending process and, while love may be read as the ultimate 
meaning of revelation, it cannot be truly ultimate, given the hermeneutical nature of 
the Christian tradition.102 Vattimo suggests then that, in this light, it is entirely 
possible to understand nihilism as being based on the Christian tradition, guided by 
and given meaning to by kenosis, in the sense of God’s love.103  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Vattimo’s work focuses on the lived experience of religion. This chapter explored 
this through the Italian philosopher’s understanding of myth. For him, given that we 
are in the era of the end of metaphysics, it is necessary to develop a new understanding 
of myth that will adequately reflect this. Indeed, philosophy must respect myth, 
 
99 See Jarett Zigon, “Narratives,” 217, and J.E. Malpas, Donald Davidson and the Mirror of 
Meaning: Holism, Truth, Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 147.  
100 See Harmakaputra, Hans Abdiel. "Between Transcendence and Violence: Gianni Vattimo 
and René Girard on Violence in a Secular Age." Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and 
Culture 23, no. 1 (2016): 117-136. 
 
101 Vattimo, Belief, 64. Emphasis original. 
102 Ibid., 65. 




allowing its meaning to come to light. Currently, he claims that modern philosophy 
lacks a satisfactory theory of myth, as these theories are still enmeshed in a 
metaphysical framework. Thus, a new theory must be developed that adequately 
reflects myth in light of the dissolution of metaphysics. The same, he suggests, may 
be said for religion, where he focuses on the hermeneutic structure of the Christian 
tradition, which reflects the importance of the lived experience of religion. The 
chapter explored the re-presentation of religion in the light of the current conditions 
of existence, examining the two primary forms that mark the return.  
The final parts of the chapter centred on charity. The mystic, Joachim of 
Fiore’s work is significant for Vattimo, as the abbot’s Trinitarian division of time 
underpins the Italian philosopher’s understanding of secularization; in particular, 
Joachim’s Age of the Spirit, which is characterized by freedom and charity. Due to 
the emphasis that Vattimo places on hermeneutics, the chapter turned then to the 
question of limits. The answer, for him, lies in charity, the love of humanity inherent 
to Christ’s teachings. Charity also invites us to think about the sharedness of the world 

















Vattimo’s work is underpinned by his interest in aesthetics. During the 1960s he 
taught aesthetics in the University of Turin, while actively publishing on Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and aesthetics. The seeds of his thought concerning weak thought and the 
religious can be found in these early texts. His volume, Art’s Claim to Truth, may be 
read, not only as Vattimo’s thought concerning aesthetics, but as the groundwork for 
his later writings regarding the postmetaphysical. This chapter focuses on Vattimo’s 
views of aesthetics, while, at the same time, connecting this to some of the themes 
explored earlier in this thesis. Much of this chapter rests on Vattimo’s understanding 
of Heidegger. Indeed the first section focuses on the relationship between philosophy 
and ontology, which is examined here through the lens of the aesthetic. This section, 
too, is built on the foundation of the ontological difference.  
 I will consider a number of issues that are increasing concerns in 
contemporary culture. Cultural tourism and the manner in which we encounter works 
of art in both Church and museum spaces provide important insight in relation to the 
division and use of such spaces and to the current relationship between art and 
religion. This discussion leads to the question of secularization as the destiny of art. 
Indeed, Vattimo claims that the roots of the idea of art as secularized religion may be 
found in the work of Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin. This exploration of the destiny 
of art gives rise to a discussion concerning the eschatological character of art. There 
is an openness to the future inherent in art, which Vattimo likens to prophecy. This is 




something that disturbs us and unsettles our everyday reality. For Vattimo, the 
artwork does not act as a definitive truth, a faithful representation of reality, but, 
instead, is a message that calls for a response. This is explored through the work of 
the artist Alfredo Jaar.  
 
6.1 Ontological Aesthetics 
This section considers the relationship between philosophy and aesthetics through an 
ontological lens. It examines some of the philosophical positions concerning 
aesthetics, while paying attention to the ontological difference. Vattimo draws on 
Hegel’s thought on the death of art, and explores its relation to poetics. Given that the 
artwork requires a degree of comprehensibility, I will next turn to the role of 
language. Finally, this section concludes with Vattimo’s understanding of 
Heidegger’s thought concerning the setting-into-work of truth, exploring the work as 
the opening up of a world.  
 
6.1.1 Aesthetics and Ontology 
Vattimo discusses the relationship between philosophy and aesthetics through an 
ontological prism. For him, the ontological difference is crucial to the discussion. As 
I have discussed earlier in this thesis, the ontological difference is the difference 
between beings and Being, or, rather, entities and the existence of these entities. One 
particular aspect of the ontological difference that Vattimo claims that is necessary to 
pay attention to in this discussion is the epoché. In Heidegger’s case—at least in 
Vattimo’s reading—the epoché is to be read in light of the ontological difference, 
where it is the character by which Being reveals and conceals itself simultaneously in 




Heidegger, the key insight is the emphasis on difference, where being can never be 
confused with Being.  
The epoché is the character by which Being reveals and conceals itself 
simultaneously in the appearing of beings, or things and persons that 
inhabit the world . . . Being both makes and lets beings appear: one could 
say that Being makes place for them.1  
 
It is necessary to pay attention to the ontological difference as Vattimo is concerned 
that such a description may give suggest the image of an actual place, where Being 
withdraws to in order to allow beings to appear. His fear is that such an idea would 
continue to confuse the issue by giving the impression that Being is, in fact, an entity 
and he wishes to emphasize that this is not the case. Having said that, the epoché does 
have significance not only on the level of the spatial, but also on the temporal. “Being 
withdraws itself and lets beings distend themselves within time. So there is authentic 
history only insofar as Being is always yet to come.”2 This means that history is only 
possible due to the epochal character of Being; “it is through Being’s withdrawal that 
there is history, possibility, future, and so on.”3 Against the background of these 
 
 
1 Gianni Vattimo, Art's Claim to Truth, ed. Santiago Zabala, trans. Luca D'Isanto (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 14. Emphasis original.  
Vattimo notes that Heidegger’s understanding of the epoché should not be read in the precise 
sense as in Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Dermot Moran, for Husserl, the epoch requires 
the phenomenologist to move away from assumptions. These assumptions are those that we make 
about the world which are “deeply embedded in our everyday behaviour towards objects and also at 
work in our most sophisticated natural science.” This ought to uncover a new domain of experience, 
which provides the “only genuine access to the infinite subjective domain of inner experience.” Its 
focus is not on the natural world around us, but on consciousness instead; “to get it to yield up its 
secrets as to how the world and its meanings are constituted.” In order to do this, Husserl believed that 
we need to bracket, or suspend, “certain fundamental structures” which allows “more basic 
objectifying acts of consciousness to become visible in themselves.” This, Husserl maintained, “is a 
first step to laying bare the essence of the act, for example what precisely it means to perceive 
something, remember something, imagine something, and so on.” In other words, any proper 
description comes from a first person point of view; we describe the item through our experience of it. 
(Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology [London: Routledge, 2000], 147-149). 
 
2 Ibid., 15. 
 




ontological concerns, Vattimo turns to aesthetics.4 He considers the understanding of 
aesthetics as a reflection on the structure and value for human life of the experiences 
that put us in touch with “works of art” or the ‘beautiful’ to be problematic.5 “It 
[aesthetic discourse] concerns the structure and value of aesthetic experience 
überhaupt, without attempting to modify, evaluate, or produce this or that experience 
in particular.”6 It is clear that here aesthetic discourse is not the same as a discourse 
on the arts (or criticism) in the conventional sense.  
 He begins by critiquing the foundational metaphysical mindset by contrasting 
Aristotle and Plato and their understandings of the “foundational ideal of 
knowledge.”7 In Plato’s thought, he claims that there is an awareness of the 
ontological difference that is lacking in Aristotle’s. Aristotle provided the definitive 
meaning of the foundational ideal of knowledge, in that we have knowledge of a thing 
only when we have understood its cause or its “why”: “To know means knowing the 
causes.”8 The Aristotelian understanding survived, permeating Western philosophy 
and contemporary thought at the expense of ontology and of the Platonic 
understanding of the same.9 Vattimo identifies certain foundational mindsets that have 
 
4 See Georg Bertram, "In Defence of a Hermeneutic Ontology of Art." Tropos: Rivista Di 
Ermeneutica e Critica Filosofica 9, no. 1 (2016): 11-24. 
 
5 Vattimo, Art's Claim to Truth, 15. 
 
6 Ibid. Überhaupt here means ‘in the first place.’ 
 
7 Ibid., 16. Foundationalism holds that it is possible to justify belief by reference to other 
beliefs. For a more thorough look at foundationalism, as per Plato and Aristotle, see Terence Irwin, 
Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) and Franco Trabattoni, Essays on Plato’s 
Epistemology (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016).  
 
8 Vattimo, Art's Claim to Truth, 16. For more on Aristotle’s understanding of knowledge, see 
David Bronstein, Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016).  
 




continued to survive within contemporary philosophy and aesthetics. He admits, 
however, that  his scheme may not be complete or historically accurate. There is, for 
example, a prevalent Hegelian mindset in philosophical aesthetics, especially relating 
to dialectics and totality.10 For Vattimo, this Hegelian mindset still pervades 
aesthetics, even if it is unconsciously so. It is evident in the ‘dialecticizing’ of art, 
whereby the reality always refers to some sort of totality.  
Aesthetics always presents itself to a lesser or greater extent as the 
‘dialecticizing’ of art; in other words, aesthetics makes it its task to 
understand and explain art by placing art in relation with the general 
structure of spirit, history, society, the evolution of styles, languages, and 
so on.11 
 
The dialectical attitude relies on a foundation, on some form of ultimate authority, that 
acts as a point of reference. A being, or, indeed, even an experience, is known in 
relation to such a totality.12  
For Vattimo, another mindset that falls into the category of being foundationalist 
is neo-Kantianism. It is, he claims, yet another foundationalist attitude that fails 
adequately to address ontology. In this case, the foundation is a transcendental one.13 
 
 
10 “The dialectical principle, for Hegel, is the principle whereby apparently stable thoughts 
reveal their inherent instability by turning into their opposites and then into new, more complex 
thoughts, as the thought of being turns first into the thought of nothing and then into the thought of 
becoming” (Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History [Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005], 38).” Although appearing to be a contradiction, we see examples of this 
type of thought in everyday usage, particularly in proverbs such as ‘pride comes before a fall’” (G.W. 
Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, eds E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel, vol III, (Frankfurt: 
SuhrkampVerlag, 1969ff), 175, in Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and 
History [Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005], 39).  With regard to totality, for Hegel only the whole 
is true, however it is necessary to incorporate each stage of the thought process in order to understand 
the whole.   
 
11 Vattimo, Art's Claim to Truth, 18. 
 
12 Ibid.  
 




While this mindset appears to be less fixed within a metaphysical framework, this is 
in fact not the case.  
It is “a systematic presentation of the different activities of man, each of which is 
referred back to its own a priori, to the direction of consciousness.”14 Because of its 
continued emphasis on consciousness, neo-Kantianism views aesthetics in a 
transcendental light. “In this view, aesthetics is understood as a transcendental 
description of the structure of the experience of the beautiful and of art, its realm of 
possibility insofar as it is the identification of the dimension of consciousness in which 
it is actualized.”15 It is similar to Hegelianism in that the focus, again, is on self-
consciousness.16  
For Vattimo, the foundationalist attitudes within contemporary philosophy fail 
to take into consideration adequately the ontological difference. Rather, the 
ontological difference ought to take a central place in both philosophical and aesthetic 
thought.  
As aesthetics it should place at the center of its inquiry a consideration of 
the problem of art, but as a philosophical aesthetic—and precisely as 
philosophy—it should keep in mind the central philosophical question of 





15 Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, 19. 
 
16 See Vattimo, Art's Claim to Truth, 18. Vattimo maintains that phenomenology retains the 
traces of the Kantian mindset, showing that modern philosophy contains, what he considers to be, the 
rigid transcendental qualities of the Kantian programme. It is due to Husserl and his followers that an 
attempt to radicalize Kant came about. Even though Husserl disagreed with Kant in some respects, 
Vattimo considers that in the foundational sense, that this does not offer an alternative to neo-
Kantianism as long as it follows Kantian thought; the ontological difference is once again forgotten. 
It also functions as “a ground from which the definite forms of experience originate.” Vattimo suggests 
that this can be seen in phenomenology’s treatment of art, particularly in Mikel Dufrenne’s work. The 
French philosopher and aesthetician explores the links between phenomenology and art, while 
remaining faithful to his roots in the work of Sartre, Heidegger, and Husserl (Vattimo, Art’s Claim to 
Truth, 18).  
For more on Dufrenne, see Edward S. Casey, “Mikel Dufrenne” in The Handbook of 






He returns to the epoché to develop this argument in favour of the centrality of the 
ontological difference. For him, the epoché is key to a positive reading of the 
relationship between Being and beings. “Being is not, except as epoché: if you will, 
Being is nothing but its history, its epoch . . . Being is the illumination of the realm in 
which beings appear.”18 While Being is revealed through epoché, that is through its 
history, it is necessary to keep in mind that any comparison or investigation of 
different epochs cannot reveal Being to us. This would imply that being is an entity, 
an actual being, capable of discovery as if it actually existed just outside of our world, 
waiting for us to find it.19 As Being is not such a thing, it is interpretation that holds 
the key to gaining access to it. “If interpretation holds knowledge of the epoch, and 
therefore of beings, it is the only possible path of access to Being. And it is an 
authentic path of access to Being to the extent that Being, not reduced to beings, does 
not stand outside or above the epoch.”20 Rather than a structure or foundation, Being 
is an event and as such is always originating.21 It is as event that the very essence of 
human beings is grasped. This means that, as such, any exploration of Being must 
look to the ways in which beings occur as opposed to seeking an ultimate foundation.  
Genuine philosophical discourse is given always and only where the character 
of openness and ulteriority belonging to Being appears as such, whether in the 
transcendental descriptions of a certain field of experience or in the more 
specific discourse around a determinate work.22  
 
 
17 Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, 21.  
 
18 Ibid., 23. Emphasis original. 
 




21 Ibid.  
 




Philosophy and aesthetics, then, must look to experience as a path of access to Being. 
Aesthetics, Vattimo claims, must be understood in light of the epoché in the sense that 
they too are a part of the way in which Being occurs in our world and, as a result, can 
be understood as a mode of being of art in the present epoch of Being. “They are 
themselves part of the region of beings that is to be understood ontologically.”23 Given 
that art is one of the paths of access to Being, it offers a vast array of approaches, be 
it through reflection on a particular artwork, through poetics, criticism, and so on. 
Thus, we may say, that ontological aesthetics is a cultural philosophy and its task is 




6.1.2 Ontology and Poetics 
 
Vattimo takes a particular interest in the philosophical problem of poetics. Poetics is 
the study of literature, which operates on the basis of the assumption that a literary 
work possesses characteristics that can be studied in order to classify it.24 By 
examining the text itself, it is possible to conduct a scientific study in order to identify 
and classify the texts’ characteristics.25 Vattimo maintains that because of the 
emphasis on identification and classification, that there is an aesthetic problem 
inherent to poetics. In our present century there has been a particular blossoming of 
poetics, which goes back to the Romantic movement of the late nineteenth century. 
This blossoming has prevailed over the production of works.  “It is not so much the 
case of poetics serving us to better understand and evaluate the works as it is that the 
 
 








works are nothing but provisional examples of ‘programs’ that claim to be held and 
recognized as such.”26 This problem, he proposes, may be examined from two 
perspectives. First, its representation of the arts and, secondly, the philosophical 
significance of the portrayal. “First, it concerns the meaning of poetics as a general 
characteristic of the art world in our century; second, it concerns the value and 
philosophical bearing of their content and statements.”27 In order to explore the 
problems that he has identified, the Italian philosopher approaches them by using 
Hegel’s concept of the death of art as a basis for his exploration. The Hegelian 
understanding of the end, or death, of art is rooted in the secularization of art, which 
was brought about by the Reformation and particularly associated with the 
development of romantic art.28 The increasing secularization of art means that it is 
unable to fulfil the same functions in modernity as it did previously. During the 
Middle Ages, for example, icons and other artworks were used as a doorway to the 
sacred in order to render the divine visible. After the Reformation, however, art is no 
longer used in veneration in that traditional way because it has become secularized. 
In its detachment from religion, art no longer fulfils this earlier function. “Art 
considered in its highest vocation is and remains for us a thing of the past” (Aesthetics 
1:11).”29 Art is no longer an integral part of religious life since its relation to the 
transcendent has changed. “No matter how excellent we find the statues of the Greek 
gods, no matter how we see God the Father, Christ, and Mary so estimably and 
 
 
26 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, 30. 
 
27 Ibid.,31.  
 
28 For further reading, see David James, Art, Myth and Society in Hegel’s Aesthetics (London: 
Continuum, 2009).  
 




perfectly portrayed: it is no help; we bow the knee no longer.”30 As regards to poetics, 
Vattimo claims that we may only speak of the death of art “if the Hegelian expression 
is taken in all its weight and therefore if the contemporary situation of art is placed 
into a historicist and idealist frame of interpretation.”31 Outside of this interpretative 
framework, the phrase the ‘death of art’ has only a generic sociological meaning that 
might generate misunderstanding.32 Hegel maintains that art still had a future, when 
one acknowledges a change in the function of art rather than simply pointing to its 
decline.33 Similarly, poetics may be seen both as an indication of the death of art and 
as an attempt to save art. “They [poetics] are an indication of the ways in which art 
has sought and still seeks to defend itself from that death.”34 For Vattimo, poetics 
may be understood as an attempt to rescue art, given that art was threatened by its 
lack of self-consciousness, or, in other words, by a lack of philosophical or self-
reflection.35 From this perspective, he maintains, Hegelian and post-Hegelian 
philosophy have not been capable of doing justice to art.36 Through the means of 
 
 
30 Ibid. Stephen Houlgate notes that the emancipation of art from religion came at a cost; “the 
emancipation of the secular and the human in art marks the liberation of art itself from religion. But 
this autonomy is acquired at a price, Hegel believes, because in being separated off from religion art 
loses its equality with religion as the full revelation of the highest truth. In gaining its freedom from 
religion, therefore, art also discovers its own limitations” (Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: 
Freedom, Truth and History [Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005], 237).  
 




33 For more, see Jason Gaiger, “Catching Up With History: Hegel and Abstract Painting” in 
Hegel: New Directions, ed. Katerina Deligiorgi (n.p.: Acumen, 2006; reprint, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 
160. 
 
34 Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, 32. 
 
35 Ibid., 32.  
 




poetics, the artists’ need to defend themselves and their art is, he claims, is an 
opposition to the death of art. Vattimo goes beyond the limitations of Hegel’s 
hypothesis, choosing to apply it to social structures in his exploration of the 
philosophical problem posed by poetics. In this light, the death of art now refers to 
the artists’ social condition in the nineteenth century, which significantly changes the 
way in which poetics are understood. “The poetics . . .  are more concretely the ways 
in which artists, confronted with a new social position that had never before been 
experienced, seek to give meaning to this situation and to give a meaning to 
themselves in it.”37 He turns to the industrial revolution in order to further elaborate 
this point. The industrial revolution and the advent of mass society marked a shift, 
not only in society, but also in the relationship between the artist and the public. There 
is a certain loss of direct contact with a limited and well-known public and, against 
this, the acquaintance of a much wider public, albeit anonymous and removed.38 Not 
only that, but whereas art was generally commissioned in the past, now, with the 
shifting social landscape, the artist was left to draw on himself or herself for 
inspiration. “In sum, the artist has lost a clearly defined social condition and has not 
yet acquired a new one in turn.”39 The artist is now connected to a much more 
extensive and more anonymous horizon than was traditionally the case. The social 
 
 
37 Ibid., 33.  
 
38 Ibid. In general, the industrial revolution in the 19th century marked a period of rapid social 
change. Instead of small scale, domestic production, large factories sprang up, which sparked mass-
migration; cities grew and the landscape altered significantly; not only with factories dotting the 
horizon, but agriculture went into decline as it was no longer the main industry. Artists too were 
affected by the changes. As Vattimo points out, commissioned art, which had been popular in the 
preceding eras, was frowned upon by the romantics; “the romantic artist already is an artist abandoned 
to himself, who generally has no commissioner in the traditional sense of the term; who has no specific, 
precise, or given demands to which he must respond; and who must seek solely within himself, within 
his own personality, the inspiration, the source, and rules of his own art” (Vattimo, Art’s Claim to 
Truth, 33). 
 




figure of the ‘integrated’ artist (i.e. belonging to the whole) is replaced by the 
bohemian artist, who is a figure of transition in the first ‘industrialization’ of art. 40 
Today the process of industrialization has been fulfilled so that the figure of the 
bohemian artist has been overtaken, and the figure of the integrated artist has 
returned, though as a figure that has been integrated into the world of mass 
communication: the press, cinema, radio, and television.  
Vattimo continues his exploration by examining the role that language plays in 
relation to poetics. “What holds sway over the twentieth-century artist is not so much 
the problem of his own relationship to the world as it is that of his means of expression 
(or if anything the former mediated by the latter).”41 He stresses the importance of 
the relationship between the non-linguistic arts and language. An example would be 
a concert, where patrons are provided with an explanatory pamphlet about the music 
that they are about to hear. Criticism then acts as a mediator between the arts and 
language by interpreting the symbols produced by the artists so that the masses may 
understand and appreciate them. This leads in turn to a rapid production of new 
symbols as criticism allows them to be absorbed at a swifter pace. Without the 
explanations that criticism offers, this process would take much longer. Afterall,  
“artwork needs a realm of comprehensibility in order to be understood and 
enjoyed.”42 This means further that language is central with regard to poetics and 
ontology. “The salient outcome of twentieth century poetics would be a re-
ontologization of art through the affirmation of the originally ontological, founding 
 
40 See ibid., 33.  
 
41 Ibid., 34.  
 




function of language.”43 The artwork serves as a point of departure, as a pathway of 
human experience through which we may access Being anew. It means that poetics 
defends the ontological bearing of art in refusing “to see and practice art as a 
disinterested activity beyond true and false, good and evil, and so on, or as an activity 
that could appear to be true only once unmasked, demythologized, and relativized by 
reflection.”44 It is through human experience, through history and our ways of relating 
to it that we access Being.45 
 
6.1.3 The Setting-into-Work of Truth 
In his exploration of aesthetics, Vattimo turns to Heidegger’s thought concerning the 
work of art as the setting into work of truth. He claims that the setting-into-work of 
truth is connected to the decline of art. “What we experience in the moment of the 
decline of art is describable in terms of the Heideggerean notion of the work of art as 
the ‘setting-into-work of truth.’”46 The setting-into-work of truth has, for Vattimo 
“the same pregnant meaning as the Italian expression “putting a building to work” 
(messa in opera di una construzione), where the meaning is that it has been put in a 
condition to function.”47 In other words, the work of art must actually work or have 
some effect. If it does not, then it is not actually an artwork, but only has the potential 
 
 
43  Ibid., 55. 
 
44 Ibid., 42.  
 
45 Ibid., 42.  
 
46 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 60. Vattimo draws on two of Heidegger’s essays, 
“The Essence of Truth,” and “The Origin of the Work of Art” for his exploration of aesthetics and the 
setting into work of truth. 
 




to be one.48 What the artwork does is open up a world that is, at the same time, both 
true and new: “the work opens a new ‘epoch’ of being as an originary event, which 
cannot be reduced to what it already was, and it grounds a new order of relationships 
within beings, a true and actually new world.”49 The ‘new’ is in the sense of our 
relation to the entities that surround us; they themselves are not new, but are given to 
us in a new light which allows us to see them for other than what they were.50 The 
work, however, is only effective under certain conditions. “A work is in actual effect 
as a work only when we remove ourselves from our commonplace routine and move 
into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own nature itself to take a stand 
in the truth of what is.”51 We allow the work to work and to be effective as a work, 
when we allow ourselves to step out of the everyday, the ordinary, and into the light 
of what the work discloses. 
The nature of poetry, for Heidegger, is the founding of truth. ‘Founding’ here 
may be understood in the threefold sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning. 
“Heidegger identifies three stages in the setting-forth of this founding truth: founding 
as bestowing, founding as grounding, and founding as beginning.”52 Karsten Harries 
 
 
48 See Julian Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 51. “To be, in the full sense, an artwork, the work must ‘work’, that is, to be effective . . . If it 
is not yet received then it does not yet ‘work’ — it lacks a ‘work-being . . .and is at best a potential 
artwork. (If it no longer ‘works’, if it has ‘passed over into the realm of tradition and conservation’, 
then it is, presumably, like John Cleese’s ex-parrot, an ex-artwork).” Emphasis original. 
 
49 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, 152. 
 
50 Karsten Harries, Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger’s “The Origin of the 
Work of Art” (New York: Springer, 2009), 169. For more on the non-concealment of art, see Joseph 
J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art Works (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1985), 191. For Heidegger, non-concealment is synonymous with truth, see Martin Heidegger, “The 
Origin of the Work of Art,” in Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 
1978). 
 
51 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David 





remarks on the three meanings:  
Key here is the term “founding,” which translates stiften, which in turn 
is understood as schenken (bestowing), gründen (grounding), and 
anfangen (beginning). To understand the meaning of stiften, we may 
want to think of the religious or educational context, in which the word 
“foundation,” Stiften, has an obvious home. It is not difficult to make 
sense here of Heidegger’s triple sense of founding: such a foundation 
depends on a gift, a bestowal of an endowment; this endowment 
establishes something, say an institution; and this establishment is the 
beginning of something that has its own history.53 
 
The first aspect is bestowing or gifting, which marks the work of art as an original 
creation. “The truth that discloses itself . . . can never be derived from anything else. 
Thus the founding of the truth has the character of an overflow, an endowing, a gift.”54 
It is also a gift because it is not the creation of an artwork by one person for that one 
person alone, but, rather, it is projected towards others.  
The second aspect is grounding, which orients the still emerging truth towards 
the future. “Truth is thrown toward a people that, in history, come to preserve it.”55 
In this the preservation of a work is important. It is necessary in order for it to come 
into being and those who preserve it are not just individuals but make up a whole 
culture.56 In order for the artwork to work, it requires the preservers. It must be 
communally received and, in doing so, brings an entire culture together. In order to 
illustrate this opening up and grounding of a world, Heidegger uses the example of a 
 
52 Joshua Reeves and Ethan Stoneman, “Heidegger and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric,” Philosophy 
and Rhetoric 47, no. 2 (2014): 148. 137-157. 
 
53 Karsten Harries, Art Matters, 174-175. 
 
54 Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art Works (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1985), 191. 
 
55 Ibid.    
 
56 Julian Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 





Greek temple. “It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time 
gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, 
disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape 
of destiny for human being.”57  
The third aspect is beginning.  It is, in a sense, a founding which retains its 
connection to the historical as origin.  
Every beginning of art is thus an irruption within being of a new and 
emergent world. This world, along with the poetry that founds it, is 
historical, endowing the ground with everything it will call future people 
to preserve; it is the origin both of art and of a community’s historical 
existence.58  
 
It is the transformation of a potential community into a living one, united by a 
common project. The artwork transforms the community by making this shared 
project possible; the people appropriate a heritage, which determines their culture, 
their current situation, and their destiny.59 Indeed, when each beginning occurs, there 
is an unconcealment of beings. Heidegger remarks: “at each time there happened 
unconcealment of beings. Unconcealment sets itself into work, a setting which is 
accompanied by art.”60 The artwork does not just open up a world, but preserves and 
brings together an entire culture. This is only established if there is an openness, 
which takes a stand against everything that would destroy it, fixing truth in place in 
the figure, or, in other words, in in the self-establishment of the community.61 Each 
 
57 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 106. 
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time a beginning occurs a new world irrupts, and, each time, history starts over with 
a potential community transformed into a living one.  
Continuing his exploration of the nature of poetry as the founding of truth, 
Vattimo turns to Heidegger’s essay on ‘The Nature of Language.’62 In this essay, 
Heidegger comments on Stefan George’s poem “The Word.”63 Towards the end of 
the essay, Heidegger ‘edits’ a line of text in the poem. The line originally reads as 
“Kein Ding sei wo das Wort gebricht’ (‘where the word breaks no thing may be’).”64 
Heidegger re-does the line, changing it to read, “‘Ein “ist” ergibt sich wo das Wort 
zerbricht’ (‘an “is” arises where the word breaks up’).”65 Vattimo points out that “it 
no longer means ‘no thing is where there is no word,’ but rather ‘an ‘is’ occurs where 
the word fails.”66 He believes that Heidegger makes no claim here for an occurrence 
of Being ‘in person’ outside the mediation of language. The connection between the 
setting-into-work of truth and poetry is made through Heidegger’s understanding of 
truth as event. “Truth is not a metaphysically stable structure but an event.”67 
Inaugural events, for Heidegger, occur primarily through the medium of language. “It 
is primarily in language that the originary familiarity with the world unfolds, which 
constitutes the non-transcendental, always historically finite and ‘situated’ condition 
of the possibility of experience.”68 Heidegger’s term for our being in the world, 
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Dasein is equivalently the disclosure of being, which is sited in, what Vattimo calls, 
a “horizon’ of language.”69 It is this horizon of language that permits us to speak of 
truth, and poetics is a privileged instance in the occurrence of truth. The horizon 
marks the context in which something can be understood. Take for example a sign. 
After asking what a particular sign means, and finding out, for example, that it is a 
road sign, we now know that it belongs within a particular horizon.70 That horizon is 
the activity of driving a car.71 The horizon permits us to access the thing, as it provides 
us with a meaning so that we may understand. “What we call poetry are the inaugural 
events in which the historical/geschicklich horizons of experience of particular 
historical human beings are instituted.”72 Vattimo links the inaugurality of the work 
to the shattering of the poetic word as exemplified in the prophetic word. The 
prophetic word figures an alternative world with regard to which the existing order is 
revealed in its injustice and inauthenticity. And yet, the poetic word itself shatters and 
fails in the sense that it reinstates the representational relation between word and 
things. “The poetic word is destined to shatter just as the prophetic word does at the 
moment in which the prophecy is ‘realized.’”73 The inaugural significance of poetry 
is the founding of historical worlds, and it has the same characteristics as 
representational language. “It is consumed and shattered in referring to the things, 
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when the thing is (now) made present.”74 Language, then, makes things appear; it 
shows or unconceals.75 
Vattimo maintains that there are certain criteria to be met if the work of art can 
be a setting-into-work of truth. “Precisely because it is an event, truth can occur only 
in that shattering of the word which is monumentality, formula, and the faint light of 
the Lichtung.”76 In order to explore monumentality, formula, and the Lichtung, we 
must first turn to Heidegger’s concept of the fourfold. Language here that which 
permits showing or appearing. “‘To make appear’, particularly in the sense of making 
each thing be reflected in the mirror-game of the fourfold.”77 The fourfold is 
Heidegger’s formal structuring of the world in which one dwells. It is composed of 
earth and sky, mortals and divinities: “the first pair in the foursome, earth and sky, 
stands for natural elements, and the second pair, mortals and divinities, stands for 
cultural elements.”78 This is not a scientific account of the material world, but a poetic 
one. “The poet’s whole attitude . . . demands that we are to think of what is called 
man’s existence by way of the nature of dwelling . . . we are to think of the nature of 
poetry as a letting dwell.”79 Poetry, then, is a way of bringing the fourfold forth into 
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presence. We can see the importance and centrality of language here as it is in 
language that the elements of the fourfold are held together and appear or dwell. 
“Saying is given primarily as local saying; local, place-bound saying is the site where 
home is first given and where, at last, we might become at home . . . Home is in 
dialect.”80 Language, then, gathers a world together. Indeed, for Vattimo, we access 
Being through language. “It has to do with summoning, a summons that comes to me 
not just from words but from a lived tradition that I assimilate, recognize, and live 
out within language.”81 Language, then, is to be understood with Heidegger as the 
dwelling place of Being. 
The idea of dwelling is itself connected to mortality. Our dwelling ends with 
death which is the mark of our mortality, and in dwelling we initiate our own nature. 
“In the mode of dwelling mortals . . . become mortals through their acceptance and 
recognition of death.”82 Heidegger further connects death with language using 
animals as a counterexample. Animals are unable to speak and, therefore, are 
incapable of experiencing death in the same way as humans. The experience of death 
is unique to human beings.83 It is the possibility of non-existence that links Dasein to 
nothing (or mystery). It is in this mystery that the shattering of the word finds an exact 
point of reference. “The shattering of the word in originary saying and in poetry . . . 
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must . . . be understood as being defined by its relation to the constitutive mortality 
of Dasein.”84 Existence is always marked by death, and the shattering of the word 
that allows the ‘is’ is linked to mortality as the ‘is’ is always found in the earthly 
dimension of the fourfold. Vattimo draws again on Heidegger’s essay, “The Origin 
of the Work of Art,” in which he speaks about the relationship between the earth and 
the Greek temple. The world (Welt), for Heidegger, is the system of meaning which 
are understood as they unfold in the work (of art). Over against this, the earth (erde) 
is that element of the work which comes forth as ever concealing itself anew. It is 
akin to a core or nucleus that is never used up by interpretations of exhausted by new 
meaning. The earth is the dimension which in the work connects the world (as a 
system of meanings) to its ‘other’; namely physis or nature. It is both earth and physis 
together that makes the work of art the setting-into-work of truth. The work of art is 
a setting-into-work of truth because “in it the opening up of a world as a context of 
referrals—like a language—is permanently connected to the earth as the ‘other’ of 
the world.”85 The earth has for Heidegger the features of physis, which is defined by 
birth, growth, and death.86 “Poetry can be defined as that language in which a world 
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(of unfolded meanings) opens up, and in which our terrestrial essence as mortals 
reverberates.”87 If, according to Vattimo, we do not wish to consider poetry within 
the framework of a philosophy of self-consciousness, then we must make recourse to 
the concept of monumentality.88 A monument is not a function of subjective self-
reference. It is, in contrast, primarily “a funerary monument built to bear the traces 
and the memory of someone across time, but for others.”89 The formal rules of poetry 
are the ways in which poetry achieves monumentality: “the formal rules of poetry, 
from rhyme and rhythm to the refined techniques through which the twentieth-
century avant-garde movements have tried to make poetry into an ‘essential’ 
language.”90 The monument, Vattimo maintains, is a formula, which is already 
constituted in such a way as to transmit itself. It is not the artistic casting of a full life. 
This means that it is already marked definitively by mortality. The monument-
formula is not constructed to ‘defeat’ time, but, rather, to endure in time. Heidegger’s 
Greek temple serves as an example of whereby it carries its meanings by allowing the 
signs of the times to be inscribed on its stone surface: “from the changing light of day 
to the winds and seasons, and finally to the ‘destructive’ traces of the passage of the 
 
Language creates reality, disclosing and revealing the reality of human beings. For theology, this is 
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years and centuries.”91 The temple’s exposure to the passing of time, the forces of 
nature, all weathered on the stone has a positive sense for the work of art. The same 
exposure to mortality and earthliness allows for different interpretations as time and 
generations pass. The concealment and unconcealment that is evident in the work of 
art is the locus of the setting into work of truth since truth is an event as opposed to a 
stable, fixed structure. Vattimo uses Heidegger’s term Lichtung to characterize the 
dynamic, whereby truth shines through the artwork. In its etymology the term itself, 
Lichtung, allows for both concealment and unconcealment; “Lichtung is synonymous 
with Waldblöße, ‘clearing in the woods’; ein Holz lichten means to clear a wood, that 
is, cut down trees in order to open up a Lichtung.”92 In terms of a clearing sited within 
a wood, it is ringed by denser growth and uncut trees; it denotes a place that has been 
opened up to the light, but yet is surrounded by darkness. The truth present in the 
artwork is one that is freed from the strong structures of metaphysics, one that comes 
after the monumentality of the work; it is eroded by time, yet still endures. 
 
6.2 Hermeneutics, Art, and Religion 
 For Vattimo, there is a deep connection between hermeneutics and religion. Drawing 
on his mentor, Luigi Pareyson’s work, he stresses the importance of the lived 
experience of religion. It is not given through objective, rational thought, but rather 
is presented in other forms such as myth, poetry, and art. There is, then, a relationship 
between art, religion, and philosophy that must be explored. Vattimo understands this 
connection in terms of the secularization of art, which is a process of transformation 
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that emphasises the hermeneutic character of both religion and art. This exploration 
of the relationship between religion and the secularization of art leads to a discussion 
of the eschatological character of art. It is necessary to look at the artwork as an event, 
as something that cannot be exhausted and closed in on itself. Instead, it calls for a 
response rather than a definitive explanation. This is illustrated, for example, in the 
work of the artist, Alfredo Jaar, whose undertaking “The Rwanda Project” calls on 
the audience to listen and respond to these messages.  
 
6.2.1 Hermeneutics: The Connection Between Art and Religion 
For Vattimo, hermeneutics may be read as a narrative of modernity or a koiné that 
characterizes Western culture.93 Where hermeneutics would previously be 
accompanied by an adjective, such as biblical, or literary, it now appears in 
contemporary culture simply as hermeneutics. It is now less limited and specialist, 
acting as a general theory of interpretation that applies to all areas of human 
experience. It is important to keep in mind that hermeneutics is not a metaphysical 
framework. It neither acts as, nor claims to be, an objective, metaphysical structure.  
Rather, it is more of  a response to a sending. Vattimo draws on Nietzsche’s 
announcement of the death of God as an example. Here, Nietzsche does not make a 
statement, claiming factually that God is dead, but, rather, he makes an 
announcement. It is “an acknowledgement of a course of events in which we are 
implicated and that we do not describe objectively, but interpret speculatively as 
concluding in the recognition that God is no longer necessary.”94 Hermeneutics is not 
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a presentation of ‘facts,’ but an attention to interpretation. Indeed, hermeneutics per 
se is strongly connected to the Western religious tradition.  
Modern hermeneutic philosophy is born in Europe not only because here 
there is a religion of the book that focuses attention on the phenomenon 
of interpretation, but also because this religion has at its base the idea of 
the incarnation of God, which it conceives as kenosis, as abasement and, 
in out translation, as weakening.95  
 
Vattimo makes the case that while hermeneutics is the child of modernity, modernity 
is the child of the Western religious tradition.96 This is because of secularization, 
which, for Vattimo is not the abandonment of religion, but a continuation of the 
kenosis of God, which is that process of weakening that began in the incarnation. This 
process was carried on in the reading of Scripture as we continue to interpret the word 
of God. The Scriptures are a mediated tradition allowing for interpretation. They are, 
in essence, hermeneutic.  
Vattimo draws on the thought of Joachim of Fiore in order to further illustrate 
the connection between hermeneutics and religion. Joachim divided time into three 
ages, with each age characterized by a person of the Trinity. While the first two ages 
were marked by the Father and Son and had already arrived, the third age, still to 
come, would be permeated by the Spirit. This age would be characterized by freedom 
and charity, with the discipline of the previous ages softened and replaced with a 
more spiritual sense of the scriptures. In this third age, for example, the literal 
interpretation of the scriptures is rendered obsolete. “A religion in which everyone 
can be the author of their own Bible . . . runs alongside the same dream of a 
Christianity that is no longer dogmatic or disciplinarian.”97 History, for Joachim, is a 
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process of spiritualization, and it is precisely because of this that the third age is 
characterized by freedom and openness.98 Vattimo maintains that it is akin to the 
openness and freedom found in his own reading of the incarnation as a process of 
weakening. “It is Joachim of Fiore, the medieval prophet of the so-called ‘third age’ 
of salvation history, or the age of the spirit, who emphasizes the openness to the future 
implicit in the dogma of incarnation.”99 For Vattimo, then, we are now, in principle, 
in the age of spiritual interpretation rather than the age of literal interpretation when 
it comes to engaging with sacred Scripture.  
Hermeneutics is the continuation of the Christian myth of the incarnation of 
God.100 Vattimo draws on the work of his mentor, Luigi Pareyson, in order to 
elaborate his point. For Pareyson, philosophy is the hermeneutics of religious 
experience, or, in other words, myth.101 Myth, in Vattimo’s understanding, is the 
symbolic presence of the divine in the visible.102 Religious experience is not given 
through rational thought, but is presented through other forms, such as myth and 
poetry. This is made possible through the incarnation. “Christ does not undermine the 
myths and stories of false and lying gods: he makes their signification of the divine 
possible for the first time.”103 The incarnation does not render any particular 
signification obsolete, but acknowledges that there is a plurality of myths with all of 
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them signifying the divine. “For Pareyson, the mythology of Christianity and the 
Christ Symbol provided the key to a true hermeneutic. Christ was the perfect symbol 
because he showed the partial and incomplete nature of all mythology.”104 Vattimo 
suggests that the incarnation allowed myth to express each and every invisible and 
symbolic presence of the divine. “The liberation of the plurality of myths, and thus 
the re-legitimation of religion in the wake of hermeneutics are wholly dependent on 
a process of secularization set in train by the story of the kenosis of God in the 
incarnation.”105 There are many ways of experiencing truth and for Vattimo two types 
of experience stand out as being connected; namely, the aesthetic and the religious. 
Hermeneutics, then, for him, must concern itself with the aesthetic and explore the 
relationship between art and religion in modernity.  
Vattimo analyses in particular the experience of art. Taking a particular church 
as an example, he discusses two ways in which we encounter works of art. The church 
in question is Sant’Ivo della Sapienza, built by Francesco Borromini, which is 
considered to be a masterpiece of Roman baroque architecture. Vattimo sets the scene 
by describing the experience of walking into the church on a Sunday morning in order 
to view the architecture, only to be confronted with a celebration of  mass in progress. 
First, you have the cultural tourist, interested in the church for purely aesthetic 
purposes. While, generally, undeterred by the celebration, the tourist is not at ease in 
the building; one is aware that, in this situation, one is somewhat of a disturbance, 
somewhat out of place. Secondly, you have the faithful at prayer. Vattimo maintains 
that they react with mixed feelings as, while they ought to welcome the tourists with 
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a charitable attitude, they are conscious of the tourists as being in conflict with what, 
at that time, is considered to be the proper meaning and function of the church space. 
It is a situation that is comparable with the (possibly unheard of) experience of 
someone entering a museum to kneel and pray at one of the icons or altarpieces on 
display.  In that situation, one would be out of place with the function of the building. 
For Vattimo, the experiences described here are significant in terms of understanding 
the relationship between art and religion. The authentic experience of the work of art, 
according to Walter Benjamin (whom Vattimo draws on), is the ‘distracted 
experience.’106 This corresponds to the experience that Vattimo describes as the 
faithful at prayer. While they may have an idea of the architectural wonders of 
Sant’Ivo della Sapienza, it is a ‘distracted perception’ as the focus is principally on 
prayer. Indeed, Benjamin favours the priority of the religious meaning, what he calls 
the authentic experience, over the aesthetic experience. “When you live in the Middle 
Ages in a town full of artworks, such as Siena, you do not go around looking at the 
works of art as we do now. You just live there, and the works are part of your life.”107 
It is this experience, rather than that of the museum, that for Vattimo is the authentic 
experience of the work of art. “A work of art should not be an exception in our lives: 
everyday life should be beautiful.”108 In contrast, the museum emphasizes the value 
of the work, treating the pieces as specialised phenomena rather than as part of an 
experience that ought to permeate everyday life. Vattimo considers that this idea of 
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the experience that so to speak aestheticizes everyday life is comparable to the 
secularization of religion. Secularization here is taken to be the very idea of the 
incarnation of God. God comes into the work in the form of a servant and humanizes 
Godself.  To begin with, he maintains that in line with the secularization theory there 
is an inherent relationship between art, religion, and philosophy. “There are not three 
sources of experience: the religious, the philosophical, the artistic, as many people 
tend to believe.”109 These three are in a dynamic secularizing relationship. Indeed, art 
could then be a way of secularizing the religious experience of the divine. By this, he 
means that a possible future for art could be the recovery of its liturgical and cultural 
value as a form of social, collective celebration of what we believe in. He proffers 
Bauhaus as an example of art as a collective celebration and a way of giving an 
authentic character to everyday life. It opposed the idea of the artist as a specialized 
phenomenon, valuing instead the aesthetic character of the whole of our 
experience.110 The museum in contemporary culture might be reflective of this 
attitude, focusing on artworks as indicative of different forms of life and lifestyles, 
rather than being concerned with the value of the piece, or, for instance, the 
superiority of a particular work over another. Otherwise, the museum may simply be 
a slave to the fluctuating trends of the art market.111 “Aesthetic experience is no longer 
the encounter with a perfect form, but a meeting with a plurality of possible forms of 
life.”112 The museum might be understood as a centre of collected information, where 
one might encounter a plurality of possible forms of life proposed through the works. 
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Vattimo is of the opinion that to discuss the relation between religion and art is 
to think of the destiny of art in relation to secularization.113 The roots of the idea of 
art as secularized religion lie in the work Aeltestes Systemprogramm des Deutschen 
Idealismus, a collaboration between Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin.114 The work’s 
focus is on freedom and liberty. The programme announced is “the advent of the 
kingdom of freedom that will be realized only on the basis of a ‘sensible religion,’ 
understood as the ‘monotheism of the heart, the polytheism of the imagination and of 
art,’ and the ‘mythology of reason.”’115 For Vattimo, this book resonates with the 
hermeneutic character of the Age of the Spirit that we find in Joachim of Fiore’s 
work. The ‘religion of the senses’ that is proposed by Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin 
is the ideal configuration of an art conceived explicitly as secularized religion. We 
are speaking of religion as poetic mythology, which is more than capable of dealing 
with the subject matter and the task that once belonged to the traditional expression 
of religion. Religious experience is approached through myth, poetry, and other 
forms. Certainly, for Vattimo, that this transformation, or secularization, of religion 
corresponds to the aesthetization of our everyday lives. He takes Nietzsche’s 
observation that “the era of art as works of art is finished” and challenges the idea 
that the artwork is something that is bought and sold.116 This raises the question of 
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what is art today? “The practice of art in our world tends to shatter the limits of art as 
a specific phenomenon.”117 Our everyday lives are in fact increasingly aestheticized. 
Merchandising and advertising, for example, are omnipresent. The result of the 
aesthetization of everyday life is, for Vattimo, the blurring of the lines between reality 
and imagination. “All the work of media information, television, newspapers, is a 
way of mixing more and more imagination, interpretation and facts.”118 This is the 
way in which the aesthetic will carry on developing as the process of secularization 
continues. Vattimo views the shift in art from something that is specialized and value 
based to something that permeates ordinary, everyday life in the same light as 
secularization. “I would try to locate this event within the process of transformation, 
secularization, and the return to the religious in a different form.”119 Secularization, 
for Vattimo, is, after all, a process of transformation. Art itself has been transformed. 
“When one tries to grasp the meaning of aesthetic experience in its specificity, one is 
referred back again to a sphere that resists definition otherwise than in terms of the 
experience of religion and of myth.”120 Contemporary art now permeates our public 
spaces, be they museums, public squares, and so on. It is part of our community and 
our everyday life. This transformation itself is part and parcel of  the weakening of 
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Being. Certainly, the end of metaphysics offers us the opportunity to examine how 
we view religion, as it is the rebirth of the sacred in all its various forms.121  There is 
no longer one single, shared horizon, but rather a plurality of experiences, be they 
religious or artistic in nature. In this transformation of art and the aesthetic 
experience, religion could find itself on a new path, one that is more ‘aesthetic,’ more 
in accordance with Joachim of Fiore’s Age of the Spirit, and with the Aeltestes 
Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus.122 
 
 
6.2.2  The Eschatological Character of Art 
For Vattimo, art has an eschatological character. This character of the artwork lies in 
its openness to the future. “Eschatology is the constitutive openness of the work to 
the future.”123 This openness to the future is explored in Vattimo’s reading of 
Heidegger’s setting-into-work-of truth. Here, the work of art must function in the 
sense that it has some effect or has the potential to bring about something new. If this 
is not the case, then the work is only a potential artwork. The artwork opens up a 
world that is, at once, both true and new. This occurs when we allow ourselves to step 
out of the everyday and into the light of what the work discloses. When we allow 
ourselves to move into what the work discloses, we open ourselves up to a new order 
and to new relationships. Christian eschatology, too, involves a temporal openness to 
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future possibilities. In doing so, it retains its strong relationship with the past and its 
connection to the present. This is equally so for the artwork.  
Every beginning of art is thus an irruption within being of a new and 
emergent world. This world, along with the poetry that founds it, is 
historical, endowing the ground with everything it will call future people 
to preserve; it is the origin both of art and of a community’s historical 
existence.124  
 
Not only does the artwork open up a world, but it brings together a community, 
preserving and consolidating an entire culture. The artwork unites a community by 
bringing it together through a shared project, which gives people a common heritage 
that determines the present and the future. Eschatology has consequences for history, 
precisely because of its emphasis on the future. Christian eschatology incudes a 
concern with and a hope for this world. As we cannot live apart from the world, its 
future cannot be ignored. We have a responsibility towards the world from which we 
cannot disengage.  
Vattimo maintains that it is easier to understand the eschatological character of 
the artwork if it is examined through the lens of language. Specifically, he takes our 
relationship to the Bible as an example. The model of the Western traditions’ 
relationship to the Bible is marked by a hermeneutic of the various senses in reading 
the text: with the literal, the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical. These senses 
provide a richness to the living reading of Scripture. The allegorical sense refers to 
the deeper meaning that is hidden behind the surface of the text. The use of allegorical 
interpretation was employed in mythology, for example, in order to uncover what the 
text concealed. The underlying idea is that writers often wrote one thing but meant 
another, as we saw in René Girard’s reading of mythology. The written word is often 
 
 




a symbol of a deeper reality and the allegorical interpretation of Scripture enables us 
to find a more profound understanding of events. The moral sense is concerned with 
the moral lessons that can be drawn from the Scripture reading. In this way Scripture 
acts as a guide to how we ought to live as Christians. The anagogical sense looks 
towards the future. Through this lens, with the Church on earth as a sign of the 
heavenly Jerusalem, we look to our destiny as we journey through life. For Vattimo, 
in the case of art, reductive criticism removes the anagogical sense. Once the 
anagogical sense is separated from the allegorical, we are left with a purely 
intraworldly reference. “Every technique of reading that is grounded on the exhibition 
of reference, on demythification and explanation, is always a form of intraworldly 
allegory.”125 Without the anagogical, all we are left with is the continuum of history, 
which, for the Fathers, was an empty concept once the eschatological perspective was 
denied.126 History without the possibility of salvation is devoid of meaning. 
Reductive criticism deprives the artwork of any meaning beyond the 
heightening of experience. In the case of art, eschatology is the constitutive openness 
of the work to the future, in the light of which all intraworldly references acquire their 
meaning.127 It is necessary to see the artwork as an event, one that acts as an 
announcement of a truth that cannot be exhausted and closed in on itself. Rather than 
requiring a definitive explanation, the artwork calls for a response. “[It is] an appeal 
that demands an answer rather than an explanation.”128 This is evident if we consider 
the work of art on the plane of language. In the case of the language of the Bible, to 
 










the degree that it is prophetic, it does not give an explanation of a preconstituted 
world, but, rather, as the Word of God, calls for a response to a world that it has 
created. In much the same way, for Vattimo, the eschatological character of the 
artwork is dependent on the artwork’s founding a world and a language.129 To engage 
with the prophetic character of the work of art is to do so through language as the 
world is given to us through language. “The historical epochs are determinate 
openings of Being, original ways in which beings are arranged within the light that 
man—Dasein—projects, their event is above all linguistic.”130 In other words, a world 
is born through language as it is how we give order and meaning to the world. 
Language creates reality for us, disclosing and revealing it to us. In more theological 
terms, this is particularly evident in the case of the sacraments. When we use 
expressions such as I promise, I love you, I forgive you, reality is constituted and 
opened up. The sacraments are endowed with form and reality through the word.131 
Through language, the invisible, the past, and the absent are made present. It is our 
historicity that makes it possible for us to be shaken out of the present moment and 
liberated into the breadth of our possibilities as our historicity is marked by 
remembrance, making present, and expectation that is expressed through language.  
For Vattimo, encountering an artwork is much the same as encountering a 
person.  This is because the world is, essentially, a system of meanings into which we 
are thrown. The artwork founds a world as it too founds a new system of meanings. 
When we encounter a person, or an artwork, we meet a new perspective on life. 
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Neither are set into the world exactly as it is, but, instead, represent a new worldview. 
We engage with both the person and the artwork linguistically. Vattimo considers 
that this is the primary mode through which we can enjoy the work. “Discourse 
becomes the fundamental way in which the work of art can be encountered and 
enjoyed, and all the other acts constituting an approach are merely preparatory.”132 
The works’ performance, which is the way of living the work in its concrete physical 
nature, is simply the preliminary condition for discourse with the work.133 The 
performance, or manifestation, depends on the medium through which the work is 
made present. Should the work be a painting, for example, it will be visualized. When 
we engage in dialogue with the work, we inhabit the world that the work has opened 
up for us. The artwork, then, can be read in an analogy with reading the Bible; it can 
be read even as prophecy, given that it is a point of departure, and is not one of 
arrival.134 As such, we have to ask not what it means or what it refers to or what reality 
it should be referred to in order to be explained. Instead, we ought to attend to the 
philosophical, moral, and existential meaning of the artwork itself. As the artwork is 
a point of departure, there is, then, a gap to be bridged between the work and the 
viewer. Interpretation functions as the bridge that spans this gap. It acts as a mediator 
between the world of the work and the world of the interpreter. While engaging in 
dialogue we listen and respond, but, chiefly, we also interpret and mediate. Through 
this mediation and interpretation the work comes to light, but always in terms of the 
interpreter’s own world. Interpretation is a linguistic event and, therefore, is based on 
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a shared communality of language between speaker and listener.135 The object of 
interpretation and the interpretative process are both linguistic events. They are 
placed inside the horizon of language. “The linguistic horizon is that within which 
the singular historical events (persons, things, works) offer themselves to 
understanding.”136  
At the core of Christianity is an existential encounter with the person of Jesus. 
This is essentially a historical and personal experience. The essence of religion is, in 
fact, lived experience and it ceases to exist in the abstract. Given that religion is a 
matter for those who profess it, it can be approached only from within the arena of 
personal experience.137 Such an exploration takes place within the horizon of 
language, given that this is the way in which we encounter and make sense of the 
world. We are called to engage in dialogue as our encounter with Jesus is the fruit of 
a dialogue that takes place between God and humanity. The starting point for this 
dialogue is none other than our lived experience given that through it, as Christians, 
we try to formulate a way in which to live out our religious faith in the world. There 
is not one, singular form of Christian faith that is experienced and lived out in the 
world, but many realizations of the same faith. This lends a certain vitality to the 
future, which retains an openness to the divine that allows it to enter the rhythms of 
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the past, the present, and the future. Given the emphasis on dialogue and lived 
experience in Christianity, Vattimo underlines the importance of hermeneutics to the 
Western religious tradition. Interpretation, after all, allows for reflection on the lived 
experience.  
The dialogue that takes place between God and humankind is revelation, 
centred in the incarnation. Revelation is a dialogical encounter with the Word of God. 
Jesus became a part of human history through the incarnation, so that we are called 
on to act in the image of God in our relationships, whether with each other or with 
the world around us. There is no singular anthropology that sums up our culture, 
society, politics, etc. As we grow and change because of technological advancements, 
we require a renewed anthropology to reflect this change. Anthropology, based on 
lived experience, takes into account our societies and cultures as they grow and 
change. There is no ‘one size fits all’ type of anthropology that sums up who we are 
in the world. Even the Bible reflects this diversity. It was written over the course of 
many years, reflecting different attitudes, politics, economics, and so on, during the 
ages. Our self-understanding is never something fixed and static, but rather must 
change and expand to encompass our own growth and development throughout 
history. For Vattimo, the incarnation is the embodiment of this. Revelation is both an 
ongoing history and salvation.138 He believes that the history of salvation and the 
history of interpretation are deeply connected. Thus, he argues that Jesus’ relationship 
with the Old Testament is based on interpretations. 
He presents himself as the authentic interpretation of prophecies, even 
though before leaving his disciples he promises to send them the Spirit of 
Truth upon them, which will continue to teach, and thereby to continue on 
the history of salvation by reinterpreting Jesus’ own doctrines as well.139 
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 For Vattimo, salvation unfolds in history through interpretation. Kenosis is more 
fully realized in salvation thanks to this relationship between salvation and 
interpretation.140 Indeed, from a Christian perspective, being open both to 
interpretation and to reflection on our own pre-understandings is an openness to the 
saving reality of God.  
 
6.2.3 Interruption and Response 
While we may speak of art in eschatological terms, which lies in the artworks’ 
openness to the future, it is important, for Vattimo, to establish that this is not 
something that is peaceful or harmonious.141 The setting-into-work-of-truth interrupts 
and disturbs our everyday reality. Vattimo draws on the work of Heidegger and 
Walter Benjamin in order to explore the disruption that results of the opening up of a 
world. “The power of disorientation (Heidegger, not only Benjamin, speaks of shock 
as the effect of the work) is contained in the birth of an alternative opening, even in 
that “innocent” realm of art.”142 Both Heidegger and Benjamin have their own 
understanding of Stoss or shock. For Heidegger, the Stoss is the shock produced by 
the work of art. This is not a shock in the sense of wonder or amazement elicited by 
the work, but, rather, the fact that there actually is a work of art is what produces the 
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everyday made strange.  It is the opening up of a world in the work of art that produces 
this shock; we are used to encountering the world as already given. Here, the work 
reveals a world. “It opens a new world and shows it to us in the moment of its 
disclosure.”144 This opening up of a world calls into question our own position in the 
world, as it makes the familiar seem strange and puts our accustomed world into 
crisis. “This is precisely the Stoss (shock) of the artwork: in encountering a great 
artwork, the world I was accustomed to seeing becomes strange, is put into crisis in 
its totality, because the work proposes a new general reorganization of the world, a 
new historical epoch.”145 The Stoss is produced by the setting into work of truth in 
which the artwork opens up a world that is, at the same time, both true and new. “The 
work opens a new ‘epoch’ of being as an originary event, which cannot be reduced 
to what it already was, and it grounds a new order of relationships within beings, a 
true and actually new world.”146 Stoss is, for Vattimo,  the only way to describe this 
encounter with the artwork that leads us to view the ordinary as strange and 
unfamiliar. In his exploration of the disruption of the setting-into-work-of-truth, 
Vattimo turns to Walter Benjamin, specifically his essay “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction.”147 This essay examines art’s essence in the 
technological age.  While the genuineness of art cannot be reproduced by technology 
the original artwork does not retain full authority over its reproductions. There are 
two reasons for this. First, copies have their own autonomy and independence from 
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the original work of art. Here, Benjamin uses photography as an example. “It 
[photography] is able to bring out aspects of the original that can be accessed only by 
the lens.”148 Secondly, the copies can be placed in positions that the original cannot 
attain. Yet, even though the existence of the original artwork is unaffected by the 
reproduction, it still suffers a loss in value. The genuineness of the work is affected. 
The genuineness of a thing is the quintessence of everything about it 
since its creation that can be handed down, from its material duration to 
the historical witness that it bears. The latter (material duration and 
historical witness) being grounded in the former (the thing’s 
genuineness), what happens in the reproduction, where the former has 
been removed from human perception, is that the latter also starts to 
wobble.149  
 
Benjamin uses the term ‘aura’ to describe the genuineness of the original. The aura 
denotes the originality of the experience that cannot be reproduced. Mass production 
affects tradition, liquidizing it; “it substitutes for its unique incidence a multiplicity 
of incidences. And in allowing the reproduction to come closer to whatever situation 
the person apprehending it is in, it actualizes what is reproduced.”150 Reproduction 
changes the way in which art gives itself in the present epoch.151 For the Torinese, 
shock appears to work in the opposite way to technical reproduction. “In the age of 
reproduction both the great art of the past and new media products reproducible from 
their inception, such as cinema, tend to become common consumer objects.”152 
Vattimo sees here a change in the work’s values; Benjamin saw, as a by-product of 
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mechanical reproduction, the replacement of the cult value of a work with the 
exhibition value. “Cult value was rooted in art’s origins in religious/magical ritual, 
where the unique presence manifested in the aura of the work of art.”153 The 
exhibition value emerges with the increasing portability of the work of art. 
“Exhibition value involved the gradually changing function of the work of art as it 
became portable and (later) duplicable—thus, the passage from the fixed fresco of 
the Renaissance to the mobile ‘public presentability’ of the easel paintings.”154 This, 
for Vattimo, is the equivalent of saying that the artworks ‘aesthetic significance’ rests 
solely in how it is appreciated in terms of formal perfection.155 Shock changes this 
form of appreciation, making the experience of the artwork more akin to the Stoss of 
the setting-into-work that Heidegger describes. In Benjamin’s work, the shock is a 
particular attribute of the cinema. Indeed, Benjamin points out that the Dadaists 
considered a work of art as a bullet striking the viewer. “The cinema too is made up 
of projectiles, of projections: as soon as an image is formed, it is replaced by another 
to which the spectator’s eye and mind must readapt.”156 Benjamin sees in film the 
presentation of the dangers that humankind encounters in modernity. Film is “the art 
form that corresponds to the heightened state of mortal peril that modern man must 
face.”157 It is this mortality that we face in the work of art that connects us to the 
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shock (Benjamin) or Stoss (Heidegger). For Heidegger, the Stoss of art is concerned 
with death as the experience of mortality. Existence is defined by death in the sense 
that we are marked by mortality. “In the mode of dwelling mortals are able to initiate 
their own nature, that is become mortals through their acceptance and recognition of 
death.”158 Death is always an outstanding possibility of existence.159 Indeed, for 
Heidegger, the fact that the work is there rather than not, gives rise to the Stoss, in the 
sense of a suspension of our familiarity with the world.160  
Disorientation is a feature common of Stoss or shock. It is, for Heidegger, 
“Dasein’s failure to understand its own being in everyday life.”161 For Benjamin, 
disorientation arises from “encounters with the deeply ambiguous world of things.”162 
He uses the example of an apartment to illustrate this understanding of disorientation,  
which can be seen in the spatial dimensions.  He takes a nineteenth century apartment 
as a case, decorated in an Oriental style, which on the one hand is a safe place, a 
fortress, but which on the other harbours an ambiguity. “It [the apartment] is always 
also elsewhere, conjouring a metaphysical orient where exoticism blurs and conceals 
the mundaneness of the real surroundings.”163 This combination of fortress and 
escapism has an impact on the inhabitant.  “[The inhabitant] is at once trapped and 
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eternally escaping, subject to a spatial disorientation which robs his existence of 
solidity and authenticity.”164 Vattimo maintains, however, that disorientation is the 
very purpose of the aesthetic experience: “aesthetic experience is directed towards 
keeping the disorientation alive.”165 Equally for Heidegger the disorientation in the 
work of art serves as a foundation to the new.  
The work is a foundation only insofar as it produces an ongoing 
disorientation that can never be recuperated in a final Geborgenheit. The 
work of art is never serene, never ‘beautiful’ in the sense of a perfect 
harmony between inside and outside, essence and existence, etc.166   
 
The aesthetic experience that characterizes the work of art is no longer that of security 
and harmony, but responds to the precarious structure of existence in general. The 
shock characteristic of new forms of reproducible art in the contemporary expression 
of Heidegger’s Stoss that is constitutive of the experience of art. “The shock 
characteristic of new forms of reproducible art is simply the expression in our own 
world of Heidegger’s Stoss, the . . . disorientation constitutive of the experience of 
art.”167 Shock is the way in which aesthetic experience presents itself in late 
modernity.168 
While earlier appreciation of art treated the artwork as the faithful 
representation of an objective truth, this view is increasingly obsolete. It is, for 
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of existence. Art, rather, reflects the cultural and societal currents without adhering 
to a foundation, or truth, that might subject the artist to an exterior power.169 “The 
task of art is not to represent the truth of the world but, rather, to take a stance in the 
name of a project of transformation.”170 Vattimo draws on the work of the artist 
Alfredo Jaar in order to develop this particular line of thinking.171 Jaar’s The Rwanda 
Project is a series consisting of twenty-one pieces of representation, that took six 
years to complete. For several reasons, the artist found it to be a difficult project. One 
of the main reasons for this difficulty is connected to the idea of the artwork as a 
representation of the truth of what happened. Having followed the genocide in the 
newspapers and shocked with how little media coverage it received, he went to 
Africa.  There, he spent time photographing the situation, speaking to survivors and 
“gathering evidence” of what had happened.172 On his return home to New York, he 
realized that most of the images that he had gathered were unusable. This is so as, he 
believed that they would not draw a reaction from most people. The pictures he had 
taken were too horrific. The reason why can be explained by Roland Barthes’ short 
essay ‘Shock-Photos’ can help explain why this is so.173 The issue is the politics of 
the image, the very way in which the image is organised that erodes its power. “As 
we look at them (the images), we are in each case dispossessed of our judgement: 
someone has shuddered for us, reflected for us, judged for us; the photographer has 
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left us nothing-except a simple right of intellectual acquiescence.”174 Images act in 
much the same way as Girard’s reading of myth signifies an obfuscation of the 
violence that takes place as part of the scapegoat mechanism. The politics of the 
image shroud the reality in that the action has already taken place and we are not 
implicated. Our own complicity is concealed and these images do compel us not to 
action, but to acceptance. This posed a challenge for Jaar. He attempted to reduce the 
scale of the tragedy, despite the vast number of victims, in order to make it more 
accessible to us. This is the focus of the work Rwanda Rwanda. This piece consists 
of a white background with ‘Rwanda’ written repeatedly in bold black text. It is 
designed as a public intervention piece, with 100 prints installed in various locations 
such as car parks, bus stops, and so on. For Jaar, if you do not understand the story 
behind the piece, the text, rather than being a visual articulation of that story, simply 
becomes just another image.175 In a further attempt to get his audience to identify with 
one particular story, Jaar created The Silence of Nduwayezu. This piece is formed of 
one million slides, placed in a dark space, which are heaped on the surface of a light 
table. While light can represent hope or liberation, in Jaar’s piece it represents horror. 
The slides are copies of a single, photograph; a close up of Nduwayezu’s eyes. These 
are the sad eyes of a child that has seen both parents slaughtered with a machete. 
Jaar’s piece encourages the audience to lean in, to look at Nduwayezu’s eyes in close 
proximity. These eyes are those of a child that have witnessed first-hand a genocide 
that we did not want to witness. After his parents’ death, Nduwayezu stayed silent for 
approximately four weeks. In using this photograph, Jaar created a piece that refers 
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to the silence of the international community. It is a silence that allowed the events 
of the Rwandan genocide to take place. For Jaar, part of the complexity of The 
Rwanda Project was to talk about violence without using photographs of violence. In 
‘Shock-Photos,’ Barthes refers to an exhibition of photographs depicting violent 
events in Guatemala. The photos of these events cannot touch the viewer as the horror 
is too deliberate and over-constructed. There is no room left for the viewer to either 
condemn or commiserate.176 Jaar believed that there must be a way in which we can 
discuss suffering without making victims suffer again, while all the time respecting 
their dignity. Certainly, for Vattimo, “Jaar put on stage the very meaning of 
photography as a way of informing and awakening public consciousness.”177 While 
this is the purpose of the project, Jaar does not intend his photographs or artworks to 
be a literal representation of reality. Rather, these images are aimed at disturbing our 
everyday reality. They are messages that call for a response and for a practical 
intervention. The happening of truth disturbs and moves us out of our everyday 
reality. “The encounter with the work of art is like an encounter with someone whose 
view of the world is a challenge to our own interpretation.”178 We are called to 
respond to this challenge. The encounter grasps a moment of the past and charges it 
with an eschatological present.179 In this sense the artwork is a point of departure, 
calling us to take its moral and existential meaning seriously. For Vattimo, the task 
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of art is to take a stance in the name of a project of transformation.180 We need, then, 
to begin to take this seriously, recognizing our own responsibility in creating 





This chapter explored the role that aesthetics plays in Vattimo’s thought, focusing on 
the relationship between religion, art, and hermeneutics in the light of the end of 
metaphysics. Given his emphasis on lived experience, this relationship can be 
understood in terms of the secularization of art, which it reflects a process of 
transformation. The chapter examined this process and how it emphasizes the 
hermeneutic character of both art and religion. For Vattimo, not only does art have a 
hermeneutic character, but it also has a prophetic one. This required an exploration 
of the eschatological quality of art. Indeed, it is necessary to look at the artwork as an 
event, as something that cannot be exhausted and closed in on itself. Rather, it calls 
for a response as opposed to a definitive explanation. There is an openness to the 
future that is inherent in art, which Vattimo likens to prophecy. This is not something 
peaceful or harmonious, but, rather, something that disturbs us and unsettles everyday 
reality. We saw that, for Vattimo, the artwork does not act as a definitive truth or 
literal representation of reality, but, rather, is a message that calls for a response. This 












The primary goal of this dissertation was to consider how one might access faith, for 
Vattimo, in contemporary culture. His work invites us to discuss the very possibility 
of a way of coming to faith in a post-metaphysical age. In order to better examine this 
question, it was necessary to appreciate the influence that Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Girard have had on his work, as he very much understands Christianity in terms of 
their contributions, particularly with regard to plurality and interpretation. Certainly, 
Vattimo’s understanding of faith in contemporary culture is a synthesis of his 
particular philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. His project invites a 
reconsideration of metaphysics and its relationship to the Christian faith. Indeed, by 
recognizing that Christianity has been marked by the metaphysical tradition, 
Vattimo’s work offers the opportunity to re-examine our approach to faith in light of 
the dissolution of this tradition. In Part One of this dissertation, I focused on the 
importance of his reading of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought as this remains the 
central axis of his thinking. By reading Heidegger through a Nietzschean lens, 
Vattimo developed his particular understanding of nihilism. Nietzsche’s death of God 
and Heidegger’s discussion of the end of metaphysics are drawn together to achieve 
a certain dismantling of a traditional, overarching framework that was marked by 
authoritarianism. Vattimo’s own experiences in the political landscape of the 1960s 
to 1980s during the Anni di piombo are, in part, responsible for this particular reading. 
What he originally held as the revolutionary idea in Nietzsche’s work, namely the 
Übermensch, was at odds with his political experiences during the Anni di piombo. 
He became conscious that the political transformation promised during this time was 
one that was still marked by a certain authoritarianism. He realised that, from a 




another. With regard to Heidegger, the view of history as the history of metaphysics 
and the forgetting of Being is central to Vattimo’s work. Metaphysics establishes a 
foundational framework, bringing into being ultimate truths against which we order 
and frame our very reality. Vattimo ultimately opts to follow this line of thinking, 
embracing the idea that we do not have an objective worldview; it is, rather, always 
coloured by our history, culture, background, and so on. In the postmodern age, we 
are always dealing with interpretations rather than with ultimate truths. The Italian 
philosopher recognizes that, traditionally, Christianity has operated mostly from 
within a metaphysical landscape. The German philosophers’ work provides Vattimo 
with the opportunity and the means to consider Christianity in a light that is more 
reflective of the current times with its emphasis on hermeneutics.  
While Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s work may be said to be the cornerstones 
of Vattimo’s thinking, René Girard, too, has been influential. Part Two of the thesis 
examined Girard’s impact on Vattimo’s thought, particularly in the further 
development of the Italian philosopher’s weak thought (il pensiero debole). This 
section focused on Girard’s investigation of human interrelations, in his mimetic 
theory. While mimetic theory primarily concentrated on the violence arising from 
mimetic desire, it connected, in addition, religion, culture, and violence. It does so 
through Girard’s exploration of the centrality of violence for primitive religions and 
the means by which this violence is dealt with in society. Crucially, in terms of 
Vattimo’s later development, the French anthropologist stresses the fundamental 
difference between the Gospels and traditional mythic accounts, which seek to cover 
up the outbreaks of violence in a community. We saw that the Gospels exposed the 
truth of what exactly happens when an outbreak occurs, and, in this way, can be read 




these same dynamics in what he termed weak thinking. Girard’s work offered a 
further foundation on which to develop the reflection on violence in conjunction with 
social justice, politics, and religion. Vattimo views metaphysics as an expression of 
an authoritarianism that he equates with violence. Thus, violence may be understood 
not only in terms of the physical but also of the philosophical. A belief or ideology 
that is held to be an ultimate truth or foundation effectively silences those who do not 
share in that same belief-system. It leaves no room for disagreement or discussion as 
it demands adherence to one particular ideology. While Girard’s reading of 
Christianity is one that sees it as putting an end to sacrificial violence, this alone is 
not sufficient for Vattimo. He focuses on the idea of desacralization not only in terms 
of a moving away from sacrificial-based religions but also from authoritarian belief-
systems. 
 While recognizing the limitations, or failings, of metaphysics, and 
consequently of those institutions that built on any such framework, Vattimo offers 
an appraisal of Christianity that considers what it might be like in a post-metaphysical 
age. The form of faith that might correspond to such a situation, while certainly 
different, is not one that is devoid of all content or significance. He is careful to 
acknowledge the cultural and historical significance of Christianity, recognizing that 
this is a Western heritage that is still meaningful. Regardless of the dissolution of 
metaphysics, it is not something that we can dismiss; it has indelibly marked and 
shaped our culture and can continue to do so. We can no longer, however, return to 
the Christianity that we once knew, but we can re-present it in a way that more 
authentically corresponds to the current situation. In his particular understanding, 
Vattimo is keen to maintain what he considers to be the central tenets of Christianity. 




incarnation to this understanding of Christianity. He emphasizes the weakening that 
is inherent to kenosis, as found in Philippians 2:7. This well-known passage points to 
the self-abasement, or emptying, of God, by which he lowered himself and took on 
human form. We saw that it acts as a crucial link between the philosophical and the 
religious in Vattimo’s work. This kenotic act of weakening signifies the death of the 
God of which Nietzsche spoke and the birth of the non-violent, non-absolute God of 
the post-metaphysical age. Vattimo acknowledges the significance of kenosis, too, on 
a personal level, claiming that, by linking philosophy and Christian religious thought, 
it allows him to connect with his own religious origins, lending him a sense of 
continuity and a coherence.  
The incarnation is not the only way in which Vattimo maintains a connection 
with what he considers to be the central tenets of Christianity. In Part Two of the 
dissertation, we examined also the place of caritas in Vattimo’s work. Caritas, or 
charity, as the love of humankind that permeates Christ’s teachings, is at the heart of 
the New Testament. While acting as a constraint, or limit, on interpretation, it invites 
us to think about the sharedness of our social spaces, our relationships, and of our 
world. Vattimo balances the philosophical and the religious in his understanding of 
caritas. It offers a pathway for Christianity to move beyond a belief-system rooted in 
the metaphysical toward one that is more focused on the core message of the New 
Testament: love. In addition to drawing on the incarnation, kenosis, and caritas, the 
Italian philosopher draws on the thought of the mystic, Joachim of Fiore. 
Appropriating the mystic’s Trinitarian division of time, Vattimo sees us entering the 
third age, marked by the Spirit, which is characterized by freedom and openness. He 
connects this with his own reading of the incarnation as a process of weakening, 




themselves are a mediated tradition, handed down to us through various generations 
and traditions, requiring interpretation and, therefore, are not static and unchangeable. 
While Vattimo’s work demonstrates a departure from the established metaphysics 
that was traditionally associated with Christianity, he retains what he considers to be 
the teachings and influences at its core. It is a reading that opens up a multitude of 
possibilities for the future of Christianity outside of any established metaphysical 
framework.   
The final section of the dissertation, Part Three, set out to examine the form that 
access to faith might take in contemporary culture, in the wake of the dissolution of 
metaphysics. Vattimo does not attempt to establish his own thinking as a replacement 
for a prior foundation. Rather, his thought offers the opportunity to engage in new 
explorations and considerations of faith. Here, in this section, I examined the 
connection between philosophy and religion as expressed through myth. There is an 
emphasis on the need for a new understanding of myth that does not rely on a 
foundational metaphysics. For the same reason, the relationship between religion and 
secularization must be re-examined. In teasing out what a new understanding of the 
relationship between religion and secularization might entail, I focused on Vattimo’s 
understanding of aesthetics. I discussed the role that the artwork plays as an opening 
up to the religious dimension of life and acting as one of the possible avenues of 
access to faith in contemporary culture. This discussion raises questions that are of 
particular concern in the current time, such as the use of sacred and secular space with 
regard to the ways in which we encounter works of art. An example here might be 
the possible recovery of the liturgical and cultural value of art as a collective 
celebration of our beliefs. It underlines the growing awareness that faith is reflective 




recognition of the eschatological and prophetic character of art itself, perceiving art 
as a message or form of communication that calls on us to respond.  
In this dissertation, then, I set out to explore the question of how might we come 
to faith in contemporary culture from the perspective of Gianni Vattimo. To begin 
with, the thesis explored what Vattimo claims to be the current cultural climate, 
namely that, for many, we are in a post-metaphysical age. The discourse surrounding 
Vattimo’s consideration of Nietzsche’s nihilism and Heidegger’s ontological 
difference underlined that, now, we are always dealing with interpretations rather 
than definitive truths. This distinct cultural climate framed the discussion and 
emphasized the difficulties of coming to faith in postmodernity. In recognizing that 
the Christian tradition itself has been marked by metaphysics, the argument follows 
that there is a need for a new relationship with religion. Rather, we require one that 
is not reliant on a foundational metaphysics. This research suggests that, in re-
examining our relationship with religion in such a way, there is no dismissal of the 
cultural and historical significance of Christianity.  There is, instead, a careful 
acknowledgement that this is a Western heritage that is still meaningful. It is one, 
however, that this dissertation argues may be re-presented in a way that more 
authentically responds to the present situation. I set out to show that, while Vattimo’s 
work demonstrates a departure from the more classical metaphysics associated with 
Christianity, he retains what he considers to be its central tenets. Indeed, the 
dissertation stresses the centrality and importance of the incarnation to this particular 
understanding of Christianity. The dissertation, then, shows that framework is not to 
be confused with content. Many practices that act as a point of access for faith, while 
departing from a more classical framework are not, necessarily, devoid of all religious 




opening up to the religious dimension of life. It also considered the eschatological 
and prophetic character of art itself, recognizing art as a message or form of 
communication that calls on us to respond. Overall, the research suggests that 
Vattimo’s work offers a pathway for a renewed engagement with the religious 
tradition. This is, of course, simply one of many possible avenues left open to us for 
coming to faith in postmodernity. There is, nonetheless, a deep attentiveness in 
Vattimo’s work to the different ways in which we are drawn to God and it expresses 
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